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ABSTRACT 
TWO ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR 
BY 
LI ZHANG 
NOVEMBER 15, 2005 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Economics 
    The main theme of this dissertation is government’s strategic behaviors. We 
show that different budget structures give governments incentives to behave differently, 
and that the Leviathan model and the Bureaucratic model are better in modeling 
government behaviors than the median voter model. We first discuss theoretically the 
design of an optimal tax system, promoting the Leviathan government to maximize social 
welfare in order to maximize its own revenue. Then we examine empirically how 
government behaviors vary with different budget structures.  
In essay I, we apply the Buchanan-Brennan (B-B) rule to examine the effects of a 
tax system on the efficiency of agricultural production in the context of Chinese local 
governments, which receive insufficient control from the central and are free from the 
pressure from local residents due to asymmetric information and lack of horizontal 
accountability. We extend the B-B rule to include the incentive issues and the risk sharing, 
and also their trade-off. Farmers and the agricultural sector assume significant roles in the 
national economy of China, while the under-provision of public infrastructures and the 
 x
risks involved negatively affect agricultural production and therefore impede economic 
growth. Within the principal-agent framework, we illustrate how the problem is inherent 
in the agriculture tax system in China and propose our solution of special earmarking.  
In essay II, we test empirically for the government’s strategic behaviors. We argue 
that the environmental performance is affected by government policy. Therefore it relates 
inherently to the budget structure and government incentives. With an illustrating model 
between structure of revenue and expenditure and pollution level, we propose three 
hypotheses, which state that the lower the ratio of business related tax in total revenue, 
the higher the ratio of property tax in total revenue, the higher the share of health 
expenditure in total expenditure, the government will have higher incentive to control 
pollution and thus the pollution level is lower. Our empirical evidence provides support to 
our hypotheses, which show that structures of revenue and expenditure do affect the 
government’s incentives to control pollution. Therefore, changes in the budget structure 
might be helpful to achieve better environmental performance. 
 
 
 
 xi
  
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
DOES GOVERNMENT BEHAVE STRATEGICALLY? 
It is well known that taxes can distort the decision makers’ incentive structures in 
an economy. Examining the impact of taxes on the behavior of economic agents is one of 
the most important issues in public finance theory. For example, in most of the public 
finance textbooks, the core consists of the impacts of tax on people’s labor supply, saving, 
investment decisions, and the way people deal with risks. However, the government itself 
is assumed not to be affected by taxes in the traditional standard analysis framework. 
One of the justifications may be that economists believe in the median voter model. 
According to this model, the interests of citizens eventually govern government behavior 
(Rosen 1999). 
Generally speaking, there have been three approaches to model government 
behaviors in the public finance literature: the median voter model, the Leviathan model 
and the Bureaucratic model.1
The median voter model is the most popular theoretical framework in the 
literature that deals with government behavior. Since government officials are elected by 
the general public, they can only stay in power if they satisfy the preference of the public. 
Due to the diversity of the preferences of different individuals, government officials can 
                                                        
1 The ideal case of a benevolent social planner, who maximizes social welfare, even though socially as well as 
economically optimal, does not exist in the real world, therefore is not considered here. 
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only be elected or re-elected if they accommodate the majority residents’ preference. 
Under certain conditions, the median voter’s preference will win over in majority voting. 
Therefore government officials need to satisfy median voter’s preference in order to stay 
in power or get elected. There is a vast literature that has tested the median voter model. 
To name a few, there is the pioneer work of Borcherding and Deacon (1972), and 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1975), Holcombe (1980), Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982), and 
more recently, Turnbull and Djoundourian (1994).  
Some observed facts make the median voter model flawed, however. For example, 
there exists an asymmetric information problem. The effectiveness of election depends 
crucially on the information on the candidates, while it is expensive for voters to collect 
this kind of information.  
Alternatively, the government can be modeled as an organization with its own 
interests. In other words, the government is assumed to behave like an individual 
decision-maker, like a consumer or a firm. Since the citizens may not be able to control 
the government very effectively, the government may be trying to maximize its potential 
revenue sources, or using minimum resources to meet some requirements. This is the 
so-called Leviathan model, originated from Brennan and Buchanan, who describe 
government as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan 1977, 1978, 
1980). This Leviathan has an inherent tendency to maximize budgetary revenue; 
therefore the size of the government tends to be bigger than optimal. In the literature, the 
Leviathan model states that the more decentralized the government structure, the more 
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tax competition among decentralized governments will put restrictions on the 
government’s intrusion into the economy, therefore, the smaller the size of the 
government. There is also a literature that elaborated on the validity of this model, and 
many studies arrived at different results. For example, Oates (1985) found no relationship 
between decentralization and government size, while Stein (1999) found that fiscal 
decentralization led to larger governments in Latin America; and some case studies found 
a negative relationship between decentralization and government spending, such as 
Marlow (1988) and Grossman (1989). Rodden (2002) differentiated between 
decentralization funded by intergovernmental transfer and local taxation, and 
demonstrated that in the former case, governments grow faster, while in the latter 
decentralization limits the growth of governments. 
Also, even if the governments care about the interests of the residents, it may be 
difficult for the elected officials to control the behaviors of employees, or the bureaucrats 
in the government.2 According to the so-called Bureaucratic model developed mainly by 
Niskanen (1968; 1971), bureaus are monopoly suppliers of the services they provide, 
with political sponsors as their monopoly buyers. And bureaus exchange a specific output 
with the political sponsors for a specific budget, unlike producers who trade other 
merchandises (Niskanen 1968). As he realized later, during the process of exchange, 
there exists bargaining between these two parties. Also the bureaus have information 
advantages on the production costs, while the sponsors do not have incentives to monitor 
                                                        
2 Or even worse, the elected officials are bureaucrats themselves. 
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the behaviors of the bureaus. In addition, Bureaucrats have their own utility functions, 
including “salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, ease of 
managing the bureau, and ease of making changes” (Niskanen 1975). Therefore 
bureaucrats will try to maximize their own interests, instead of maximizing the public 
interests. In term of budgetary behavior, bureaucrats will try to maximize the size of the 
their budget, in order to get more out of it, of course subject to the cost constraint of 
producing certain output. Later on, Niskanen modified his previous argument and 
pointed out that the bureaucrats maximize their discretionary budgets, or “the difference 
between his total budget and the minimum cost of producing the expected output” 
(Niskanen 1975, 1994). Niskanen also provided some empirical evidence on the 
overspending behaviors of the bureaus (Niskanen 1975).  
Actually, Niskanen believed the reason that the governments choose bureaus as 
inefficient providers of government services instead of choosing more efficient private 
provision is that by so doing a net surplus is generated that can be shared with the 
members of the governments. Therefore, “most of the problems often attributed to 
bureaus are more fundamentally caused by the structure and decision rules of the 
legislature, for which bureaus are merely their preferred agents.” (Niskanen 1994) 
Both of these last two theories posit that governments are similar to individuals, 
behaving in their own interests, reacting to different incentives, even though from 
different angles. 
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The Government Does Behave Strategically 
In these three different models above, the latter two take into account the 
governments’ or government officials’ strategic behaviors, which we may apply to 
explain some phenomena that cannot be explained by the median voter model. A lot of 
studies that we are going to talk about in the following have been attempting to explain 
the real world experience by relating to governments’ strategic behaviors, both 
theoretically and empirically.  
McGuire (1999) reassessed the empirical outcomes on state-imposed limits on 
local property taxes. She found evidences that support the Leviathan hypothesis, rather 
than the median voter model.  
Following Brennan and Buchanan, Glaeser (1995) examines the incentive issues 
behind the expenditure behavior of local governments. For a revenue-maximizing 
Leviathan, it is always in its interests to expand its tax base. In the context of property 
taxes, what the local government needs to do is to provide amenities. The quantities and 
qualities of amenities determine property values, based on which the local government 
collects its revenues. That explains why government has incentives to spend on 
amenities.   
Observing that during the process of transition from planned economy to market 
economy, Eastern European countries and China have taken completely different paths in 
treating the new non-state-owned or private firms, Gordon and Li (1997) brought up their 
explanation. Local governments in China often support the new firms in order to gain the 
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related taxes and maybe part of the profits (Wong 1991). However, local governments in 
Eastern Europe economies often took a negative attitude toward the new firms 
(Blanchard and Shleifer 2000; Shleifer et al. 1996). To explain this, Gordon and Li link 
the difference of attitude toward new firms to the incentives faced by the two kinds of 
governments. They argue that the revenues of local governments in China highly depend 
on the new firms, while in other transition countries taxes mainly come from the existing 
state-owned firms. Therefore, different tax structures give governments different 
incentives to treat new firms. This shows that governments respond strategically to the 
different incentives provided by the tax systems.   
Gordon and Wilson (1999; 2003) explore how the relationship “between tax 
structure and each bureau’s budget can affect the policy choices made by these officials” 
(Wilson and Gordon 2003). They observe the absence of government in the discussion of 
optimal taxation, arguing that the taxation system cannot be optimized unless we take 
into account the response of government officials to the tax structure. Their conclusion is 
that government officials always prefer the policies that can expand tax bases. For 
example, in terms of environmental policy, governments are most likely to choose 
Pigovian tax over allocating free permits to the current firms. The reason is that the 
Pigovian tax can contribute the revenue increase to governments, while the latter cannot.    
Local government in China provides another good example to analyze the 
incentives behind government behavior. Due to the characteristics and special roles of 
  
 7
Chinese local governments in illustrating the governments’ strategic behaviors, some 
empirical studies examining Chinese local government behaviors are worth noticing. 
As we will discuss in detail later, there is no horizontal accountability in the 
political system in China, because local officials are not subject to the re-election 
pressure, and most of them are appointed by the higher-level government. In determining 
the appointment and promotion of local government officials, revenue that they collect is 
usually one of the most important criteria. Under this context, local government has very 
strong incentive to maximize the revenue that can be collected. It is interesting to note 
that before the 1994 tax reform, local governments were able to manipulate the tax rate 
and the tax base to maximize the revenue they could collect in their jurisdictions. The 
1994 tax reform assigned the power to change the tax rates only to the central 
government. This restriction itself is a response by the central government to the previous 
strategic behavior of Chinese local governments under incompatible incentives. Local 
governments try to increase their own revenues at the cost of reducing central 
government revenues. Wong (1991; 1992) documented some serious problems of 
Chinese local governments. For example, Wong wrote, “they [the three features of the 
tax system] have created problems of persistent overinvestment, duplication, regional 
blockades, and continuing bureaucratic management of industry” (Wong 1992). There 
even existed some regional barriers to resources flows, such as in the case of the “wool 
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war” and the “silk cocoon wars” (Wong 1991).3 These kinds of behaviors surely were 
rational responses of local government to the tax system, because in those days the most 
important tax was from the manufacturing activities. The central government issued a lot 
of regulations, trying to put an end to these behaviors, but the regulations hardly ever 
worked since the inherent incentives encouraged the local governments to circumvent 
and not comply with them. 
Huang (1995) shows how the local governments’ investment behaviors respond 
strategically to the monitor of the central government. In the 1980s the Chinese economy 
was still controlled by the central plan. But the central plan suffered from high 
monitoring cost. For some investments, it was easier to monitor and control; for some 
others, however, the monitoring cost was pretty high. With renovation investment and 
construction investment as examples, Huang shows that in the 1980s the Chinese local 
governments always chose to invest more on renovation, on which the monitoring costs 
by the central government were higher, so they can take advantage of the central 
government’s inability to effectively monitor and therefore harvest the benefits of 
noncompliance.   
For a Leviathan-like government, as in the case of China, if it lasts more than one 
period, it will try to allocate the current resources to maximize the expected future 
                                                        
3 As Wong (1991) put it, in response to the decline of resources allocated by the central government to the local 
governments, they try to protect local tax bases, and one of the consequences is the regional protectionism. Due to the 
dependence of local revenue on the development of local enterprises, local governments promote local tax bases by 
supporting local economic growth, or “intervene whenever possible to protect their resources and markets”. They ban 
the free flow of wool and silk cocoon prompted by market mechanism between localities, in so doing bringing about 
the outbreaks of “wool wars” and “silk cocoon wars”.   
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revenue. The local government may behave exactly like an investor in that where to 
spend the current resources will depend crucially on the expected payoffs from the 
“projects” in the present period. If some public sector projects cannot bring back tax 
revenue, the local government will not spend much on them, unless it is required to do so 
by the central government. In their article, Zhou and Zhao (2002) show that in the two 
Chinese townships, the government expenditures on the agricultural sector are only 
3.39% and 1.37% respectively. This is partly due to the fact that the Chinese current 
agriculture tax is fixed and not related to agriculture production, and spending on 
agriculture and increase production will not bring more revenue. As a consequence, 
governments have no incentive to invest in the agricultural sector. This will be the object 
of our analysis later. On the other hand, the expenditures on education are 48.33% and 
22.85% respectively. Such a high share of resources were allocated to education, even 
though it can not bring about revenue in the short run, because the central government 
mandates that the local governments give priority to education in their budgets. In 
addition, the two township governments paid 5.49% and 2.91% of their revenues to their 
tax administrations. Compared with the tax administration in the United States, which 
costs only around $10 for $1000 revenue collected, or 1% of the revenue, the situation in 
China clearly shows a substantial X-efficiency in the local public sectors.4  
In addition, differences in tax base give local governments different incentives, 
which in turn lead to different expenditure behaviors. Han (2002) and Zhao (2002) 
                                                        
4 For further information, please refer to the following website: 
http://www.co.fairfax.va.us/gov/omb/pdf/Volume1/00157.pdf, last retrieved Nov. 08, 2005. 
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investigate the expenditure behaviors of three less developed county governments in 
China. Zhou and Zhao (2002) provide a picture of how a local government in a rich 
prefecture allocates its fiscal resources. From their studies we can see that there 
obviously exists some difference between the behavioral patterns of rich local 
governments and poor local governments. The difference is exactly the consequences of 
different governments’ revenue maximization behaviors. The tax bases for governments 
in rich and poor area are different, since the government in the rich area collects its 
revenues mainly from industrial activities, while the government in the poor area may 
rely heavily on agriculture sector for its revenue. For the former, the tax bases are related 
to the industry production, so the local government spends a lot in outlets that are 
conducive to production expansion in order to collect more revenue. For the latter, the 
local government fulfills its revenue objective by imposing heavy levies over and above 
the fixed agriculture tax and exploiting the farmers. While the agriculture tax is not 
related to the agriculture production, the public goods provision in agriculture sector is 
not conducive to the revenue increase, which gives local governments little incentive to 
expend on agriculture sector.  
The above review tells us that governments do take on strategic behaviors. More 
fundamentally, evidences show that the governments behave differently under different 
tax structures. It is safe to draw a conclusion that even though in countries where 
government officials are elected by the voters, election by itself may impose restrictions 
on the behaviors of government officials and thus affect government behavior, it is not 
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guaranteed that government will behave completely in the voters’ interests. More 
importantly, modeling government as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan might be a better 
choice in an economy where election does not exist. This demonstrates that the 
assumption in traditional public finance literature that governments are free of the impact 
from taxes is unrealistic, and therefore it needs to be reconsidered. 
In addition, the strategic behaviors by the governments take many forms and have 
significant welfare effects, as exhibited by the strategic behaviors of some local county 
governments in China. In Tuanfeng County, Hubei Province, for instance, the county 
governor dismissed the County Office of Environmental Protection in 2003. The 
governor made this decision because the environmental protection office “disturbed” the 
local firms’ production activities, making products manufactured by the industries within 
the county more expensive and thus less competitive. Thus the environmental office was 
dismissed because its behaviors threatened the county’s tax base. Another example is also 
from Hubei Province, China. The governor of Jianli County took a big step on reforming 
education system, selling all profitable elementary and middle schools to private 
investors and meanwhile shutting down those non-profitable schools (Liu 2003). By 
doing so, the county government no longer had to allocate budgetary expenditure on 
education, which could not bring about any immediate tax revenue. 
These examples show how a “bad” constitution can have seriously negative 
welfare effects. In the first case, local government collects revenue from industries, 
rather than from property. If there is a conflict between environmental protection and the 
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expansion of the tax base, letting the firms continue their production and therefore 
continue to pollute would be optimal for the sake of protecting local government’s tax 
base. Therefore a rational choice is to “dismiss” the environment office. In this process 
the interests of the local residents are being sacrificed, however. In the second case, it 
may be irrational for local officials to allocate a big share of budget to education because, 
from the perspective of the local government, education is thought to be a pure expense 
without any immediate return. After the reform, education becomes an industry from 
which private investors can charge high tuitions and make profits. Children in that county 
can no longer enjoy free compulsory education and it will become difficult for children 
from poor families to afford education. These kinds of government behavior demonstrate 
that it is really important to take into account the incentive issues in the design of tax 
structure. 
As discussed above, the governments do behave differently under different tax 
structures. Therefore, in term of efficiency, optimal tax design is of great importance. 
This issue is more important for economies in which voting system does not work very 
well. An observed fact is that the government in advanced economies is subject to 
horizontal accountability, since in these economies, the re-election is a pressure for the 
government officials. Therefore the officials should take into full account the interests of 
the general public and are accountable horizontally to them, in order to gain their votes. 
In some countries like China, however, the local government officials are appointed by 
the higher-level government therefore there is only vertical accountability in that the 
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officials are accountable vertically to their superiors and care about the preferences of the 
higher-level government. In this context, local officials would not respect the interests of 
residents in their justifications and this horizontal accountability does not exist, unless 
the residents’ interests are related to those of the higher-level government.   
Combating the Revenue Maximization of a Leviathan-like Government 
Various examples exhibit that the governments do take on strategic behaviors, 
then the problem now is how to combat their strategic behaviors. For a Leviathan-like 
government, seeking for ways of dealing with their revenue maximization should be in 
place. 
What is an optimal constitution, or optimal tax structure in general?5 From the 
perspective of the traditional framework, the answer lies in minimizing the excess burden 
associated with some given revenues. Ramsey rule gives a good solution, but it considers 
efficiency only (Ramsey 1927). Also, the Diamond Rule is another choice if we take into 
account horizontal equity (Diamond 1975).  
For a Leviathan-like government, the social planner’s problem is not only to 
minimize the excess burden for given government revenue, but also to deal with 
government’s strategic behaviors. The government has both incentives and discrete 
power to manipulate the “investment” of the current resources in order to harvest future 
returns. In other words, all the current resources will be optimally, in term of revenues 
                                                        
5 We think it would be interesting to expand the analysis to include expenditure so we can discuss budget structure in a 
more comprehensive way, like we will do in the second essay. 
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will be collected in the future, allocated to the sectors that can yield highest returns. In 
this sense, the local government behaves likes a corporation (Oi 1996). The Leviathan 
government may spend nothing on some public sectors if they cannot “harvest” tax 
revenues from them according to the constitution (tax structure), while allocating 
subsidies to the sectors contributing to revenue growth.6 In this sense, the optimal choice 
surely should include the efficiency issue.  
When it comes to efficiency, there is an important issue that needs to be stressed. 
In order to collect more revenue, improving on the efficiency of tax administration, 
taking into consideration both the tax capacity on one hand and the tax collection efforts 
on the other, is assuming a significant role. However, with the objective of dealing with 
the strategic behaviors of local governments in this volume, we pretty much leave this 
issue out. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it plays a very important role in enlarging 
tax revenue collection in the context of the tax system in China. 
Among the models examined above, the median voter model has a built-in 
mechanism to limit government behavior: voting. If the government official does not 
satisfy the preference of the median voter, which stands for the majority election’s 
preference, he will be voted out of the office. Therefore, being accountable horizontally 
to the public is a must for government officials behaving purely in the voters’ interests. 
If the governments are not constrained by the election pressure as in a democratic 
system, neither are the governments like the market-preserving federalism type that 
                                                        
6 In this paper, sometimes “constitution” and “tax structure” are used interchangeably.  
  
 15
Weingast et. al. present, what constraint can we construct to put a limit on the behaviors 
of governments (Qian and Weingast 1996, 1997)?7  
Basically, two approaches can be followed for dealing with the Leviathan-like 
governments. The first one is to let the governments compete with each other. The 
competition can be realized in two ways. One is to decentralize powers in the hands of 
central governments to local governments. Not only can lower level of governments 
better accommodate the preferences of local residents, but also voters at the local level 
are in a better position than central government to monitor local government behaviors, 
thus decentralization can solve at least part of the asymmetric information problem. In 
this respect, there is going to be efficiency gain by inducing competition among local 
governments. There are also costs involved in term of the loss in efficiency in the 
economies of scale and scope. The other is fragmentation. For powers already in the 
hands of the local governments, we can artificially build more governments at the same 
level, and then let the constructed market work as an intermediate mechanism to reshape 
government behaviors. There is a huge literature on the effects of decentralization and 
fragmentation on government behaviors (Nelson 1986; Oates 1985; Zax 1989). However, 
the induced competition may not work effectively when governments behave 
strategically.  
                                                        
7 The theory of market preserving federalism advocated by Weingast, Qian et al. states that, under the conditions of 
hierarchy shaped and institutionalized clearly divided assignment of government responsibilities with the authority of 
the local governments over the local economy, hard budget constraint for all level of governments, formation of 
common market to ensure the mobility of factors across localities, the vertically separated and decentralized federalism 
is actually a effective mechanism to preserve market incentives. For details, see Qian and Weingast (1996; 1997) and 
others. 
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Alternatively, we can use direct measures to make governments behave desirably. 
In terms of constitutional economics (McKenzie 1984), in order to limit Leviathan’s 
taxing power, the only way is to lay some rules at the constitutional stage, which means 
to erect legal restrictions, stipulating what can be done and what cannot be done before 
constitution is established. Proposition 13 in California is one of the most famous cases.  
At the after-constitutional stage, however, voters may not have effective measures 
to make government behave desirably, even when the government is under the pressure 
of pursuing re-election (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).  
What we should be concerned with here is to make the tax structure compatible 
with the incentives of government. Public goods provision is important to both the 
consumption and production activities. If voters could not control government tax 
collection behaviors, they would not be able to control the government expenditure 
behaviors. One view, as proposed by Brennan and Buchanan (1978), can be used to solve 
this problem. In their path-breaking research, Brennan and Buchanan (1977; 1978; 1980) 
“drop the central assumption that budgetary spending and taxes are determined through 
an effectively democratic voting process in the postconstitutional period” (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1978). Instead, they assume that voters can set up rules to constrain 
government, which is assumed to be a selfish organization trying to maximize its own 
interests. For different rules placed by the voters, the government may respond very 
differently.  If voters cannot effectively monitor government behaviors, the government 
does not have incentives to satisfy voters’ preferences. Therefore, it is optimal for 
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government, in some circumstances, not to spend on those outlets that are important to 
voters but are not conducive to the growth of government revenues. Under this 
circumstance, the optimal choice for voters is to induce “a Leviathan-like government to 
provide the public goods and services that taxpayer-beneficiaries desire” (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1978). From Brennan and Buchanan’s perspective, the basic rule is to relate 
tax base complementarily to the provision of public goods at the before constitution stage. 
To put it another way, they advocate some special form of earmarking. They believe that 
“effectively designed earmarking may limit the extent to which government, any 
government, can exploit the taxpaying public,” and “government may be given a positive 
incentive to provide the goods and services that taxpayers want” (Brennan and Buchanan 
1978). In so doing, the increase in the public goods provision will lead to the expansion 
of tax base. They also believe that this rule is consistent with a Leviathan’s incentives 
and, therefore, will be self-enforcing. The maximization of revenue could be realized 
either by expanding tax revenue, or, when there is no room to expand tax revenue, simply 
by keeping the expenditure as low as possible.  
This rule (thereafter we call it “B-B rule”) points out the key problem in the 
theory of mechanism design. For a tax structure to be “good,” it must solve government’s 
incentive problems.8 In other words, it must combine the voters’ interests together with 
that of the government’s.  
                                                        
8 Where “good” means efficiency supporting.  
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However, rule setting needs to be contingent; therefore there always exist 
loopholes. Taken as a contract, a constitution by nature is incomplete and cannot exhaust 
all possibilities. It would be very difficult to construct a good constitution. Meanwhile, 
B-B rule suggests directly taxing public sectors, which seems a little bit implausible in 
reality. 
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CHAPTER II  
ESSAY I TAX STRUCTURE, MORAL HAZARD  
AND CHINESE LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEHAVIORS 
The current budget system in China provides a natural experiment to examine the 
Leviathan model. In this system, essentially the local government receives no pressures 
from the local residents. In other words, there is no horizontal accountability for the local 
officials. The local governments are at least free from the pressure of re-election, even if 
it is unrealistic to say that they do not need to serve the interests of local residents. From 
this perspective, we take the Chinese public finance system as a good example to study 
the behaviors of Leviathan-like governments. Therefore, in order to have a better idea of 
how incentives can influence government behaviors, here we will focus on the behaviors 
of local governments in China. There are 5 levels of governments in China: the center, 
provinces, cities or prefectures, counties and townships. Each level of government plays 
different roles, takes on different risks, has different degrees of fiscal discretion, and is 
affected very differently by the “constitutions.” Generally speaking, each government is 
responsible more directly to the next higher level of government. However, even though 
the provincial government is the one that is directly accountable to the central 
government, the central can intervene in local issues in county and even township level 
governments. There is usually no delineated expenditure responsibilities assignment 
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among levels of governments, which makes it difficult sometimes to differentiate which 
level of government is responsible for what. In our notation of the general introduction to 
the system in China in the following part, unless explicitly specified, when we use local 
governments, we usually mean it in a general sense, which includes all sub national 
levels of governments.  
Tax System and Local Governments in China 
It is observed that there exist some paradoxes in the behaviors of local 
governments in China. Across the whole country, local governments are trying their best 
to attract investors into their localities, including investing a lot on infrastructures, 
granting preferential tax policies, and so on. Sometimes local governments’ efforts to 
recruit enterprises are even being carried out at the costs of huge side effects, such as 
serious pollutions or spreading of environmental related diseases. In rural China, 
however, local governments have been investing very little on such infrastructures as 
roads, wells, dams, and so on. In cities, the local governments refuse to give nonresidents 
rights that are equivalent to what city dwellers are enjoying, to use public schools, 
hospitals and so on, or alternatively charge them higher fees.9 Also, in order to reduce the 
public expenditures on education, local governments deregulate the operations of the 
school system, allowing schools, especially top schools, to charge students elevated 
                                                        
9 In China, the household registration system, “hukuo,” that shows where you have legal residency and put restrictions 
on cross region labor migration, is still quite strictly enforced. It came into effect in 1948, and dividing households into 
rural or urban residents, with urban residents having access to foods and other facilities subsidized by the government, 
also being employed by state-owned enterprises. See Roy Bahl and Jorge Martinez (2003). The local residency cannot 
be changed simply by renting or even owning a place to live in a particular locality, different from what is in the United 
States. It has to satisfy certain requirements, going through certain complicated official procedures and generally are 
very difficult. The households are asked to prove their local urban residency before entering schools in cities and towns, 
otherwise they will have to pay much higher fees than normal tuition. 
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tuitions. As a consequence, schools become monopolies, with higher prices and lower 
enrollments for education than before. These seemingly unrelated phenomena are, 
according to our point of view, in fact implicitly connected with each other through the 
local governments’ incentives of pursuing revenue. Local governments are encouraging 
or making efforts in activities that will bring about more revenue, while discouraging or 
compressing activities that are not contributing to revenue increase.  
Some background about the Chinese budget system 
Before carrying out more detailed analysis of local government behavior in China, 
some background information is in order. The Communist Party of China, the ruling 
party, has a strictly hierarchical structure, and generally higher-level government 
determines the appointment, promotion and dismissal of lower level government officials. 
Since there are no elections, there are no correlations between the stay-in-power or 
promotions or dismissal of local government officials and satisfying the preference of 
local residents; therefore local government officials are not accountable horizontally to 
the public. Instead, local government officials are generally accountable vertically to 
higher-level government, who determines their appointment and promotion. Local 
government officials do not have to care about satisfying local residents’ preferences 
unless upper-level government officials do. Sometimes in order to achieve their goals 
they may even sacrifice local residents’ interests. As we mentioned above, they might try 
to take in investors who can bring about huge environmental problems to the locality.  
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It is observed that, since higher-level government plays a vital role in local 
government officials’ political career, the latter will try all means to please the former. 
According to Edin (2003), the principal criteria of evaluating public officials include 
political integrity (de), competence (neng), diligence (qin) and achievements (ji). Among 
them, achievement is the most important criterion, account for 60 to 70 percent of 
evaluation of the performance. The reason is that the other three criteria are often based 
on the subjective assessment of higher-level government, unlike the achievement 
criterion, which is more objective and verifiable, and therefore more comparable and 
more incontrovertible. This gives higher-level government greater information advantage 
in evaluating officials. Under the strategy of “fa zhan shi ying dao li” (means 
development is what really counts) that the communist party of China has been 
advocating for the objective of catching up with developed countries, GDP maximization 
has been included in the central government’s policy agenda for years. In order to 
guarantee that central government has enough resource in fulfilling objectives of 
macroeconomic control and economic development, revenue collected by local 
governments and remitted to the central government is of vital role. That is why revenue 
collected by local government is one of the most important criteria that higher-level 
government uses in assessing local officials’ achievements.10 Under this context, local 
government officials’ strategy of pleasing higher-level government can be safely 
                                                        
10 Or, alternatively, with more revenue collection, it’s easier for local government officials to achieve objectives central 
government uses to assess their performance. 
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summarized in the objective of maximizing local revenue. Local government officials 
would try their best to mobilize revenue from all sources, in addition to taxes, in order to 
remit more tax revenue to the center on one hand, and keep more revenue in their own 
discretion on the other. The retained revenue is indispensable in fulfilling their 
expenditure responsibilities, which are usually the mandates of the central government. 
Another part of it, maybe more important, is used to invest on items that are conducive to 
tax revenue further increase so they can access more revenue in the future. From this 
perspective, local officials’ revenue maximizing behavior itself is aimed at maximizing 
their own personal benefits, either political benefit as stated above or monetary benefits, 
since more funds at hands enable local officials to pursue “perks” more easily or simply 
can bring about more cash bonus. Therefore, besides the Leviathan model, the 
bureaucratic model is also likely to have some explanatory power in modeling local 
government behaviors in China. That is why we are trying to construct a model, 
combining the essence of Leviathan model and Bureaucratic model in the following 
section. 
The fiscal system in China has experienced a series of changes and reforms. 
Revenue maximization has entered local government officials’ objective function ever 
since the tax contracting system was founded in 1984.  
Before the tax reform in 1980s, local governments at best acted as agents of the 
central government, who collected revenue on behalf of the latter and handed it over to 
the center. Then central government allocated the revenue according to different factors 
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back to the provinces. Local governments would bargain with the center in order to get 
more revenue allocated. Back then the government revenue mainly consisted of profits 
from state-owned enterprises. Local governments did not have an incentive to mobilize 
more revenue since all of their expenditure came from the allocation of the central 
government. Greater bargaining power was more important than capability of collecting 
more revenue.  
The revenue contracting system, started in 1984, put an end to this situation. 
Under the contracting system, based on different fiscal conditions of individual localities, 
provinces were grouped into 6 types of different revenue-sharing contracts they had with 
the central government, either remitting certain amount or some proportion of collected 
revenue to the center and retaining the rest, taking the forms of “basic sharing,” “basic 
sharing with growth,” “incremental sharing,” or “fixed quota” or “fixed quota with 
growth” (Bahl 1999); or receiving certain amount of subsidies from the center (Knight 
and Li 1999). For example, “basic sharing with growth” means that “revenue growth up 
to a defined limit was divided between center and province according to a formula;” and 
“both the limit and the sharing ratio were negotiated. The province could retain all 
collections above the limit” (Bahl 1999). Since the contracts were fixed before the 
revenue was collected by the local governments, local governments always tried to find 
ways to keep more tax revenue collected away from the remittance to the center so as to 
keep more as their retained revenue. One important choice was to channel revenue into 
extra-budgetary revenue or even off-budgetary revenue, a subject to which we will return 
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later. Another choice was to grant preferable tax rates or tax breaks to local enterprises, in 
exchange for more non-tax revenue, which were in the local governments’ interests but 
impairing the central government’s interests. Meanwhile, the central government, after 
the provinces had collected the revenue, often reneged on its promise and asked for more 
than what stated in the contracts from the provinces (Ma 1995; Ma and Norregaard 1998). 
Therefore the relation between the center and the local governments was pretty much ad 
hoc and adversarial instead of following certain rules and being cooperative. The lack of 
constraints to both the central and the local governments made it difficult to quantify 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in China. Since the profits from state-owned 
enterprises had been gradually changed into taxes, tax revenues became the major source 
of government revenue. By that time local governments already started their revenue 
mobilization. But since the fiscal relations between the local and the center were 
according to certain predetermined contracts, even though the contracts were not 
implemented strictly, revenue collection was not so important in evaluating the 
performance of local government officials. Local government officials cared more about 
the retained revenue after remitting to the center, as well as extra-budgetary revenue and 
off-budgetary revenue over which local governments had full discretion. This is one of 
the reasons why the ratio of central government’s revenue to total revenue kept falling in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, the ratio of government revenue over GDP kept 
diminishing, too, contrary to what “Wagner’s law” predicts. Mainly owing to the falls of 
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these two ratios, new tax reform was undertaken at the end of 1993 and was implemented 
beginning in 1994.   
The 1994 tax reform claimed to make a fundamental departure from the old 
system.11 In 1994, taxes were divided distinctively into central taxes, local taxes and 
shared taxes. There was also a significant change in tax administration: the newly 
founded national tax bureau, separated from the local tax bureau. Each of these two tax 
administrations is responsible for the collection of central taxes and local taxes, 
respectively, with the shared taxes falling into the territory of the central tax bureau and 
then shared between the central and the local governments. Simply put, one of the major 
parts in shared tax is value added tax, with 75% of the tax revenue kept by the central 
government and 25% allocated to the local.12 It also includes the corporate income tax, 
personal income tax and security transaction tax, and etc. VAT has been assuming more 
and more a more important role in total tax revenue. In 2000, VAT, together with other 
business-related taxes such as sales tax and consumption tax, took almost 80% in total 
tax revenue. In 2003, the VAT alone still comprised almost 50% of the central tax 
revenue and 20% of the local tax revenue with a average of 36% in total tax revenue 
(China statistical yearbook 2004). Now local governments’ enthusiasm of mobilizing 
revenue is more than ever before. Since economic development becomes the priority of 
the central government, more local revenue means more resource in fulfilling local 
                                                        
11 As it turned out later, this claim hasn’t been fully justified. 
12 The corporate income tax is shared based on the property rights of the enterprises in question, the personal income 
tax is shared with 60% goes to the center and 40% goes to the local, and the security transaction tax is shared equally 
between the center and the local (Liu 2004). 
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governments’ development targets and therefore becomes very important in evaluating 
local government officials’ performance. For the shared taxes, even though the share to 
local governments are fixed, local governments can always get more if the total amount 
of the shared revenue is higher. Besides, as we mentioned above, the VAT revenue takes a 
very big share in total tax revenue. Therefore, local governments usually take great 
efforts to mobilize shared revenue. Local taxes, which are completely within local 
governments’ domain, apparently are also their revenue maximizing targets. With 
revenue maximization as their objective, local governments’ behavior is centered on how 
to mobilize more revenue, in addition to tax revenue. They will engage in activities that 
are conducive to further increase revenue and discourage or even try to compress 
activities that cannot bring about more revenue. 
Though there have been some big changes in the Chinese tax system, the basic 
incentives behind the local governments stay almost the same. The voting system still has 
no role to play at all. All levels of local government officials are still appointed by their 
superiors. The local officials have no incentives to satisfy the local residents, as predicted 
by the median voter model. Also, as mentioned above, collecting more revenues or 
constructing more factories are still important and necessary (though not sufficient) 
conditions for the local officials to get promoted. In short, in the new context the local 
governments are still Leviathan-like, and, for the reasons stated below, their revenues 
depend on the taxes to an even greater extent.  
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Local governments’ revenue maximizing behavior is not without any constraints. 
Some arrangements made in 1993 by the central government, along with other 
institutions that have long been effective, serve in effect as constitutional constraints that 
Brennan and Buchanan proposed to local governments. Central government knows well 
that, given that local residents cannot migrate freely across regions, neither can they 
choose government officials through voting, local governments have a tendency to 
extract too much fiscal resources from local residents.13 Therefore the central 
government imposes some constraints on local governments’ revenue mobilizing 
behaviors. First, central government determines the type of taxes, and local governments 
cannot levy new taxes. Second, the tax rates for all taxes are predetermined by the central 
government, and local governments generally have no discretion.14 These two constraints 
applied to central taxes, shared taxes, as well as local taxes. Tax revenue is determined by 
tax rate and tax base. Now that the tax base is the only variable local governments can 
actually adjust, local governments can only achieve tax revenue maximization by 
enlarging the base of the taxes to which they are entitled. They cannot obtain higher tax 
revenue by marking up tax rate. Additionally, capital in China is relatively mobile 
compared with labor, especially FDI, partly owing to the still effective Household 
Registration System, the so-called “hukou.” For local governments, more capital 
investment means larger tax base. Local governments were able to grant preferential tax 
                                                        
13 To put this in the traditional term of public finance, this is to say that local residents can neither “vote with the foot”, 
nor “vote with the hand.” 
14 There are some exceptions, even though quite minor, such as the urban construction and maintenance tax and 
property tax, somehow gives a signal that the central government is now taking more liberal route. 
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rates and other tax breaks to attract foreign investors before 1994 tax reform. After 1994, 
these tax concessions are not permissible any more. Local governments could also reduce 
the enterprises’ financing costs by making state-owned banks loan out funds at lower 
than market interest rates, the so called “policy lending.” After the financial reform in the 
1990s, this kind of policy lending is no longer a policy instrument for local governments. 
These changes in concert impose further constraints to local governments’ revenue 
maximizing behavior. They have to find alternative ways to attract investors. Of course, 
as we noted above, improving on the efficiency of tax administration, or improving on 
the rate of tax collection is always a strong economic instrument that local governments 
can employ. But in this paper, for the incentive problem that we are dealing with 
specifically, we do not give it as much attention as it deserves. 
Therefore, on the one hand, local governments encounter more contingent 
constraints in raising tax revenue than before; on the other, they are taking on more 
expenditure responsibilities, partly owing to the fact that there is no delineate expenditure 
assignment between level of governments, which enable higher level government to shift 
expenditure responsibilities down to lower level governments. Local governments are 
now more attempted to engage in revenue maximizing activities. Here we should 
interpret the “revenue” in a more general sense: it includes not only tax revenue that we 
mainly dwelt with above, but also the revenue from other sources such as user fees and 
various surcharges.  
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It almost becomes a tradition in fiscal reforms in China that only the revenue side 
is tackled. The latest fiscal reform in 1994 is a case in point. It reassigns revenue between 
central and local governments, while no corresponding expenditure reassignments have 
been made. As a consequence, the center shifts some responsibilities to the provinces, 
and the provincial governments in turn shift their responsibilities down to the lower level 
governments. In China, unlike most of the developed countries, expenditures on items 
with huge externalities and basic human development such as education, health and even 
social security are responsibilities of local government. Due to the importance of these 
expenditure responsibilities, some of them are mandated by the central government, 
however without corresponding revenue assignments, therefore become “unfunded 
mandate.” The most important one is “the setting of wages for local civil servants by the 
central authorities” (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003). These mandates “provided 
organizational incentives for local agencies to maximize their quest for financial 
resources, as evaluation of performance of local officials created personal incentives to 
raise revenues” (Bernstein and Lu 2003). Budgetary revenue apparently is not enough for 
the increased expenditure responsibilities for lower level governments; therefore revenue 
sources outside of budget become indispensable to local governments. Extra-budgetary 
revenue and off-budgetary revenue have long been local governments’ revenue sources in 
implementing their expenditure responsibilities. In some years the amount of 
extra-budgetary revenue sources was even comparable to budgetary revenue. It often 
happens that local government divert budgetary revenue to extra-budgetary revenue to 
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avoid remitting the latter to the center and so have more discretion over it, which 
contributes to the diminishing of the share of central government revenue in total revenue. 
“The practice [of tapping extra budgetary funds to finance government expenditures] is 
so pervasive that extra budgetary funds are commonly considered a ‘second budget,’ 
whose availability substantially alleviates the revenue squeeze at the local level” (Wong 
1991). That made central government narrow the definition of the latter and try to 
include more revenue sources into budgetary management in late 1993. However, besides 
extra-budgetary revenue, off-budgetary revenue, which comes from “ad hoc charges, 
unauthorized fees, forced ‘contributions,’ and the like” (Wang 1997), is completely 
outside central government’s budget control. Even before the 1994 tax reform, local 
governments had levied various fees and surcharges, part of which was used to make up 
their expenditure shortage. Some of the extra or off-budgetary revenue are employed to 
finance the local governments’ expenditure responsibilities that can not be fulfilled with 
the budgetary expenditure. For example, some of the health fees were rolled out directly 
to health spending. But not all of the extra-budgetary funds are used in this legitimate 
way. For example, one story tells that the fees from the bureau of social planning were 
used to construct the office building for the local government.15 There was certainly a 
considerable amount of this fund being used to satisfy the personal interests of local 
government officials, whether to pursue the “perks” or directly as their cash bonus. In 
rural areas of China, these fees and levies have long been a heavy burden for farmers and, 
                                                        
15 This is from the author’s own experience in Henan Province, China. 
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given its nature of coercive collection and improper usage, contribute to the social 
instabilities in rural China. That is why the central government has been trying to enforce 
the administration of extra-budgetary revenues and reduce or eliminate illegal fees and 
surcharges. However, it has not been very successful.   
It should be noted that the behaviors of local governments are the responses to the 
arrangements of central government. These arrangements are similar to the case of 
Proposition 13 in California, in that they both put strict constraints on the revenue side at 
the local level. Our conjecture is that, under these constraints, in order to maximize tax 
revenue, local governments would try to enforce the tax collection as strictly as possible, 
reducing the expenditure to the minimum level, and rearrange their expenditure budgets 
and their compositions to attract the firms into or keep them from moving out of the 
locality, with the goal of enlarging their revenue base. They would expend more on 
expenditures that are conducive to more taxable activities, such as infrastructure, in order 
to obtain higher revenue in the future. They encourage investment because they can 
collect VAT and other business taxes from firms’ production activities. They refuse to 
expend on education and health because, as they see it, they cannot derive much revenue 
and so cannot benefit much from these expenditures, unless the central government 
mandate otherwise. Therefore, expenditures on such basic human development as 
education and health services have become relatively less important. 16 Similarly, they 
                                                        
16 The case for education is better since the central government mandate that local governments put priority to 
education. 
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refuse to treat nonresidents equally because they cannot collect income tax from them. 
However, in rural areas where they can only collect head tax, which is in fact a fixed 
amount for every farmer, unlike VAT and other business taxes, which are proportional to 
actual productions, they can not benefit from investing on rural infrastructures; therefore 
they would make as little efforts as possible in expending on local public goods in rural 
China in order to reduce expenditure.  
Some Important Facts about the Tax System in China Need to Be Stressed 
The current tax system in China has been examined intensively since it was 
established in 1994. For example, Bahl (1999) discussed the whole system and paid 
special attention to the effects of tax reform on the fiscal relationship between central 
government and local governments, the tax administration etc. A series of World Bank 
reports were also published, such as the one in 2002, which analyzes the current 
inter-governmental fiscal relations, pointing out the problems in revenue and expenditure 
assignments, and proposing ways to fix these problems. Bahl and Martinez (2003) 
examined the role that fiscal federalism plays in the context of economic growth, 
modernization and globalization and various aspects of economic reform in China. Xu 
(1995) summarized the backgrounds of tax reform, and introduced the process of fiscal 
reform in detail. Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang (2002) examined the evolution of the 
fiscal transfer system and pointed out the existing problems. Huang (1995) and Wong 
(1991) studied the relationship between the central and the local, with special attention to 
the strategic behaviors of local government.                                                 
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Among various aspects of tax system in China, there are some important facts 
that need special attention.  
First, even though widely considered to be a decentralized fiscal system (Qian 
and Weingast 1996; World Bank 2002), at least from the fact that the expenditures by 
subnational government make about 70 percent of government budgetary expenditures 
(Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2003), the tax system in China strikingly demonstrates that 
it is the central government itself that is in charge of the tax base and tax rates. This is 
totally different from a federal fiscal system.17  
In China, the centrally determined tax structure and tax rates are applied to all 
local governments without considering the characteristics of individual localities. 
Uniform is by no means an efficient arrangement in China because China is such a big 
and diversified country; geographically, democratically and economically. 
Second, the current tax system has been useful in dealing with the specific 
problems facing the central government at the time when it was designed and 
implemented. For example, in 1993 the Chinese economy was under heavy pressure 
from inflation. The consumption based VAT was designed to counteract the firms’ 
investment enthusiasm because the inflation was believed to result from firms’ over 
investment (Xu 1995).18  
                                                        
17 As an example of federal fiscal system, the states in the United States surely have the power to choose tax bases and 
rates in their jurisdictions.  
18 The VAT can be classified into consumption-type VAT and income-type (which further classified into gross 
income-type and net income-type) VAT according to the different treatment to investment assets. The 
consumption-type VAT excludes investment and therefore includes only consumption, in effect a kind of sales tax. See 
Rosen (Rosen 1999).  
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Meanwhile, the designers of the tax system believed in their capability of making 
the local officials do what the central government desired, and often ignored the 
significant role that incentives can play in shaping local government behaviors. As 
mentioned above, even under the pressure of re-election, the governments in western 
countries still adopt strategic behaviors. When there is no election pressure, the 
enthusiasms of taking on strategic behaviors would be even greater. The Chinese local 
governments not only lack horizontal accountability, but are also subject to little 
monitoring from the higher level government because of generally high monitoring costs. 
They would not follow what the higher level government expects them to do if the 
incentives from the tax structure are incompatible with their interests. For example, in 
September 1993, when the contracting system was still under way, in order to guarantee 
the launching of the new tax sharing reform and mitigate the resistance from provincial 
governments, the central government adopted a major concession towards provincial 
governments. That is, based on the hold-harmless principle, the center promised to give 
tax rebates back to the provinces, and “guarantee that the level of each province’s 
revenue after 1993 would not be lower than that in 1993” (Wang 1997). In order to do 
that, the policy makers needed to determine the base year, based on the revenue in which 
the central government can determine the amount of tax rebate from central to each 
province according to some formula (Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang 2002; Wang 1997; 
Wong 2000). Since higher base year revenue will lead to a higher rebate in the future, the 
provincial governments would have incentives to manipulate the tax revenues in the base 
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year in order to get higher rebate in the future. The central government finally announced 
1993 to be the base year in September, 1993. As a result, from September till the end of 
1993, the tax revenues collected by all provinces increased dramatically. For example, 
compared with the year before, in September alone the revenue increased by 60%; in 
October and November, the increases were 80% and 90% respectively. In December, the 
figure was doubled and reached 120% (Zhao 2003). The strategic responses from 
provincial governments load heavy burden on the central government in the process of 
implementing tax rebate policy in 1994 tax reform.  
Third, there exist risk issues in the current tax system. Because the local tax base 
is fluctuating, the local governments have incentives to stabilize their budget revenues. 
One way to stabilize the budget is to shift expenditure responsibilities to the residents 
and make the residents pay for the provision of public goods and services by themselves 
when a financial crisis occurs. Sometimes, the shift of expenditure responsibilities may 
not only result in the under-provision of public goods and services in the locality, but also 
put local residents into difficulties. The reduction in services obviously violates the 
regulations issued by the center, and the invasion into local residents’ lives goes further 
against the central government’s endeavor. If the bitterness from the suffering local 
residents can catch the center’s attention, the center may take some economic or even 
political actions to discipline the misbehaving local government. Punishment in this form, 
however, rarely happens since voices from the grassroots can seldom reach the center. 
Consequently, local government’s conduct of fulfilling the expenditure assignments by 
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invading local residents’ lives happens quite often, not only in the educational sector, but 
also in other basic service sectors such as agriculture supporting funds.  
Even in the case that the fluctuation is not a serious problem, the total revenues 
within local governments’ discretion are limited. Regulations issued by the central might 
impose risks on local revenues in the sense that the constitutionally imposed expenditure 
responsibilities leaves local governments with less discretion over the remaining revenue, 
thus is equivalent to a reduction in local revenues. For instance, if the central issues an 
order to guarantee the teachers’ salaries, expenditures on other public services have to be 
reduced or even revoked. For example, in Xiangfan, Hubei Province, the payment arrears 
are transferred from education sector to government departments. A lot of government 
employees, even those in the Revenue Department of Xiangfan Prefecture, cannot get 
paid on time (Lu 2004). Besides taking the form of payment arrears, local governments 
could also reduce or stop expending on local infrastructures, and so on, which would 
result in more serious consequences of underprovision of public goods and services. It is 
reported that local governments deregulate those local key schools, and let them behave 
like a monopoly and charge high tuitions. In doing so, local governments shake off part 
of the expenditure responsibilities on education. But the consequence is higher tuitions 
and lower enrollments, which is obviously an inefficient outcome and also not in the 
local residents’ interests.19 It is also acknowledged that in order to shift the risks in the 
revenues, local governments charge higher user fees for the public utilities they own. 
                                                        
19 The case in Jianli County, Hebei Province that we mentioned earlier provides us an example. Also another example 
is from the author’s fieldwork done in the Henan Province, China, in 1998.  
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These examples show that the local governments can shift some of the risks in 
their revenues to the residents or other economic agents within their jurisdictions. That is 
why risk issues should be considered explicitly in the current tax system. Besides direct 
regulations, two methods can be followed to help the local government to deal with the 
risks. The first one can be done through a transfer system managed by the center. 
Obviously the revenue accrued to the center is more stable than those of the locals 
because the center collects revenues from the whole country and has a more diversified 
tax base. The transfer fund can be delivered from the center to different provinces 
according to different formulas and from provinces to city or prefecture and county 
governments following some different arrangements (Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang 
2002). However, since the formulas highly depend on the provincial governments’ 
capabilities of negotiating with the center, the provinces that need support most are 
generally those that are poor and have weak bargaining power. Therefore usually the 
poor provinces are not necessarily able to obtain the support they need through the 
transferring system. Same phenomena are also observed when the transfers are allocated 
by the provincial governments to lower level governments. 
Alternatively, assigning a more stable tax base to the local government can reduce 
the risks. Property tax, imposed more on relatively immobile properties and therefore 
provides government relatively stable revenue sources, is widely used as the tax base for 
local governments in developed countries. In contrast, the VATs and the agriculture tax 
that are widely used as major revenue sources for provincial and county governments in 
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China, fluctuate with the economic conditions and natural conditions respectively, and 
thus involve risks and can not guarantee to provide stable revenue. Before the adoption 
of property tax as major local government revenue source, what should be done is to 
stabilize the current tax base in order to reduce the risks involved.  
Since infrastructures play a vital role in mitigating volatility of weather and 
stabilizing agriculture production, the problem of fluctuations is more serious in areas 
where infrastructures themselves or their maintenance are in great need. However, due to 
the nature of the head tax in current rural China, the necessity of stabilizing the tax base 
is not so urgent, which partly explains why county and township governments, whose 
major revenue source is agriculture tax, have no incentive to invest in infrastructure. 
Nonetheless, too much variation is by no means a good thing, thus reducing the 
variability of tax base should be within every level of governments’ policy agenda. 
Fourth, the public goods that we are considering here are generally not merely 
consumption goods, but more importantly, are inputs for production, such as irrigation 
facilities including reservoirs, dams, and transportation system including roads, bridges, 
etc. Unlike other infrastructures that mostly bring benefits to households, such as parks, 
health care facilities, these infrastructures are also conducive to production. In this sense, 
the government behaviors of public goods provision are closely related to economic 
growth. That is one of the reasons that it is of great importance to examine the role of 
government in public goods provision in the context of economic growth of China. 
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From the above analysis we can see, the current tax system in China suffers from 
a series of incentive and risk-sharing problems. These problems make the system less 
efficient than it could be.20 If we consider this “constitution” a contract between the 
central and the local, just like contracts binding a landlord and a farmer, these problems 
can be easily discerned. And it will not be too difficult to remedy these flaws. Keeping 
this in mind, we are trying to apply the principal-agent model and suggest some 
mechanism to correct the inefficiencies in the current system.  
In order to evaluate alternative systems, it is necessary to undertake positive 
analysis of how the current system works. Here we take rural China as an example, 
investigating how the current agriculture tax system works inefficiently and suggesting 
ways of correcting for it. The reason for choosing to carry out only theoretical analysis in 
this section is due to the difficulty of obtaining relevant data, which makes it impossible 
to perform empirical analysis. In addition, the relative simplicity of the agriculture tax in 
China makes it easier to model the relationship between central government and the local 
governments. Here we need to specify local governments as county and township 
governments, for whom agriculture tax comprises one of the most significant revenue 
sources. More importantly, the agricultural sector in China is the most fundamental 
economic sector. The majority population in China, the country with the biggest 
population in the world, consists of farmers, who are generally low income earners, and 
the task of getting the farmers ends is by itself formidable. According to the Chinese 
                                                        
20 For this perspective, Gordon and Li (1997) follow the same logic as Wong. 
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yearbook, in 2001, among the almost 1.3 billion population in China, the rural population 
took up almost 770 million, a share of about 60%. Following the process of urbanization, 
this share has been declining from over 80% in late 1970s, but still takes up a bigger 
share than the urban population. The county and township governments take on a more 
active role in rural China, which makes it a better object in studying government 
behaviors.  
Agriculture Production and Local Government Behaviors 
Agriculture is one of the most important sectors in the Chinese economy, though 
it is not contributing the most to total GDP. Most of the rural residents are making their 
living by conducting agricultural activities related to land. This suggests that land is the 
main financial resource for most of the farmers. What is more, for some of the farmers, 
the land may be the only chance by which they can make their families’ ends met. Even 
for those new immigrants from countryside to urban areas, the land is of high importance, 
since most of them take only seasonal jobs in urban areas. What they earn are just 
top-ups to their agriculture earnings. In addition, their jobs are full of uncertainty. 
Therefore, the agricultural activity is still the center of the family issues and agriculture 
production levels are very important for the farmers.  
The Chinese rural economy is different from the agriculture industries in the 
western countries, since the latter are in general intensively capitalized. The agriculture 
sector in China is characterized by three stylized facts. First, the majority of farmers in 
China can only conduct agriculture activities on very small pieces of land, located 
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diversely around the village they live.21 The average land each farmer is entitled to 
operate in a county in Hebei province is only 0.07 hectares (Xiang and Huang 2003).22  
Second, the majority of lands are located in areas very sensitive to the changes in 
the weather and other natural conditions. Because the irrigation facilities are not 
generally available, for some batch of land, the production has to rely mostly on the 
natural precipitation. According to Xiang and Huang (2003), in Hebei province, the mean 
value of areas could be covered by the irrigation facilities is only 65% with a range from 
13% to 95%. Also, in the same province, the surface water resource is only 10% of the 
national average and 70% of irrigation depends on underground water source, which 
cannot be easily accessed without considerable investment on irrigation facilities (Xiang 
and Huang 2003). The water supply in per capita terms in China is less than one quarter 
of the world average, which makes it imperative to construct infrastructures for water 
such as dams and wells, etc in the rural areas and develop water-using efficiencies 
(Project of China's Agenda 21). Empirical studies illustrate that the infrastructure is 
helpful for the improvement of agriculture productivity. For example, even in Jiangsu 
Province, one of the provinces endowed with the most desirable climate for agriculture 
activities, evidence shows that investment on infrastructure is very helpful and very 
important to the increase in agriculture production (Wang 2003). 
                                                        
21 The reason behind this arrangement is to balance the gain from risk-reduction and the loss caused by diseconomies 
of scale.  
22 1 hectare equals 2.471 acres, which makes the average land a farmer can operate to be 0.17 acres. 
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The third fact is that, as mentioned above, the quantity of farmers in a village is 
usually very large. It is well known that it is usually difficult to reach an agreement in a 
big group. In this context, it would be hard to agree on the size of the public goods to be 
provided in villages by negotiating among farmers in some areas. Due to the high 
transaction costs involved in reaching an agreement on private provision of 
infrastructures, the incremental productivity gains from investment in the infrastructures 
will be reduced.  
The interaction of these three factors makes it clear that, without government 
intervention, the extremely high transaction costs of providing public goods privately 
will become a big obstacle in making decisions on investing on infrastructures that play 
such important roles in agricultural production. Lack of government intervention leaves 
public facilities in rural China mostly unattended. For example, the irrigation facilities in 
China have been in need of maintenance since the decentralization of the collective 
economies (Cheng and Chun 2003).  
From the above analysis, the government interventions on infrastructure 
provision could be both beneficial and desirable.23 The problem is how to finance the 
                                                        
23 In addition, the public intervention can play a significant role in the anti-poverty in the Chinese rural area. The most 
part of the Chinese rural communities have been suffering from poverty for a long time. In most rural areas, the basic 
income sources are still proceeds from farming activities that highly depend on the weather conditions. The 
consumption risks in the rural area in developing countries such as China are notoriously related to the natural 
conditions. A lot of non-market institutions have been developed to deal with the risks. Without perfect insurance 
market, the households can take other actions, some time at very high costs, to avoid the risks they face. These actions 
can take such forms as crop and field diversification, engagement in other non-farming activities, etc. They “might also 
limit income risk by choosing a diverse portfolio of occupations, or through the strategic migration of family 
members” (Alderman and Paxson 1994). In combating risks, the households can be made better off by the informal 
arrangements such as state-contingent transfer, support between families members, friends, etc (Besley 1995; Morduch 
1999; Morduch 1995). The various efforts taken by the households, however, may not alleviate them from poverty 
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investment. Given that the local governments are of Leviathan type and that governments 
play important roles in infrastructure provision in the rural areas in China, carrying out a 
positive analysis of tax structures within this context can better serve our objective of 
studying tax structure and government behaviors.  
Some General Descriptions about Chinese Agriculture Tax 
Before getting into insightful analysis, it is necessary to make a plain picture of 
the agriculture sector in China. Unlike provincial and prefectural governments’ 
enthusiasm of raising revenue by expending more on such infrastructures as roads and so 
on that we discussed before, county and township government officials seem to have had 
little interests in local infrastructure construction in rural China. The investment related 
to rural production has exhibited systematic decline, especially when there is a decline in 
the revenue pool, like what happened after the fiscal reform hardened the budget 
constraint for local governments. One of the case studies conducted in Shaanxi Province, 
one of the poorest in China, unveiled that the pressure of fiscal self-sufficiency resulted 
in the under-provision of public goods in favor of maximizing revenue instead of social 
welfare. Therefore, the rural productive investment fell from 8.6% in provincial 
consolidated expenditure in 1983 to as low as 1% in 1992 for one county, and a dramatic 
downtrend was witnessed in another county in northern Shannxi, where the same 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(World Bank 2000). The resources the households can utilize are limited. For example, though non-farming activities 
are important to reduce the risks, the household may not have the necessary knowledge or lack of minimum capital to 
do so (Dercon 2001). As far as the Chinese rural communities are concerned, as mentioned earlier, the poor families’ 
incomes are very sensitive to natural conditions and therefore involve high risks. In this context, government 
intervention can be further justified by attacking poverty in rural areas.   
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category of investment fell from 20% in 1980 to only 2% in 1992. Over the same period, 
the share of mandatory expenditure on education and health remained stable, and the 
share of wage and subsidies even increased for the first county (Park et al. 1996). As we 
mentioned before, these seemingly contradictory behaviors are in effect due to the same 
reason, namely, the pursuit of revenue. What is different in rural China is that it reflects 
the other side of the story, where county and township government officials try to limit 
activities that are not conducive to revenue increase, in order to reduce expenditure. 
In China, agriculture has been contributing disproportionably more to the 
industrialization ever since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.24 Chinese 
farmers, even though constituting the biggest population group in China and probably 
working in the hardest conditions, have been in a disadvantageous position relative to all 
other groups, mainly due to the central government policy bias towards industry. At the 
beginning of the newly founded republic country, the agriculture tax was not a big 
burden to the farmers. However, besides the agriculture tax, farmers usually were 
required to sell grain at a price lower than market price to the state, thus paying a tax 
implicitly. This compulsive grain procurement policy in the early era of PRC laid heavy 
burden on farmers. Despite the subsequent economic reforms that changed the 
agricultural policies now and then, and the calls for alleviating burdens for the farmers, 
the changes being made had been very marginal. Not until 1979 when the Household 
                                                        
24 In fact, Chinese farmers have historically been subject to various taxes and charges. In some dynasties in Chinese 
history, the burden to farmers was so heavy that farmers revolted against the governor. 
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Responsibility System (HRS) was introduced was farmer’s situation actually improved. 
The slogan for the HRS was that after meeting the requirements of state government and 
collective units, the remaining part of the grain production is left to the farmers’ full 
discretion. This gave farmers great incentives to engage in grain production. As a 
consequence, the agriculture productivity has been greatly improved, which makes it 
possible that a lot of agriculture labors were liberated from the land and subsequently, the 
rapid development of township and village enterprises (TVEs).25 This, along with the 
great efforts farmers put into the land due to the incentives that the new policy brings 
about, results in the significant increase of farmers’ income. Not only was the farmers’ 
living standard greatly improved, but the development of TVEs also contributed a lot to 
the high economic growth rates since late 1970s, which attracts attention from the whole 
world. Since infrastructure construction is good for the development of TVEs and also 
the increase of grain production, even the lowest level of government, the village had the 
incentive to mobilize resource and expend on infrastructures.26 The agriculture tax has 
been stable over time and apparently not a sufficient resource for the infrastructure 
investment. In consideration of this, county and township governments were “allowed” 
to collect other non-tax revenue as supplementing resource, which gave rise to a variety 
                                                        
25 TVEs refer to the township and village enterprises. In the Law of Township and Village Enterprises, TVEs are 
defined as any enterprises located in the rural area and funded by the collectively owned rural economic organizations 
or rural residents to engage agriculture-related economic activities. During 1978-1994, in term of the gross value of 
industrial output of TVEs, the average annual growth rate reached 22.9! And in 1994, the output took up 42% of the 
whole country (Wu and Cheng 1999). They not only contributed significantly to income increase of rural households 
and the economic growth in China during the past twenty years, but also provided vast employment opportunities for 
rural excess labor force. 
26 The village level “government” is not among the formal five-level government structure, and it is more like a 
government branch that is responsible for the township level government.   
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of user fees and surcharges imposed on farmers.27 Meanwhile, without specific 
expenditure assignment, the central as well as higher level governments tended to shift 
expenditure responsibilities downwards, which added to the demand for revenue 
resources. As time went on, local government officials’ revenue maximization behavior 
began to push the situation out of control. They began to impose more and more fees and 
surcharges, in the names of providing some local public goods, many of which are not   
needed by farmers, but are in the interests of the local officials’ pursuing political 
benefits (Zhou 2000). More importantly, especially in rural areas, these levies are usually 
mandates of the county and township governments. Even though without grounds, 
farmers have to try all means to pay for them, since these kinds of activities are backed 
up by the cohesive power of government authorities. In the extreme cases, when the 
farmers cannot hand in the taxes and levies, either due to the lower production resulting 
from poor natural conditions, or due to the cash shortage resulting from serious health 
problems, county and township governments would take away their production materials, 
livestock, or some other consumption merchandise to serve as their payments.28 
Therefore, as far as agriculture tax is concerned, the tax proceeds to the corresponding 
governments can be taken as fixed and are guaranteed.29 County and township 
                                                        
27 Of course, local governments are not formally, legally allowed to do so. Central government is not so restrictive in 
enforcing the regulation, which gives local governments some discretion to collect those fees and surcharges. 
28 The rural residents in China are in disadvantageous in many aspects relative to urban residents; the lack of health 
insurance is one of them. Therefore, if farmers encounter some major disease, they have to pay all the expenses out of 
their own pockets, which either become a big burden for several years thereafter if they can borrow money to pay for 
the bills, or they simply cannot afford to get treated.  
29 The conducts of capturing from the farmers is actually sometimes implemented more by the village level 
“government”, instead of directly by the county and township governments. However, it is with the consent or even the 
pressure from the higher level governments.  
  
 48
government officials had no incentive to improve infrastructures in order to improve 
agriculture production, since the increase in production level will not preserve or enlarge 
revenue base, different from the case for VAT.  
The decline in infrastructure investment has been a relatively recent phenomenon. 
Historically, in the Mao era, there was huge investment on the irrigation system in rural 
areas. At that time, the government could deploy a labor force in some area without 
paying much out of the budget. By improving the infrastructures that are beneficial to 
agriculture production, which was under the government’s direct control, the government 
could extract more food and produce resulting from the higher production level. (Lin 
1988).   
In the post-Mao era, however, the investment from government declined 
significantly.  According to the calculation based on data from the report by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Statistic Yearbook of China 
(China statistical yearbook 2004), the ratio of public investment over total investment in 
the agriculture sector in China was 17 % in 1980. In 1997, this ratio declined to 10% 
(Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2002). Huang and Roselle (2002) found that the ratio of 
government agricultural expenditure over agricultural gross domestic products (AGDP) 
declined from 7.6% in 1978 to 3.6% in 1985. In addition, the public expenditure on the 
water system decreased significantly. For example, in the “Fifth five – year Plan” period 
(1976-1980), the ratio of public expenditure on water system over total government 
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expenditures was 5.7%. The same ratio in 1993 was only 2.4% (Chen and Yang 1998). 
The declines of the public expenditure in rural areas have caused serious problems.  
The evidence documented above is inconsistent with economics theories. In 
general, public goods are normal goods in that as income level increases the demand for 
public goods should increase; the public infrastructures should follow this trend. 
However, we see a totally different picture here. Evidence told us that when the income 
level was low, the Chinese government invested heavily on infrastructures in rural area. 
It is unmistakable that Chinese economy has been growing fast for the last 20 years; and 
the corresponding income effect should push up the demand for public goods. However, 
the real investment in infrastructures has been declining. This mismatch between income 
level and public goods provision might be explained from some special angle. From our 
point of view, part of the answer maybe lies in the current agriculture tax structure in 
China. Therefore, we need to take a closer look at the agriculture tax system.  
The current agriculture tax in China is essentially a fixed rent. In China, the 
individual farmer has become the basic tax unit ever since the decentralization of the 
collectives. The amount of agriculture tax a household pays depends on the units of land 
the family is entitled to operate, and is not based on the amount of agricultural products 
being produced and transacted on that land.30 In general, all people in the same village 
share the land equally. The equality of land allocation means that all people have the 
same taxable units. Under this arrangement, an infant and a 90-year-old have the same 
                                                        
30 In China, the property right of land belongs to the country. Land is allocated to farmers based on some egalitarian 
rule so farmers can use the land they are entitled to. 
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tax liability as a working laborer. Therefore, the agriculture tax is actually a head tax (Liu 
2004).31
More importantly, the tax for each unit of land is fixed. According to the 
Regulation of Agriculture Tax Collection of PRC, the tax collected from land is based on 
the average of production in a period of time.32 This is justified in terms of savings in 
transaction costs. Indeed, in such a big country the transaction cost will be extremely 
high if measuring the real production of different batch of land with various outputs 
throughout of the year and collecting tax accordingly. The self-finance nature of Chinese 
farmers makes things even complicated.33 In fact, even under current regulations, the 
administration costs are already very high compared to the revenues that can be collected. 
According to the governor of Hainan Province, Liucheng Wei, the total agriculture tax 
revenue in Hainan Province in 2003 was only 50 millions Yuan.34 The administration 
cost was 20 million Yuan, which means that 40% of taxes collected went to the operation 
of tax collection agencies (Zhang 2004). This is astonishing compared with statistics in 
other countries. For example, the average tax administration cost in the United States was 
                                                        
31 According to the agricultural tax code, the agricultural tax is a proportional tax. The amount payable equals the 
product of the taxable land area, the applicable average tax rate and the production per unit of land. Among these three 
parts, the production per unit of land is the production based on fair land cultivation and normal natural conditions per 
unit a land. It is usually some average level of production, not the actual production in a given year in a particular batch 
of land. Once chosen, it will be fixed and applied to any batch of land in the village for several years. The applicable 
average tax rate in each county is usually determined by the provincial government and applied to the entire population 
of farmers in the county. The rate stated in the agricultural tax code is 15.5% (Liu 2004). However, it has never been 
this high in implementation, and has been decreasing in recent years following the policy orientation of the central 
government. In actual collection, however, since the area of land each farmer is entitled to operate is basically 
equalized, the agriculture tax is the same for everyone in the village. That’s why we take it a head tax. 
32 This is verified by my interview with the Head of a village in Henan Province.  
33 It is well know that Chinese farmers have a tradition to support themselves mainly out of their own production. 
34 To give an idea how big the figure is, the current exchange rate is 1 dollar = 8.3 RMB.  
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only 1% of the tax revenue, which means for per 1000 tax dollars collected, expenditure 
on tax administration was only 10 dollars.35
Serious efficiency problems arise due to the fixed head tax. The system shifts all 
risks to the farmers. Because the government is in a better position to deal with the risks 
than individuals, there is inefficiency in term of risk pooling. What is more, since the rent 
is fixed, any additional expenditure by government on agriculture will be irrational. Thus 
the current tax system gives local governments little incentives to invest on agriculture, 
except maybe, when there is a reassessment after a period of time. The efficiency 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the agriculture production highly depends on the 
natural conditions, which, in turn, crucially depends on the government investment 
behavior on infrastructures.  
The solution to this kind of problem often lies in the rule Buchanan and Brennan 
proposed, what we called the B-B rule earlier. 
The B-B Rule 
The most difficult problem for the Leviathan model is that it cannot be easily 
tested in western economies. For example, suppose the local government allocates some 
funds in constructing local roads. These roads surely bring benefits to the local voters 
and the local business. For these kinds of government behaviors, however, it is difficult 
to differentiate whether it is due to the pressure of re-election, or simply the consequence 
of government’s revenue maximization. To solve this problem, following what Brennan 
                                                        
35 Please refer to footnote 4 on page 9.  
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and Buchanan did in their paper, the assumption that budgetary revenue and expenditures 
are determined by the median voter’s preference at postconstitutional period can be 
dropped; therefore, “individual voters-taxpayers exert control over the fiscal system only 
at the constitutional stage; they are essentially powerless to affect the government’s fiscal 
activities in postconstitutional political settings” (Brennan and Buchanan 1978). Under 
this condition, Brennan and Buchanan suggest a particular form of earmarking, so “each 
expenditure is allotted a particular tax base that is highly complementary with the public 
good itself” (Brennan and Buchanan 1978). Brennan and Buchanan want to use the 
complementarities to constrain the behaviors of Leviathan-like governments. That is 
what we call the B-B rule. 
B-B rule is a good starting-point to solve the incentive problem inherently related 
to the behaviors of government. This rule links the interests of voters and those of the 
governments. Since the voting mechanism is assumed away, the government does 
something good from the perspective of voters, not because the government cares about 
the voters, or has altruistic preference. Instead, the benefits that voters gain are the 
by-product of government’s selfish behavior of utility maximization. For example, the 
local governments may take some actions to protect the environment. This behavior is 
not motivated by catering to voters’ interests, as predicted by the Median Voter 
Hypothesis, but to protect the governments’ tax bases. According to the current tax 
“constitution” in the United States, most of the local governments highly depend on the 
property tax as their revenue sources. Since there is a negative relationship between the 
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pollution level and the values of the properties, which in turn are the tax bases; protect 
the environment is in fact to protect the tax base (Glaeser 1995).  Similarly, central 
governments take some actions to protect environments, again, not because they care 
about voters’ health; but because higher pollution level will make people unhealthy and 
raise the possibility to pay higher health care bills, which in turn, will lower a 
Leviathan-like government’s space to manipulate the tax revenues. This is a point that we 
are going to analyze in more detail in the second essay. 
The applications of B-B rule are limited, however. Some surprising outcomes 
may be derived from this type of optimal design analysis. For example, levying tax on 
education may be efficient. This is of course, not the case in term of normative analysis 
of public finance. But for a Leviathan-like government, spending money on education is 
surely not optimal because, in most countries’ tax regimes, education sector does not 
produce any immediate tax revenue.36 The government will not have incentive to 
“invest” on education sector unless it is required to do so in the “constitution.” According 
to B-B rule, a necessary step, however, to induce instead of force government to “invest” 
on education is to grant government the power to collect taxes from education. Under 
this condition, the expansion of education sector is conducive to revenue growth. The 
government thus has incentives to “invest.”37  
                                                        
36 That’s exactly why the situations described in page 11-12 happen. 
37 This taxation can be justified by the following way. There may be some efficiency loss caused by taxation. The 
society, however, may gain from the enlarged education production. The net effect could be positive. Of course in this 
way government is acting myopically if we take into account that education can contribute to economic growth and 
therefore bring about more taxes in the future. Nonetheless, it is different in China in that people cannot move across 
regions freely, since regional migration is restricted in China. 
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The above discussion shows that applying B-B rule to solve the incentive 
problem does not take into consideration risk sharing, which may result in inefficiencies. 
Thus it may not offer an ideal solution to solving the incentive problems behind the 
behaviors of a Leviathan-like government. Keeping this in mind, we should discuss the 
incentive issues in a more restrictive manner, taking into account the risk sharing in order 
to get a constructive outcome.  
As we noted earlier, the risk issues in the Chinese fiscal system should be given 
special attention.38 The vertically accountable political structure does give central 
government the power to modify the behaviors of local government by issuing more 
regulations, however at the expense of high enforcement and monitoring costs. For 
instance, the salaries of teachers are now guaranteed by regulations from the central 
government, as a response from the central government to the huge delays for the 
payments to teachers across the whole country, which resulted in serious grievance from 
teachers and even closedown of some elementary schools and middle schools. This 
regulation from the central government did make a difference: in the subsequent years, 
such delays never explicitly happened again.  
On the other hand, however, more regulations are not necessarily a good solution. 
For whatever “constitution,” since it is impractical to exhaust all the possibilities, the 
governments will always have opportunistic behaviors, let alone the enforcement and 
monitoring costs involved. It is possible to regulate the payment schedule of teachers’ 
                                                        
38 We analyzed the risk issue in more detail in previous part. Please refer to page 36. 
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salaries in a “constitution,” but it will be difficult to monitor the behaviors of local key 
schools that charge student high tuitions. These strategic behaviors taken on by the local 
governments, as we analyzed earlier, are most likely to benefit the governments 
themselves, and hurt the residents in their jurisdictions. So it is necessary to consider the 
risks related to the revenues of local government in a “constitution” in order for the local 
government to behave desirably. Therefore, the principal-agent model which deals with 
both incentive and risk sharing should provide us a good choice.  
In a principal-agent model, there are two parties; one is the so-called agent, and 
the other is the so-called principal. This framework has numerous applications. In general, 
it can be used to analyze any situations in which one party’s behaviors can affect the 
others. The agent is assumed to have some informational advantages compared to the 
principal. For example, in a firm, the employees’ efforts can affect the productivity and in 
turn affect the interests of the owner of the firm. The owner cannot observe the effort 
levels exerted by the employees, and can only observe the resulting production level. 
Meanwhile, the production level is often assumed to be affected by some random 
variables neither observable nor controllable, which makes it impossible for the owner to 
infer the employees’ effort levels based on the production level. Therefore the 
principal-agent model usually tries to construct some payment schedule in order to 
induce the employees to exert higher effort levels, under which the possibility of 
achieving better production is higher. If the employees are paid at a fixed wage, they may 
not have incentives to work hard. On the other hand, as far as risk sharing is concerned, it 
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may be efficient to offer workers fixed wages, since compared with the individual 
employees, the firm is in a better position than the individual employees to deal with 
risks. So there is a potential conflict between the risk sharing and incentives (Holmstrom 
1979; Pauly 1974; Ross 1973; Shavell 1979).  
Essentially, the key issue in the relationship between the government and voters is 
that voters cannot observe the government’s behaviors directly, or cannot control the 
behaviors at the after-constitutional stage. For the Leviathan-like governments, if we do 
not give them incentives to do what we expect them to do, as B-B rule discussed, they 
will spend a minimum on what they are supposed to do at the after-constitutional stage. 
That is why the optimal constitution design can be better discussed in a principal-agent 
model, in addition to the earmarking as suggested by B-B rule. 
We are going to extend B-B rule in the following ways. We first keep the 
assumption behind the B-B rule that a voting system does not take effect in the post 
constitution stage. That is why we take China, where no election exists, as an ideal case 
to analyze the behaviors of a Leviathan-like government. Second, we incorporate 
production function into the initial framework. We want to achieve efficiency gain in 
production by showing how government behaviors affect the production, and in turn 
affect economic growth. While the B-B rule does not consider the risk-sharing issue 
explicitly, we will analyze the interaction between the incentives and risk sharing in a 
principal-agent framework.  
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The Model 
In this section, a very simple model will be developed to show how the current 
tax structure works inefficiently. In a later section, we will try to design a very simple 
mechanism to achieve more efficient outcomes.  
In the current Chinese agriculture tax system, we assume that, first, the local 
governments are Leviathan-like governments. For the purpose of dealing with 
agricultural tax in our model, we are going to deal more with county and township 
governments here. For ease of notation, we will label them local government. As we 
discussed earlier, even under election pressure, governments may have strategic 
behaviors. Without elections, the government is most likely to behave like a Leviathan. 
The Chinese local governments do not care or care less about the interests of local 
residents because there is no horizontal accountability. The only constraints are from 
regulations issued by the central.39 To be consistent, we call the regulations 
“constitution.” The central government is assumed not to be able to control the local 
governments once the “constitution” (regulation) is issued because of the asymmetric 
information problem. 
Second, we assume that the central government cares about the interests of 
farmers. The role of central government is analogous to that of the legislature in the 
western countries. To some extent, it seems reasonable to make this assumption. 
                                                        
39 There are at least provincial governments and prefecture governments between the central government and the local 
governments that we use here. However, the two levels of government either collaborate with the lower level 
government in the collection of agriculture tax, or take the stand of the central. Therefore we assume them away in the 
construction of our model. Even though it will lose certain merits because of this simplification, we believe that it 
won’t affect the essence of the problem we are going to deal with in this section. 
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Compared with the local governments, the central government does care more about 
farmers. At least the central takes a neutral stance and is trusted by the farmers. One of 
the explanations is that the central government wants to keep the regime stable. Also, the 
central government may want to keep some balance between local officials and the 
residents. Actually, dealing with the dishonest, or, in some context, even illegal, conducts 
of the local governments is one of the most important tasks for the central government 
and entails a lot of resources. If sometimes the local governments’ bad behaviors are 
pervasive across the country and serious in consequences, the central may enact new 
regulations, orders and documents, etc., to solve the problems. During years when the 
local governments go beyond limits in abusing their authority and taxing farmers 
excessively in the rural areas, a lot of farmers go to the central government agencies and 
petition for the problem to be solved. For example, in 1990s, the local governments in 
Anhui Province levied excessive taxes on the farmers, which broke the guideline issued 
by the central and put many farmers in misery. The farmers tried to repeal the excess 
taxes by writing to the central government, or visiting the State Council in person. 
Almost every time, the central government took some actions to discipline the local 
governments and alleviate the burdens to the farmers (Cheng and Chun 2003).  
Third, we assume the central is in a better position to deal with the risk issues. 
This assumption is reasonable. China is a big country with a fairly diversified geographic 
and demographic pattern across the whole country. Since the local governments can only 
collect taxes from their individual jurisdictions, the taxe bases in a specific region are 
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more likely to suffer from some idiosyncratic risks. The central, however, can collect 
taxes from the whole country; therefore, its tax bases may be less likely to suffer from 
those risks. It is fair to say that the revenue of the central is less risky than those of any 
single local governments. From this aspect, we can assume that the central government is 
less risk averse than the local governments. 
Fourth, we assume that the public sector has a key role to play in the agriculture 
production. First, evidence shows that, even in the most fertile regions, such as Jiangsu 
Province and Zhejiang Province, the infrastructures still play an important role in the 
agriculture production.40 In this context, reaching an agreement on constructing some 
infrastructures is surely Pareto improvement. This agreement, however, cannot be 
achieved easily. The potential transaction costs to reach an agreement among a big group 
of farmers are high. One better option is to induce the government to play some role. The 
efficiency can be achieved by allowing government to levy tax in exchange for supplying 
some public goods.  
In our model, we assume the central government will act completely on behalf of 
farmers.41 The term “farmers” and the “central government” will be used interchangeably. 
Following the classic principal-agent model, the farmers, taken as a group, also 
represented by the central government, can be modeled as the principal (Holmstrom 
                                                        
40 For details, please refer to previous section, page 42. 
41 There are some points related to this assumption that need to be clarified. The individual farmer may be even more 
risk averse than the local government. Imagine however, within such a context, the central government can allocate 
some subsidies to the farmers, and can thus share the farmers’ risks. Besides, the infrastructure is shared among many 
farmers, such that as a group, the farmers can pool some risks. The local government, however, cannot shift out risks 
and therefore is more risk averse in this sense.  
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1979).42 The farmers’ production depends on the public goods supplied by the local 
government and a random variable including weather and other natural factors that 
cannot be controlled by human behaviors.43 For example, the dams may not be useful if 
the weather is good; the pest-control makes no contributions to the production in a year 
when there are no pests. However, the dams will have a key impact on the production 
level if there is a draught or a flood, and the farmers will need the pest-control badly in a 
year when the pests become a serious problem. The production level would be extremely 
low without the dams or the measures taken by the governments to control pests. 
Since the public goods supplied by the local governments will directly affect the 
production levels, and these kinds of behaviors by local governments are not observed 
directly by the central governments, we are going to model the local government as an 
agent whose behaviors affect the interests of the principal, the farmers. Even though the 
farmers can observe the level of efforts by the local governments in providing public 
goods, it is very difficult for the farmers to deliver the information to the central 
government. Besides, there exist some factors that are not observable or not verifiable by 
the farmers, which are captured by the random variable that we mentioned earlier. 
Therefore, the central government, as the principal, cannot easily discern whether the 
lower production level is due to the delinquency of local governments, the agent, or bad 
natural conditions. Plus everything is locked into the “constitution” at the start.  
                                                        
42 Our model is essentially an application of those models in Holmstrom (1979). 
43 Originally we included the labor as an input, but the labor doesn’t play any role in this model, so we took it out. 
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Assume the farmer’s production function is: ),( Θ= axx , where x  is the 
production level for a given batch of land,  represents the level of public good 
provided by local government, 
a
Θ is the random variable capturing weather and other 
natural factors that we discussed above.44  
Imagine there is a governor newly appointed by the central government. When he 
takes the office, there are some revenues collected from last year’s economic activities. 
These revenues can be used to compensate for the costs in the public sectors such as 
educations, fire stations, outlays, dams and so on. Following our discussion earlier, we 
assume that he is a Leviathan-type official. Also, we assume that in his jurisdiction, there 
are only two economic sectors, one is agriculture, and the other is non-agriculture. The 
governor cannot make any decisions on the legal coverage of the tax bases and tax rates. 
The central government, however, cannot control perfectly the governor’s expenditure 
behaviors. In other words, even if the central government can issue mandate on how 
much the governor should allocate to education, health system, and etc., the actual 
allocations of funds are highly dependent on the local governor’s incentives, due to the 
high monitoring cost. 
We assume that the local government has the following revenue 
function: . It takes this additive form, in order to illustrate 
conveniently the fact that the local government derives utility from the tax revenue while 
)())((),( acxtvatU −=
                                                        
44 Or, alternatively, can be interpreted as the level of public goods provided, under good governance.  a
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incurs disutility from providing pubic goods.45 We assume that  is strictly 
concave in , in order to capture that the local government is strictly risk-averse, 
compared with the central government, which is assumed to be risk neutral for simplicity. 
In the revenue function,  is the tax revenue collected from agriculture sector when 
the production is 
))(( xtv
)(xt
)(xt
x , and  is the cost of providing local infrastructures under effort 
, such as on irrigation system, roads, dams, wells and so on.  
)(ac
a
To capture the effects of the moral hazard problem, we need to specify the model 
in more details. The agent, the local governor, can choose from two effort levels of 
providing public goods, { }lh aaa ,∈ , where and  represent the high and low effort 
level respectively. For the agent, the cost for low-level effort is ; the cost for high 
level is . We assume that is an increasing function of , so we have 
. 
ha la
)( lac
)( hac )(ac a
)()( lh acac >
To capture the relationship between the production level and the public goods 
supplied by the local governments, we need to assume that x is F.S.D. of a.46 This 
assumption states that a higher  will increase the possibility of obtaining higher 
production, while at a higher cost, though.  
a
To capture the effects of the random variable on the production level, we need to 
assume that the output is determined stochastically. The output variable x  can only take 
                                                        
45 Or, to put in another way, spending on public infrastructures that are not conducive to the tax revenue increase is 
actually a subtraction from the utility resulted from the higher fiscal resource at discretion, therefore is not in the 
interests of the local officials. In this sense, we have this disutility term here.   
46 x is first order stochastic dominance of a, meaning that other things equal, with higher effort level, the probability of 
achieving higher production level is higher than with lower effort level.  
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two discrete values, namely { }lh xxx ,~∈ . What is more, to model the random feature of 
this problem, we further assume that, there is a possibility that the two levels of 
government efforts can lead to the same level of output.  
Because the effort chosen by the agent cannot be observed directly by the 
principal, it is impossible to levy the tax according to the effort level .  a
In this context, if the agent’s effort level is , then there is a higher probability 
to reach the higher production level . We assume with , the possibility to get  is 
. Meanwhile, a higher-level effort  cannot guarantee the achievement of  for 
sure because the production level is determined stochastically. Still we have some 
possibilities to reach . In this case, we assume the probability of getting  under 
is .  
ha
hx ha hx
1p
ha hx
lx lx
ha )1( 1p−
In this model, a lower-level effort  supplied by the local government does not 
mean a lower-level production  with certainty, either. It might be due to 
extraordinarily favorable natural conditions. Because of this possibility, with lower-level 
effort of supplying public goods, the farmers still can obtain good harvests. Of course, 
the chance of getting  with  is lower than that with . If the agent’s effort level 
is , we assume that the probability we get  is , the probability we get  is 
. Apparently, we have  hold. Then we have the following figure. 
la
lx
hx la ha
la hx 2p
lx
)1( 2p− 21 pp >
 
Figure I Probabilities of High and Low Efforts 
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 hxX =  lxX =  Total Prob. 
haa =  1p  )1( 1p−  1 
laa =  2p  )1( 2p−  1 
 
We know that the farmer and the central government always prefer higher-level 
output, and with higher effort level it is more likely to reach higher production level, 
therefore, the central government will try to induce local government to provide . To 
do so, the only way for the central government is to design a “constitution” at the 
before-constitution stage. At the after-constitution stage, the central does not have 
effective means to control the local government. The “constitution” may work by 
assigning possibly different taxes for different levels of output. The link between 
agriculture production level and government’s revenue may give local government some 
incentives to exert higher-level effort.  
ha
To make the problem easier, we define  as the tax collected when output is 
high, and  as the tax collected when output is low. We assume that, if the central 
government does not allow the local government to levy tax on farmers, the government 
will not have incentive to supply public goods. The governor will “invest” on the 
nonagricultural sector. By doing so, they can collect some fixed amount of taxes, which 
is the reservation revenue, 
)( hxt
)( lxt
m . 
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Also, we define the following time path. First, the central government issues the 
“constitution,” which can be a tax law or regulation such as { })(),( lh xtxt . Second, local 
government may accept or reject the regulation.47 Thirdly, the local official provides 
certain level of effort. Fourthly, the random output x  is produced. Finally, by law or 
regulation, the tax will be collected.48  
Based on the classic model of moral hazard, we have the following program. First, 
the agent’s individual rationality should be satisfied. The agent should earn at least higher 
than his reservation revenue, m . Second, the agent’s incentive compatibility should be 
satisfied, which means that he has the incentives to offer higher effort. In other words, his 
utility of exerting higher-level effort  will be at least as high as the utility of exerting 
lower-level effort .  
ha
la
The local governor’s expected utility from exerting higher-level effort  is: 
, or .  
ha
))(()1())(( 11
lh xtupxtup −+ )())(()1())(( 11 hlh acxtvpxtvp −−+
The expected tax revenue from  is: , la ))(()1())(( 22
lh xtupxtup −+
or .  )())(()1())(( 22
llh acxtvpxtvp −−+
So the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for obtaining higher effort is the following: 
)1()())(()1())(()())(()1())(( 2211
llhhlh acxtvpxtvpacxtvpxtvp −−+≥−−+
The individual rationality constraint (IR) for obtaining high effort is the following: 
                                                        
47 For example, the local governor can choose to meet only the minimum requirements. 
48 As we noted earlier, the rate of tax collection is an instrument within the local government’s full control and can be 
employed to increase tax revenue. Here for our question in hand, we leave this issue out for simplicity. 
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)2()())(()1())(( 11 macxtvpxtvp
hlh ≥−−+
Constraint (1) says that for the agent, the incentive should be compatible, which means 
that the expected utility from high effort should exceed the expected utility from low 
effort. Constraint (2) says that, the “constitution” offered should be attractive to the agent. 
If both (1) and (2) are satisfied, a constitution is said to be incentive feasible.  
This is a typical two-stage model. At the first stage, the central makes an offer. At 
the second stage, for any given offer, the local governor takes actions to maximize his 
revenue. In general, we can use backwards induction to solve this program. The solution 
to this program is a sub-game perfect outcome. We first solve the local governor’s 
maximization problem at the second stage. Then we go back to solve the central 
government’s problem given local governor’s optimal solution, assuming the central 
government can solve the agent’s problem as well as the agent can do it by himself.    
Benchmark 
To make a clear comparison between the different outcomes from different 
“constitutions,” we need a benchmark model. In this case, we make a strong assumption 
that the central government is capable of observing the local government’s behaviors 
completely. In the current Chinese political system, there is only vertical accountability. 
Therefore, if the central government has full information on local governments’ 
behaviors, the latter would be required to take whatever actions to maximize the 
agriculture production, which is in the central government’s interests.    
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Let us follow the traditional methods to reach the backwards induction outcome. 
First, at the second stage, the agent makes decisions. In this special case, the agent cannot 
make decision according to his own interests because the central can force him to do 
what the central think necessary. Therefore, we do not need to consider the incentive 
compatibility. All we need to do is to keep the local government to invest on the rural 
agriculture sector, i.e., satisfy the rationality constraint. Thus, at the second stage, the 
local government will exert high or low-level effort, depending on the interests of the 
central government.   
We turn next to the central government at stage one. Given the local 
governments’ response, the central government is going to solve the following revenue 
maximization problem  
 
 { } ))()(1())((max ,,
llhh
tt
xtxpxtxpw
lh
−−+−=
This revenue function is essentially the expectation of revenue under high effort 
level and low effort level with different probabilities. Since in both cases, the local 
government collects a tax from the output resulting from different effort level, the 
revenue in each case is obtained by subtracting the relevant taxes accrued to the local 
government from the respective outputs. 
The revenue maximization is subject to the response of the local government at 
the second stage, which is macxtvpxtpv lh ≥−−+ )())(()1())((  
The Lagrange is 
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[ ]macxtvpxtpvxtxpxtxpL lhllhh −−−++−−+−= )())(()1())(())()(1())(( λ
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the following: 
)3(0)(0,0))((' >=≤+− hh xtifxtvpp λ     
)4(0)(0,0))((')1()1( >=≤−+−− ll xtifxtvpp λ  
000)())(()1())(( >=≥−−−+ λifmacxtvpxtpv lh  
From (3) and (4), we can get the first-best solution. First, λ , and  
are positive. Then we have the constraints are binding. So we have 
)( hxt )( lxt
λ==
))(('
1
))(('
1
lh xtvxtv , and so . Together with the condition that 
the agent is strictly risk averse, we have . The risk neutral principal 
offers full insurance to the risk averse agent. Also  is independent of the state of 
nature. 
))(('))((' lh xtvxtv =
)()(* lh xtxtt ==
*t
Since only the individual rationality matters, we substitute the solution 
 into local governor’s rationality equation. When , from 
the binding constraint for higher effort, we can get for local government, 
)()(* lh xtxtt == )(* hxtt =
macxtvpxtvp hlh =−−+ )())(()1())(( 11   
So we have )())(( hh acmxtv += .  
Therefore the local government’s optimal tax revenue under higher effort:  
)5()()()())(()(* macacmacxtvhighu hhhh =−+=−= . 
With a higher effort of providing public goods, the agriculture production x could 
be  with a possibility . And, with the possibilityhx 1p )1( 1p− , the production level 
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could be . In both cases, the farmer should be paying a tax lx ))(()( 1 hh acmvxt += − . 
So the farmer (or the central government)’s net revenue is determined by the following 
equation:    
))()(1())(()( 11
* hlhh xtxpxtxphighw −−+−=    
Or )6())(()1()( 111
* hlh acmvxpxphighw +−−+= − . 
On the other hand, when , from the binding constraint for lower effort, 
we can get for local government, 
)(* lxtt =
macxtvpxtvp llh =−−+ )())(()1())(( 22 , which means 
)())(( ll acmxtv += . So the local government’s optimal revenue under lower effort is   
)7()()()())(()(* macacmacxtvlowu llll =−+=−=  
With a lower effort of providing public goods, the random agriculture production 
x could be  with a possibility , and also could be with the possibilityhx 2p
lx )1( 2p− . 
In both cases, the farmer should be paying a tax ))(()( 1 ll acmvxt += − . So the 
farmer’s net revenue is determined by the following equation:    
))()(1())(()( 22
* lllh xtxpxtxploww −−+−=  
Or 
)8())(()1()( 122
* llh acmvxpxploww +−−+= − . 
Because in the benchmark solution, we assume that the central government can 
observe and control the local governor perfectly, it follows that if the value from equation 
(6) is greater than that of equation (8), the central government will require the local 
government to exert ; otherwise,  will be the central government’s policy target. ha la
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Therefore, the decision of inducing the agent to exert what level of efforts depends on the 
values of  and .  )(* highw )(* loww
The principal would induce a high-level effort if and only if:  
0)()( ** ≥− lowwhighw , which means  
)9())(())(())(( 1121
lhlh acmvacmvxxpp +−+≥−− −− .  
In the above equation, is the difference between high and low level of 
agricultural production. 
)( lh xx −
)( 21 pp − is the difference between the possibilities of 
achieving higher level of production under different effort levels. The left hand side of 
equation (9) can be interpreted as the expected efficiency gain induced by the increased 
efforts. The right hand side can be interpreted as the agent’s cost in terms of the increased 
disutility resulted from exerting the higher level of effort than the lower level of effort. 
Therefore, the central government will choose to induce a higher effort if and only if the 
expected gain from higher effort is greater than the cost.  
Alternatively, to see it more clearly, we can rewrite equation (9) as the following  
)10())(()())(()( 12
1
1
llhhlh acmvxxpacmvxxp +−−≥+−− −− . 
The left hand side of equation (10) is the net benefit from the higher effort, and 
the right hand side is the net benefit from the lower effort. The higher-level of effort will 
be chosen if and only if the net benefit from the former is greater than that of from the 
latter. From the society’s perspective, in equilibrium, the marginal benefits from higher 
effort and lower effort should be equal.  
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When (9) or (10) holds, the local government will be required to exert  and 
thereby collect 
ha
))(()( 1 hh acmvxt += − . In this case, the farmer’s profit is determined by 
equation (6), and the local government’s net revenue is governed by equation (5).  
Alternatively, if equations (9) and (10) do not hold, the local government will be 
required to exert  and collect la ))(()( 1 ll acmvxt += − . In this case, the farmer’s profit 
is determined by equation (8), and the local government’s net revenue is governed by 
equation (7).  
This analysis shows that the local government receives fixed tax revenue because 
equation (5) and (7) have the same outcome, m . The farmer, or the central 
government’s net profit, however, are different. Also, we cannot determine which one is 
bigger.  
To summarize, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition I: if the behaviors of local government can be observed completely by 
the central government, an optimal “constitution” { }ii axt ),( , where , is that:  lhi ,=
(i), the risk neutral central government offers the risk averse local government 
full insurance. The local government’s tax revenue is independent of local governor’s 
efforts of providing public goods, and therefore is risk free. (ii), since the central 
government have perfect information and also can perfectly control local government’s 
effort level, the local government’s efforts are determined by the farmer’s production 
function and risk distribution. These come to mean that the local government will exert a 
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first-best level of effort. (iii), the farmer takes all risks.49 (iv), the outcome is socially 
efficient in term of first-best.  
Some remarks about Proposition I 
The choice of optimal effort between  and  will depend on the 
nature of the production function and the process of public goods provision. For example, 
if the public goods are very conducive to the agriculture production, the provision of 
public good would significantly increase the possibility of x to achieve higher level. Then, 
a higher-level effort would be induced. This case could happen in areas where farmers 
have high demands on public goods. On the other hand, if the public goods cannot 
contribute much to the agriculture production, a lower-level effort would be optimal from 
the social perspective, since it saves on the costs. Therefore, the higher effort may not 
always be efficient. 
*t )( hxt )( lxt
In this case with perfect information, there is no conflict between the incentives 
and risk sharing. In general, incentives should be induced by a self-enforcing mechanism. 
Typically, we require the incentive constraint be satisfied. Here this constraint is 
unnecessary. The authorities of the central government, which can observe perfectly the 
behaviors of local government and thereby control it completely, replace the 
self-enforcing mechanism.   
In this first-best world, the risk-sharing issue can be separated from the incentive 
problem. The central government takes all risks and leaves the local government no risks. 
                                                        
49 The risks can be shifted to the central government by programs like price flooring.  
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This allocation of risks between the two parties is optimal since the central is assumed to 
be risk neutral, while the local government is assumed to be risk averse.  
In addition, this constitution is socially efficient. Since we can separate the risk 
from incentive issue, there are no disincentives caused by the risk sharing. Also, the 
grand production frontier could be reached through this tax structure, as for any given 
resources, we cannot find any other possible reallocation to further increase the 
agriculture production.   
The Moral Hazard Problems—Current Tax Structure and Its Outcomes 
Just as mentioned above, the Chinese current tax structure in the rural area by 
nature is a head tax. Every year, farmers hand in a given amount of money to the local 
government as the tax. Though the central government does care about the welfare of the 
farmers, the cost of monitoring local government is extremely high due to the problems 
related to asymmetric information and bureaucracy. Therefore, in reality the local 
government’ behaviors of providing local infrastructure cannot be monitored effectively. 
The current “constitution” set up a fixed tax schedule; therefore all risks fall on 
the central government.50 There exists a serious incentive problem because the central 
government cannot monitor the local government perfectly.  
Under the current tax structure, the tax revenue local government can collect is 
, which is independent of fixedt x and . Because of this, for any given , it is a fixedt
                                                        
50 If the risks cannot be shifted to the central government, the farmers will have to take all risks. Unfortunately, the 
latter is what usually happens in the real life.  
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rational for local government to exert a low effort because it means a lower expenditure. 
We can check this very easily. 
The revenue from low effort is: 
)11()()()( lfixedfixed actvlowu −= . 
The revenue from high effort is: 
)12()()()( hfixedfixed actvhighu −= . 
Then we have 
0)()())()(())()(()()( >−=−−−=− lhhfixedlfixedfixedfixed acacactvactvhighulowu , 
since according to our assumption,  is increasing in . Thus the local government 
will rationally choose low level of effort. In the current “constitution,” the central 
government does not provide local government incentives to exert high effort. The 
incentive compatibility constraint to obtain high effort (1) will not hold. Instead, the local 
government will get 
)(ac a
m , so the individual rationality constraint for low effort, 
mactvptvp lfixedfixed ≥−−+ )()()1()( 22   
will be binding, which means  
mactvptvp lfixedfixed =−−+ )()()1()( 22  
From this equation, we can get ))((1 lfixed acmvt += − , and 
)13()( mlowu fixed = . 
At the same time, for the farmer: 
))(1()()( 22
fixedlfixedhfixed txptxploww −−+−= . 
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Or . )14()1()( 22
fixedlhfixed txpxploww −−+=
It is easy to check that  
)15()()(* lowwhighw fixed>  
Since )())((1 llfixed xtacmvt =+= − , we will have  
')15()()(* lowwloww fixed=  
To summarize the effects of the moral hazard problem, we have the following 
proposition. 
Proposition II, the moral hazard problem is related inherently to the current head 
tax system in rural areas in China. The local government has no incentives to invest on 
local infrastructures.51 This disincentive problem is rooted in the current tax structure or 
“constitution.” The outcome is not socially efficient, and there is room for Pareto 
improvement.  
Some Remarks on Proposition II 
The current “constitution” is imperfect because of the incentive issue, not because 
of the inefficiency from risk sharing. First, the local government has little incentive to 
invest on the infrastructure in the rural area. The reason is simple: no matter what the 
production level is, the tax can be collected is fixed. Under the assumption that the 
probability of achieving higher production level is higher under higher effort of public 
goods provision, according to equation (9) and (10), a higher level provision of public 
goods surely means a Pareto improvement because the socially marginal benefit is 
                                                        
51 This conclusion is consistent with the data. 
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greater than the socially marginal cost. Therefore we say that the outcome under the 
current situation is not socially efficient. This is consistent with the observed facts. 
Second, what is surprising is that the allocation of risks is efficient. In this system 
the farmers take all risks, since the local government’s tax collection at the amount 
of ))((1 lfixed acmvt += −  is guaranteed no matter what the production level is. 
This surprising outcome results from the assumption that the local government is risk 
averse.  
The central government stipulates the fixed tax in the constitution, in hope that 
local government can use the money collected in this way to finance the infrastructure in 
the rural areas. However, even if the local government has the incentive to invest on local 
infrastructures, the revenue from the constitutional tax imposes a further limit on the 
fulfillment of the task. The deficiency in revenue source of providing local public goods, 
and more importantly, of fulfilling other local expenditure objectives, promotes local 
governments to collect more than the stipulated fixed amount from farmers. In the past 
several years, the central government issued a lot of regulations to impose a ceiling on 
the revenue that local governments are allowed to collect from the farmers. One of the 
most important regulations is that the local government can only collect up to 5% of the 
farmer’s total annual revenues. In the reality, the local governments circumvent the 
regulation by artificially exaggerating the farmers’ income or the tax base and therefore 
collecting bigger amount. Or, alternatively, farmers are forced to conduct special 
agriculture activities such as growing special economic plants. These economic plants 
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may be important raw materials to the local enterprises, which is in turn important to the 
local tax base; or can bring about higher tax by themselves since taxes from these special 
products are proportional to the production. For example, every year the Xin County 
government in Henan Province stipulates the farmers in their jurisdiction plant Chinese 
chestnuts, which is an important economic crop contributing to local revenue.52 
Sometimes the farmers have to sacrifice the production of other more important 
agricultural products in order to meet the mandates from the county government. Then on 
the one hand, little incentive of providing public goods that are beneficial to agricultural 
production lowers the probability of obtaining higher production. On the other, many 
items of surcharges collected often by coercive power, in addition to the fixed tax, 
worsen the farmers’ situation. If there is a good harvest, after submitting the taxes to the 
local government, the farmers might be able to maintain a fair life. If the production level 
is low, however, there will be a possibility of potential social instability.53 To solve this 
problem we may need reforms in other sectors such as constructing more complete 
property rights, building up more efficient legal system, etc. However, before those can 
be done, in the following we are going to propose a solution by promoting local 
government’s incentive of providing public infrastructures, and therefore improve 
farmer’s welfare by at least make it more probable  for farmers to obtain good harvest. 
                                                        
52 This is from the author’s personal experience in Henan Province. 
53 By this way, our approach provides a new explanation to the variance of the farmers’ living standard. This is 
different from the view of “over exploitation” of the local government to the farmers’ output (Tao et al. 2003).    
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A Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem 
The disconnection between the tax revenue and agriculture production leads to 
the moral hazard problem. The solution to the problem lies in the incentive problem 
behind the local governments. The solution in turn points to the direction where the 
current tax reform should go. 
Typically, to reach the solution we need to solve a two-stage model. First, we can 
characterize the local government’s best response in stage two.54 In this case, the central 
government cannot force the local government to participate; instead, the central has to 
offer the local at least the reservation revenue of what the current resource can bring 
about, m . Therefore, the individual rationality constraint must hold. Also, if we assume 
equation (9) or (10) hold, then it is optimal for the central government to induce higher 
effort. In this context, the incentive compatibility constraint must hold; otherwise the 
local government will not exert a higher-level effort.  
We turn next to the central government’s revenue maximization problem at stage 
one. Since the center can solve the local government’s second stage problem as well as 
the local government can, the central government should anticipate that the local 
government’s reaction to the tax structure  would be to choose the effort level of 
investment , taking into consideration of  . Specifically, we want to 
)(xt i
))((* xta i )(xt i
                                                        
54 In theory, if the agent is risk-neutral, the principal can “sell” the land to the agent. However, even if the local 
government is risk-neutral here, the central cannot sell the land to the local. The reason is that, without requirement in 
other part of the “constitution,” local government may not be interested in investing on agriculture sector.  
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construct the tax schedule in such a way that the local government will provide higher 
level of effort. Therefore, the central government’s problem at the first stage amounts to  
{ } ))()(1())((max 11,)(),(
lilhih
xtxt
xtxpxtxpw
lihi
−−+−=
 Such that the following two constraints 
macxtvpxtvp hihi ≥−−+ )())(()1())(( 11    (IR) 
)())(()1())(()())(()1())(( 2211
llihihlihi acxtvpxtvpacxtvpxtvp −−+≥−−+   
(IC) 
In our model, offering some incentives means that both the incentive 
compatibility constraint and individual rationality constraint should be binding. The 
reason is that, firstly, the local government is assumed to be risk averse. The central 
government can give local government some insurance by narrowing the difference 
between and in order to reduce the variance of the tax revenue, and making 
the incentive compatibility constraint hold at the same time. Second, the benefit that the 
central government offers to local government must be as high as the alternative return, 
)( hxt )( lxt
m . So we get the following two equations.55
)16()())(()1())(()())(()1())(( 2211
llihihlihi acxtvpxtvpacxtvpxtvp −−+=−−+
)17()())(()1())(( 11 macxtvpxtvp
hlihi =−−+
The associated Kuhn-Tucker conditions are the usual ones. Also, both of the shadow 
prices are positive. Thus we have the following solutions.  
                                                        
55 The superscript i here means “imperfect information.” 
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The solution is essentially a compromise of incentives and risk sharing. Under 
this new tax structure, we will have the local government’s utility is 
macxtvpxtvphighu hlihii =−−+= )()(()1())(()( 11*  
And the farmer’s profit is  
)20())()(1())(()( 11
* lilhihi xtxpxtxphighw −−+−= . 
We will discuss the policy implications later in detail. 
To summarize, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition III: A contract described by (18) and (19) can solve the moral hazard 
problem in the current tax system. The optimal contact requires the risk-averse agent 
share some risks with the principal, so there is no full insurance offered to local 
government.  
Some Remarks on Proposition III 
Equation (18) and (19) design a new “constitution” { })(),( lihi xtxt with 
incomplete information. To understand the characteristics of the constitution 
{ })(),( lihi xtxt , we need to compare it with the solutions under complete information and 
under the current tax structure.  
About the production level  
Let us consider the effects of the new “constitution” on the farmer’s benefits.   
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Comparing equation (14) with equation (20), we can easily show that 
. Further, when comparing equation (6) and (20), we can 
find whether we have , or, 
)()(* lowwhighw fixedi >
)()( ** highwhighw i ≥
0))()(())()(()()( 1
** ≥−−−=− lihilihi xtxtpxtxthighwhighw  
It depends on the value of the difference between and . This 
difference determines if the central government has incentive to carry out the new tax 
structure. Actually in this simple case, the difference will be zero, leaving the central 
indifferent to it. But the perfect information that we assumed in the benchmark case is 
idealistic. Under imperfect information, the new tax structure gives the central higher 
welfare compared with the fixed tax case, therefore is more favorable.  
)( hi xt )( li xt
Two outcomes can be derived from the above analysis. Firstly, 
 shows that the new production level resulted from the 
higher effort induced by the new constitution is definitively higher than the production 
level under the fixed tax. By attaching the production level to the tax revenue, the local 
government would have incentives to invest on agriculture sector. The increased 
provision of public goods increases the probability of achieving higher production level. 
The new tax system will increase welfare in term of the efficiency in production. 
)()(* lowwhighw fixedi >
Secondly, the allocation of the increased production between the farmer and the 
local government depends on some parameters. In our model, the utilities local 
government can obtain in both cases are the same whether the new tax structure is 
adopted or not. But a higher expected return is associated with the new tax structure 
  
 82
{ })(),( lihi xtxt . The benefit of the local government can gain from the increased 
expected return is offset by the increased risks associated with the new constitution. The 
reason is that, for the risk-averse local government, some risk premiums are needed to 
compensate for the loss caused by exposing to risks. Apparently, here all the increased 
benefits go to the farmers. This is not the general case, however. A simple model like 
what we are using in this paper cannot determine the general allocation of increased 
benefit.56   
About the risk sharing issue  
This section is designed to compare the efficiency of risk allocation between the 
new “constitution” and those of benchmark and current tax system.  
(i) New “constitution” v. s. the Benchmark 
Different from the first-best case, in a second-best world, there is no full 
insurance available to the local government. In the benchmark model with perfect 
information, when the higher-level outcome is realized, the local government will get 
))(()( 1 hh acmvxt += − . With imperfect information, when the higher-level outcome is 
achieved, the associated return is ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−−+= −
21
121 )()1()()1()(
pp
acpacpmvxt
lh
hi , which 
is bigger than ))(()( 1 hh acmvxt += − .57 This positive difference means that the local 
                                                        
56 To consider a model that involves benefit allocation, we can think of a model with a bonus. Bonus is widely used in 
firms that use high-power incentive programs. In the case with bonus, the bonus itself can be regarded as one form of 
redistribution of efficiency gain brought about by the incentive programs between the principal and the agent.  
57 Please refer to proof in appendix. 
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government can gain more with incomplete information than with complete information 
when the higher-level outcome is realized.  
When the lower-level outcome is realized, we have different story, however. With 
complete information, the return associated with lower-output is ))(()( 1 ll acmvxt += − . 
Under incomplete information, when the lower-level outcome is realized, the return 
is ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+= −
21
211 )()()(
pp
acpacpmvxt
hl
li , which is smaller than ))(()( 1 ll acmvxt += − .58 
Therefore, the local government would gain less with incomplete information than that 
with complete case when the lower-level outcome is achieved.  
The effects of incentive highly depend on the values of  and , 
which determine how powerful the incentive is. We should, however, focus on the lower 
tax, . The reason is that the magnitude of , increasing the variance of the 
expected return in a good direction, therefore is good for the local government for it 
enables local government to obtain higher revenue. What really matters is the difference 
between  and , since a very low value of will result in very low 
revenue proceeds for the local government by increasing the variance of the expected 
return in a bad direction. As the difference between  and  becomes bigger, 
the revenue of the local government becomes more unfavorable (Chavas 2004).
)( hi xt )( li xt
)( li xt )( hi xt
)( lxt )( li xt )( li xt
)( lxt )( li xt
59
                                                        
58 Please refer to proof in appendix. 
59 There is more detailed account on the upside and downside variation in chapter 6, Mean Variance Analysis, in the 
book cited above. 
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This difference can be expressed as 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−+=− −−
21
2111 )()())(()()(
pp
acpacpmvacmvxtxt
hl
llil . We already proved above 
that this expression is greater than zero. Comparing the arguments of the inverse function 
we can have that the difference is determined by the difference between  and  
. As the difference becomes bigger, the effects of the incentive become more 
powerful. In this case, compared with the first-best case, the expected tax in the 
second-best world is more risky.  
)( hac
)( lac
Obviously, there is an efficiency loss caused by the new risk allocation. This risk 
allocation is not efficient because the two parties have different attitudes toward the risk. 
The efficient risk allocation requires that the risk-neutral central government take all 
risks and the risk-averse local government be risk free. To obtain a higher production 
level, we need to give local government incentives. The only way to do so, however, is to 
let the risk averse local governments share some risks.  
(ii) New “constitution” v. s. the current tax system 
Compared with the current fixed-tax system, the new “constitution” is again 
inefficient in term of risk sharing, since the risk-averse local government has to share 
some risks. However, the new “constitution” is socially efficient in terms of 
second-best.60 This is because the efficiency loss in risk sharing will be compensated by 
the efficiency gains in production. 
                                                        
60 The second-best means that the central government can not observe the behaviors of local government behaviors 
perfectly, different from the perfect information that we assumed in the benchmark case. 
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Therefore no matter compared with the benchmark case or the current system, the 
new “constitution” is inefficient in term of risk sharing. This efficiency loss, as we 
analyzed above, is actually the price in exchange for the efficiency gain in the production 
because the latter requires the local government take some risks. This trade-off is 
inherently rooted in the solution to the current Chinese tax system. What we need to do is 
optimally allocate the incentives and risk sharing to a point such that the gain from 
higher incentive equals to the loss from risk reallocation.  
Implications for Tax Policy Design 
After solving the moral hazard problem, the question becomes where we should 
go in reforming the Chinese current tax system. The following questions should be 
answered before reforming the system. 
Question 1, should we give up the fixed head tax system?  
The answer to this question is definitely yes. But before we can do it, we will 
have to find an alternative to replace the current tax. 
Question 2, shall we change the uniform tax structure?  
The uniform “constitution” across the whole country may not be efficient. From 
Proposition I, we can see that the optimal choice of may be very different across the 
country because each individual locality has its own unique production function, based 
on which the actual choice is determined. In a greatly diversified country like China, the 
production function may not be uniform. As a result, the values of  and  
can vary significantly across the whole country. The uniform tax totally neglects the 
*t
)( hac )( lac
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variations and thus is problematic. However, that would imply a very complex 
“constitution” or tax system.  
Question 3, do we need an agriculture tax? 
We will encounter a typical conflict between two principles of tax policy in 
discussing this problem. On one hand, a tax should be based on ability to pay. On the 
other hand, tax should be levied on those who can benefit from the services financed by 
the tax revenue. If the first principal is adopted, there should be no tax on the farmers at 
all, since the farmers in China are typically too poor to pay any taxes. If the second is 
adopted, the government should tax the farmers because the infrastructures in the rural 
areas in China can improve agriculture production and thus benefit the farmers.  
If we consider efficiency only, this conflict can be solved such that the center 
takes all responsibilities to construct the dams and roads and other infrastructures to a 
point where the marginal benefits equalize the marginal costs, without agricultural tax 
collected from the farmers. This solution implicitly redistributes income from 
non-agriculture sectors to agriculture sector and is appealing at the first sight. In the real 
world, there have also been intensive discussions on the legitimacy of eliminating the 
head tax since last year. The prime minister, Wen Jiabao has announced the goal of 
abandoning the agriculture tax in the coming five years. And Hangzhou Prefecture 
government has already eliminated this tax. It apparently becomes an important element 
of the current tax reform and is launching. However, this option may not be a good 
solution, since it will lead to another type of moral hazard problem. The arrangement that 
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center takes all responsibility means that the infrastructures become free lunch for 
farmers. A higher demand than optimum on center’s investment will not be a surprise. 
Also, without agriculture tax, the government will not have any incentive to invest in 
agriculture sector at all!  
In addition to the lack of appeal on the economic ground, this solution, however, 
may be very difficult to implement because of the characteristics of the current political 
regime and long-standing ideology of giving priority to industry instead of agriculture, 
even though it is long been advocated that more weight should be allocated to the latter, 
as we mentioned in the part above.  
We may still need an agriculture tax, but not the head tax that we currently have. If we can 
design a tax relating the agriculture production with agriculture tax, as advocated by the imperfect 
information case discussed in our model, then we might be able to not only provide local government 
incentives to invest on infrastructures, but also guarantee tax revenues to fulfill the task. 
Conclusion 
It is not very easy to understand the behaviors of Chinese local government 
within the traditional framework. In this paper, the behaviors of Chinese local 
governments have been examined in a unique angle, by expanding B-B rule to include 
the risk issue. A simple moral hazard model in a principal-agent framework has been 
constructed to illustrate the problems inherent in the current agriculture tax system in 
China and ways of solving the problems have been proposed. Our propositions may 
throw new lights on the behaviors of Leviathan-like governments. Of course, here we did 
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not consider the transfers from the central government to local governments, thus such 
situations as when the local governments collude with the farmers, in order to obtain 
more transfers from the center; or when the local governments are simply corruptive in 
delivering public goods and drive up the costs, the cases that will complicate the issue are 
not included. We consider those possibilities for future developments.  
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Appendix  
Proof of Footnote 57: 
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Since the two taxes, the tax under higher production level in incomplete 
information case, , and the tax under higher production level in the benchmark 
case, are both denoted in the inverted function form, we can prove this inequality by 
comparing the arguments. 
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According to our assumption, 021 >− pp ; also we have and 
. Therefore, both the nominator and the denominator are greater than 
zero, and the whole term is greater than zero. Then we have  
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We assumed earlier that )(•v  is strictly increasing in t, thus we will have that the 
is also strictly increasing. Therefore, we have  )(1 •−v
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Proof of Footnote 58: 
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Since the two taxes, the tax under lower production level in incomplete 
information case, , and the tax under higher production level in the benchmark 
case, are both denoted in the inverted function form, we can prove this inequality by 
comparing the respective arguments. 
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Since we assumed earlier that )(•v  is strictly increasing in t, thus we will have 
that is strictly increasing. Therefore, we have )(1 •−v
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CHAPTER III  
ESSAY II BUDGET STRUCTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
Introduction 
The theoretical model we dealt with in the first essay established the foundation 
of this current work. We have established that in theory, government does exhibit 
strategic behaviors, which results in different consequences. However, does the picture 
really look like this when we turn to the reality? Can we provide some evidence of our 
own to supplement the work already done? It is currently not possible to test the validity 
of the model we developed in the context of China, due to the data availability. Thus we 
turn to a broader viewpoint and try to find evidence from countries all over the world to 
test the theory developed in the first essay.  
A fact we observe is that as economic growth and human activities increasingly 
have a negative impact on the natural environment, with more and more serious 
consequences start to produce negative feedback to human lives. 
Environmental quality control has gained an increasingly important role in 
government policy and businesses practices as people become more aware of the 
consequences of a polluted environment.  
Nonetheless, there is a big gap in the level of economic growth and development 
across countries and the same is true for the environmental quality across countries. This 
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difference in environmental quality can be attributed to the variations in economic 
conditions, natural endowments, social factors as well as government policies.  
The specific question we are interested in is: do differences in government budget 
structure give government agencies different incentives to engage in environmental 
quality control?  
Before the 1990s, differences in economic growth across countries were cited as 
the standard explanation for the observed variation in environmental quality. Pollution 
was interpreted as an unavoidable by-product of industrialization, and therefore it was 
seen as an increasing function of economic growth. Following this point of view, 
developed economies have seen their environments damaged at a faster pace than 
developing economies (Meadows et al. 1972).  
However, beginning in the early 1990s, a number of empirical studies showed 
that the relationship between pollution and economic growth was not as simple as it was 
thought before. 61 Pollution was found not to be a monotone function, but rather a 
concave function of GDP. This result became known in the literature as the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), borrowed from the classic Kuznets Curve, which 
relates the distribution of income to the level of income. EKC states that in the early 
stage of economic growth, pollution increases. Once GDP per capita achieves certain 
level, the relationship reverses. In other words, economic growth contributes to the 
                                                        
61 These empirical works are mostly on the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), a literature that we review later in 
this essay. 
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reduction of pollution once it achieves a certain level. The reason is that economic 
growth creates demand for higher environment quality; the better definition of property 
rights and other institutional arrangements make it possible to reduce pollution and 
improve environmental quality. 
The EKC hypothesis explains the variations in environmental quality mostly 
through the variations in GDP per capita. 62 But a lot of other factors are surely missing 
from this framework. In particular, from our point of view, the fact that environmental 
quality is a public good should be recognized; therefore government behavior must be 
taken into consideration explicitly when we try to understand environmental variations. 
Environmental quality can affect government behaviors through two different 
channels. On the revenue side, pollution is positively related to production levels, which 
in turn represent the tax base of major taxes, such as the VAT and other business related 
taxes. Since higher production means higher tax revenues, government may tolerate 
higher levels of pollution for the purpose of obtaining higher income, thus resulting in a 
relatively low effort of pollution control. This can be measured by the importance of VAT 
and other business related taxes in total tax revenue.  
On the other hand, pollution can damage other tax bases. This is especially true in 
the case of the property taxes. The extent of this damage may also affect government’s 
                                                        
62 In our opinion, “environmental behavior” is a more precise term than “environmental quality”. Environmental 
quality is actually the consequence of the agent’s environmental behaviors. For example, some communities pollute 
more than others; while they spend more money in dealing with pollution problems at the same time. However, some 
communities do not take responsibilities for the consequences caused by their behaviors. However, in order to be 
consistent with previous studies, we are following the traditional use of the term, environmental quality. 
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incentives on the revenue side of the budget to control pollution. This can be captured by 
the share of property tax in total tax revenue. 
On the expenditure side of the budget, more pollution means more expenditure on 
healthcare, due to the negative effects most pollutants have on human health, thus 
pollution levels may significantly affect the composition of government budgetary 
expenditure. But the government’s incentives to control pollution may vary depending on 
how costly pollution may be to the budget. This latter maybe roughly approximated by 
the ratios of government expenditure on health care over total public expenditure. There 
is some obvious endogeneity issue here: the level of pollution affects health care 
expenditures, but the composition of the budget, which also reflects how much we care 
about pollution, may also affect the level of pollution, or at least anti-pollution policy 
efforts. This will be a problem we have to deal with in our estimation. 
In addition, the political characteristics of different countries might have an 
impact on the policy making process for different governments, including the 
environmental policy. For example, democratic countries and non-democratic countries 
might care about the environmental quality to a different extent, since in the former, 
voting system works well and the preferences and interests of the residents are more fully 
respected; while in the latter case, the authoritarian way of decision making does not 
necessarily take into account the needs of the residents. Thus the country’s political 
regime might play a role in maintaining environmental quality. 
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This essay is intended to capture the relationship between budget structure and 
government’s incentive of pollution control, with the hope of offering a new angle in 
tackling the environment problems.  
This essay is organized as follows: in the next section, we review the EKC 
hypothesis, which we take to be the prevailing explanation on the relationship between 
economic growth and environment quality, and point out the main weaknesses of this 
hypothesis. In Section III, we offer a new explanation, which takes into account 
government incentives for controlling pollution level under different budget structures. In 
section IV, we develop a theoretical model, based on the Leviathan government’s revenue 
maximization hypothesis, formalizing the relationship between budget structure and 
pollution control. Then we offer three propositions following the implications derived 
from our theoretical model, which may have important policy relevance for environment 
policy. The first hypothesis states that the higher the ratio of business related taxes as 
proxied by general value added, sales, or turnover taxes collections in total revenue, the 
lower incentive of the government to control pollution and thus the higher the pollution 
level. The second states that higher percentage of property tax in total tax revenue will 
give governments an incentive to lower pollution level.63 The third one says the higher 
the share of government health care expenditure in total public expenditure, the lower the 
pollution level.64 In Sections V and VI, we test the three hypotheses, using a 
                                                        
63 This is based on the assumption that most of the pollution has an impact on urban areas where housing is 
concentrated, a point that we will come back to later. 
64 Of course, the endogeneity issue should be taken care of first. 
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cross-section, time series data set including 108 countries over the time period of 
1990-2002. Our results suggest that, changes in budget structure may have an important 
impact on government behaviors and therefore on the environmental performance. 
Therefore, government incentives to fight pollution should be taken into account when 
making environmental policy decisions.  
The Conventional Hypothesis on Economic Growth and Environment Quality (EKC) 
Before the 1980s, economists traditionally thought that more developed 
economies were damaging their environments at a faster pace (Meadows et al. 1972); the 
conventional wisdom was that environmental quality gets worse as the economy grows. 
However, the changes in demand for environmental quality and the actual level of it were 
not consistent with this traditional view. In the 1980s, the empirical evidence showed that 
people in advanced economies had a very strong demand for environmental quality. The 
reason appears to be quite simple: environmental quality is a normal good; therefore as 
people become richer, through conventional income effects, people demand more of it. 
Therefore, as economies grow, environmental quality actually improves rather than 
deteriorates. 
Motivated by this new evidence, economists in the early 1990s began to 
challenge the old view. They found some empirical evidence to show that the relationship 
between economic growth and environment quality was non-linear (Grossman and 
Krueger 1994; Panayotou 1995; 1992). In fact, environmental quality was found to be a 
concave function of economic growth. At the early stages of economic growth, when the 
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activities are small in scale, the economy does not produce much pollution. As the 
economy grows and production begins to expand, the benefits from production increase, 
but so do the pollution levels. At some point, pollution levels reach their peak. Beyond 
this point, the demand for environment quality increases because the disutility from 
higher pollution now outweighs the “benefit” from pollution (in terms of higher pollution 
being the by-product of higher production and incomes), and people now are not only 
willing to, but also are capable of controlling pollution due to the growing income level 
and technology available; therefore at some stage of economic growth, the pollution level 
begins to fall. 65 EKC is essentially a hypothesized relationship between levels of various 
indicators of environmental performance and GDP per capita, with the relationship 
depicted as taking an inverted-U shape. 
The EKC has important policy implications. It predicts that economic growth 
itself will be sufficient to improve the environmental quality. If the EKC hypothesis 
holds, we can draw the conclusions that once economic growth reaches certain level, it 
will have a positive effect on environmental quality. Therefore, there is no need to worry 
too much about pollution problems.   
Some Empirical Evidence 
Fundamentally, the EKC is an empirical phenomenon. Among other studies, 
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992), Panayotou (1993; 1995), Grossman and Krueger 
                                                        
65 All EKC literature traditionally investigates the relationship of economic growth and environmental indicators, and 
the level of economic growth usually measured by GDP per capita. In this essay we follow this tradition.  
   
 100
(1994), Selden and Song (1994) are widely recognized as the earliest EKC contributors 
(Yandle 2002). Grossman and Krueger (1994) tried to verify the existence of EKCs using 
data for SO2, dark matter, and SPM (Suspended particulate matter) from GEMS (Global 
Environmental Monitoring System), published by the World Health Organization. These 
data measured ambient air quality in two or three locations in each city within a number 
of countries during the period 1977-1988. Their regressions included location, time and 
also a trade intensity variable. In their results, SO2 and dark matter conform to the EKC 
hypothesis, first increasing with income, then starting to decrease after some level of 
income; while the level of SPM exhibits a monotone declining trend even at the 
low-income level, without reaching some turning point. Selden and Song (1994) 
estimated the EKCs for SO2, NOx, SPM and CO using a cross-section and time-series 
data set from World Resources, taking into consideration of country specific effects and 
time specific effects, as well as population density. They obtained results favorable to 
EKCs except for CO. In his influential paper, Panayotou (1993; 1995) estimated EKCs 
for SO2, NOx, SPM and deforestation using a cross-section data set. His conclusions 
provide support to EKC hypothesis in that the estimated curves for SO2, NOx and SPM 
do exhibit an inverted-U shape with respect to income per capita. For example, his 
regression outcome on SO2 takes the 
form { }2)/ln(51.0)/ln(3.826.35)/2ln( PYPYPSO −+−= , clearly exhibiting an 
inverted-U shape. 
   
 101
A lot of studies have estimated the turning points of income, i.e., at what level of 
income the environmental quality starts to improve. Usually for different pollutants, 
studies found that the turning points are different. For example, Grossman and Krueger 
(1994) found that for SO2 and dark matter, the turning points could be achieved when 
per capita GDP is around $4000-5000 in 1985 U.S. dollars. In Panayotou (1993)’s work, 
if measured in 1985 U. S. dollars, he obtained the turning points for SO2 at per capita 
GDP of around $3000, around $5,500 for NOx, and around $4,500 for SPM. 66 In terms 
of the regression function above, it means the level of SO2 pollution decreases at per 
capita GDP of around $3000. 
Some Problems with the EKC 
Since its birth, the EKC evidence has been in the center of debate. In general, 
there is consensus in the literature that the EKCs suffer from some problems. A first 
problem concerns the data that researchers have been using. Most of the EKC literature 
uses data aggregated over different units, which imposes a potential heteroskedasticity 
problem (Stern 2003; Stern 1996). In addition, the environmental data available to 
researchers are not necessarily reliable since the environment is notorious for its 
volatility and makes it extremely difficult to obtain environment related data, let alone 
reliable data. A second problem is that, as Arrow et al (1995) pointed out, the EKCs only 
consider the impact of production on the pollution of the environment, assuming that 
there are no feedback effects from the environment to the production process. This 
                                                        
66 In Yandle (2002), there is a good summary of turning points in different EKC literature. 
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assumption seems impractical in view of the ever-increasing economic activities 
worldwide and the limited carrying capacity of the environment. When, for example, the 
rate at which the production process consuming underground water resources exceeds the 
capability of the natural water system to make up the loss, the environment might impose 
adverse effects to the production process, either take the forms of deterioration of water 
quality or land collapse. A third problem is that the EKC literature does not take into 
consideration of other factors such as environmental regulation, relative advantages in 
international trade, etc. Strict environmental regulation in developed countries may 
prompt manufacturers to move their heavy-polluting industries to developing countries 
(Stern 2003).67 Developed countries are more and more concentrating on capital and 
human capital-intensive service sectors, which is helpful for the improvement of 
environmental quality (Hettige, Lucas, and Wheeler 1992). 
More fundamentally, even if the relationship between environmental indicators 
and GDP per capita does exist, what is the reason behind that? The EKCs believe that as 
income increases and people demand higher environmental quality, environmental 
quality will be improved by market power, instead of the effects of government 
intervention. Thus, it leaves no room or at least it does not require the role of government. 
However, in the real world, government is the provider of most public goods, including 
environmental quality control. As any other public good, the extent of environmental 
                                                        
67 This is the “race to the bottom” that we are going to dwell upon later. 
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quality control is very likely to be determined through a public choice process. 68 In 
addition, the EKC hypothesis allows no role for the institutional differences between 
governments, for example, with or without democratic voting systems, of course the 
environmental outcomes will be affected significantly.  
Being aware of these points certainly raises several important questions. For 
example, even in countries in which there are effective democratic voting systems, the 
residents may not be able to control government behaviors simply by elections.69 Then, 
in countries without voting system, what factors influence the decisions making of the 
government? Therefore, in order to have a better understanding of environmental 
performance in different countries, we need to examine the role of government, 
analyzing how government behavior can affect environmental quality, both directly and 
indirectly.  
Budget Structure, Government Behavior and Pollution Control 
By most standards, environmental quality is a public good, even though some 
part of it is a local public good, and another part is a “global” public good. The reasons 
are obvious. Environmental quality shares two properties with other public goods, such 
as national defense and street lights: being non-rival and non-excludable.70 The 
environmental quality we are talking about here includes the quality of clean water, clear 
                                                        
68 For example, the demand for a particular level of environmental quality can be regarded as a choice of the median 
voter, according to median voter model (MVM). However, there will be some other problems if we apply the MVM 
here, mainly due to the problems inherent in the MVM, such as the preference needs to be single peaked, and so on. 
69 See for example the discussion of the original work on Leviathan model, in Buchanan and Brennan (1977; 1978; 
1980). See also Niskanen (1968; 1971)for the original bureaucratic model of decision making in government. 
70 However, we could define the abuse of the environment (e.g. the atmosphere) by one country reduces the level of the 
good available elsewhere. For example, acid rain is such a case. 
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air and so on. There may be some rivalry: if one person uses the clean water or clear air, 
there might be less of it available to others. Use of water may also be excludable since 
people who do not have access to water can be excluded from its use. In this sense, these 
goods are not strictly pure public goods. Nonetheless, water and air are both renewable 
resources, especially under current technologies; thus, we can call them public goods 
without violating the general definition of a public good.  
In general, public goods are provided by the government and financed by taxes or 
user fees. The residents consume the public goods and at the same time pay tax to 
finance the provision of these goods.  
As mentioned above, the EKC hypothesis assumes no role for government. This 
assumption, however, does not appear to be very reasonable since governments across 
the world are influential in almost every aspect of the economy.  
In general, from the perspective of this essay, governments can be grouped into 
two types, democratic and non-democratic. Democratic countries use voting and other 
procedures to form the social preference over public goods, while in non-democratic 
countries voting does not exist or does not work, and collective decisions are made in 
some authoritarian manner. Even within the same type, the level of government that is 
responsible for environmental quality control may be very different. In some democratic 
regimes, it is central government’s responsibility to regulate environmental problems, in 
order to enjoy the benefits of economies of scales, and avoid the potential side effects, 
such as spillovers of pollution. Under this circumstance, it is still possible that local 
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governments have an important impact on pollution. For example, in the US where 
environmental problems are largely the responsibility of the federal government, New 
York City and eight state governments have planned to sue power plants. 71 The reason is 
that the emissions of the power plants, as they put it, “pose serious threats to our health, 
our economy and our environment.” In some other democratic countries, however, the 
authority to regulate environment is assigned to government agencies at the state 
(regional) or local levels in order to accommodate for the diversities in preferences and 
needs in different localities. This can create problems of its own, but we will not expand 
this line of research in here.72
No matter which level of government is responsible for the environmental quality 
control, the government’s incentives to achieve the goals of environmental improvement, 
in addition to the capability of doing so, are important issues that need special attention. 
There are relatively few papers in the literatures that have explored the role of 
environmental governance. The work by Dasgupta et al. (2004) is unique from this 
perspective. Their results show that governance does play an important role in 
controlling environmental quality. Without strong environmental governance, rich 
countries whose incomes already reached the turning point predicted by the EKC 
hypothesis would not necessarily accomplish the actual decrease of pollution levels. 
                                                        
71 The states include California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin, 
from the New York Times, July 21, 2004. 
72 For example, Oates (2001) differentiated between three different cases in which he treats environment quality as 
pure public goods, local public goods, or the pollution can flow across boundaries and results in spillovers. Depending 
on different situations, different level of governments or the coordination by different level of governments should be 
responsible for the formation and implementation of environmental policies. 
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Similarly, we will expect that “low levels of development do not prevent countries from 
having effective environmental institutions and policies” (Dasgupta et al. 2004). 
Therefore, poor countries can achieve high level of environmental quality if strong 
environmental governance is in place. Thus, Dasgupta et al. (2004) observe that the EKC 
framework is misleading since it suggests only when income achieves certain level can 
the level of pollution possibly starts to fall. In their view, the policy of “grow first, then 
clean up” is invalid. 73
In the public finance literature, as mentioned in the first essay, there are three 
main models about government behaviors. The first one is median voter model (MVM). 
The MVM is the most popularly used tool in the field to analyze the outcome of public 
choice within a democratic context. A voting system is used to form the public preference 
for public goods under a democratic regime. The median voter is defined as the voter 
whose preferences lie in the middle of the set of all voters’ preferences (Rosen 1999). 
The MVM hypothesizes that as long as all preferences are single peaked; the outcome of 
majority voting reflects the preferences of the median voter.   
When we apply MVM to test empirically the demand for public goods, for 
example, we need to make an inherent assumption that each jurisdiction’s (county, state, 
or country) preference is represented by the preference of the median voter in the 
jurisdiction. As mentioned earlier, in order to analyze the relationship between 
                                                        
73 They also look at the effects of geographic vulnerability to environmental damage and the sectoral composition of 
economic activity. 
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environmental quality and GDP per capita within the MVM framework, we need more 
assumptions such as that GDP per capita can be used as a proxy to the median voter’s 
income; that the preference of residents should be normally distributed and single 
peaked.  
Even if it is justifiable to interpret EKCs as the outcome of median voter’s choice, 
the MVM has some serious weakness itself. Theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence show that the citizens cannot perfectly control government behaviors through 
the voting system (Matsusaka 1995; McGuire 1999). In addition, not all countries are 
democratic and have effective voting system. Just as we mentioned above, there are 
non-democratic countries, where no voting system exists, neither does MVM work. What 
is more, MVM is usually used to explain different social choices across localities within 
a country, while environmental policy is often the central government’s policy target, 
even though sometimes being left within local governments’ discretion; thus MVM 
might have difficulties in explaining the cross-country variations of environmental 
policies. Due to these reasons, we think that MVM is not an appropriate vehicle to 
explain the variations in environment performance across countries. 
Alternatively, there are other two competing hypotheses about government 
behaviors: the Leviathan model and the bureaucratic model, which we mentioned in the 
first essay. The Leviathan model holds that the government can be modeled as an 
organization with its own interests. Without effective control from the citizens, the 
government may be willing to exploit its constituencies fiscally, trying to maximize its 
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potential revenue sources, or using minimum resources to meet some requirements, thus 
becoming a revenue-maximizing Leviathan (Brennan and Buchanan 1977, 1978, 1980). 
This Leviathan has an inherent tendency to maximize budgetary revenue; therefore the 
size of the government tends to be bigger than optimal. In the literature, the Leviathan 
model holds that the more decentralized the government structure, the tax competition 
among decentralized governments will put more restrictions on the government’s 
intrusion into the economy, therefore, the smaller the size of the government. 
Researchers have controversy over the evidence on the relationship between 
decentralization and government size, however. For example, Oates (1985) found no 
relationship between decentralization and government size, while Stein (1999) found that 
fiscal decentralization led to larger governments in Latin America; and Marlow (1988), 
Grossman (1989) found negative relationship between decentralization and government 
spending.  
According to the so-called bureaucratic model developed mainly by Niskanen 
(1968; 1971), bureaus are monopoly suppliers of the services they provide, with political 
sponsors as their monopoly buyers. Bureaus exchange a specific output by bargaining 
with the political sponsors for a specific budget. Also the bureaus have information 
advantages over the production costs, while the sponsors have neither the incentives nor 
the capabilities to monitor the behaviors of the bureaus due to symmetric information. In 
addition, Bureaucrats have their own utility functions, including “salary, perquisites of 
the office, public reputation, power, patronage, ease of managing the bureau, and ease of 
   
 109
making changes” (Niskanen 1975). Therefore bureaucrats will try to maximize their own 
interests, instead of maximizing social welfare (Niskanen 1971). In term of budgetary 
behavior, bureaucrats will try to maximize the size of the their discretionary budget, in 
order to get more out of it, of course subject to the cost constraint of producing certain 
output (Niskanen 1975; 1994). Niskanen also provided some empirical evidence on the 
overspending of the bureaus (Niskanen 1975). 
Neither of these two models believes that voting systems can control government 
behaviors; instead, they argue that the residents cannot monitor the governments (or the 
government can not monitor the bureaucrats in the latter case) very effectively. This is so 
because residents may not have information on which politician can better accommodate 
their preferences. Or, citizens may not have enough incentives to vote because it is 
difficult or even impossible for one single vote to change the outcome of the election. 
Both models state that governments or bureaucrats try to maximize their own benefits, 
defined as the “surplus” of the budget.74  
In our opinion, these two models have important implications for environmental 
performance, since the impacts of environmental performance on different budget 
structures give a Leviathan government or a bureaucratic official different incentive to 
control pollution.  
                                                        
74 Both of these two models describe that the Leviathan government or the bureaucrats try to maximize the budget, 
then after fulfilling the expenditure responsibilities mandated by the constitution, the rest will be surplus of budget, 
from which the leviathan government or the bureaucrats can have more resource at discretion or simply derive more 
personal benefits. 
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Pollution, or poor environmental performance, has an impact on the Leviathan 
government or the bureaucratic official from both the revenue side and the expenditure 
side. On the revenue side, pollution could be both good and bad. Pollution is related 
inherently to production in that, in general, higher level of production brings about higher 
level of pollution. On the one hand, higher production can bring government higher 
value-added tax or other tax revenues collected from expanded production activities and 
enlarged economic base. On the other hand, however, higher levels of pollution that 
come along with the higher level of production may in turn damage base of some other 
taxes, in particular the property tax base.  
As a rational agent, the government or bureaucrats would try to seek a balance 
between those two in order to maximize their revenue target. Under this situation, the tax 
structure may have a significant impact on the government’s incentives to deal with 
pollution. If tax revenues are mostly taken up by business activity taxes, such as VAT, as 
opposed to residential bases, such as the property tax, then government will have 
incentive to expand economic activities, with the hope of compensating for the loss from 
property tax with more revenue from VATs. The government may not have much interest 
in controlling pollution in this case, since maximizing production means maximizing 
revenue. Controlling for pollution levels requires reducing production activities, and 
reducing tax revenue accordingly, therefore it could be irrational to make this decision 
for the sake of the tax revenue. However, if most tax revenues are from property taxes, in 
order to protect property tax base, government will have stronger incentive to control 
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pollution and impose more strict environmental regulations to protect the environment, 
lowering pollution levels as much as possible. Even though pollution is detrimental to the 
atmosphere in remote areas, too, it will not have a direct impact on property tax. 
Therefore, as we mentioned earlier, here we need to assume that we are focusing on the 
pollution that negatively affects values of property in urban areas.  
It is interesting to note that in normative systems of revenue assignments at 
different levels of government, broad-based taxes, such as VAT and corporate income tax 
are assigned at the central government level, while property taxes are a much more ideal 
tax for local government (McLure 1983; Oates 1999) . These normative considerations 
are very often followed in actual assignments. All other things equal, we would have, 
therefore, that revenue maximizing local governments have much stronger interests in 
pollution control than central government in countries following this way of tax 
assignment. Consequently, we should expect in countries where property taxes have been 
assigned as an important source of local revenue, the higher proportion the property tax 
revenue takes up in local revenue, the more active environmental policies local 
government will have incentive to implement at the local level. Or the local government 
will impose pressure on the central government, if environmental policy decisions are 
made by the latter. The proportion of property tax in total tax revenue for upper level 
government, including states and federal government as in the US, will usually have no 
such effects, or not evidently so clear. This is partly due to the fact that for upper level 
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governments, the tax bases are more diversified, and property tax is usually not as a 
significant revenue source as at local level.75  
On the expenditure side, if healthcare were constitutionally assigned to the 
government, the government or bureaucrats should have an incentive to curb pollution. 
The reason is that many pollutants may negatively affect the human beings’ health status, 
which may in turn increase the government expenditure on health care. If the share of 
health care expenditure in total government expenditure is very high, in order to 
maximize the “surplus,” less pollution would be preferred. If the share is very small, the 
government or bureaucratic officials may not care about pollution that much. Different 
from the case of considering property tax at central level and local level on the revenue 
side, we do not differentiate between health expenditure at the central and local levels. 
One of the reasons is that the data differentiated between local health expenditure and 
central health expenditure is not generally available. In addition, the effect of pollution 
on expenditure side should work for both the central government and the local 
government, since neither of them will be oblivious to the pollution problem if health 
expenditure takes up big shares in their budgetary expenditure. Therefore, in our analysis 
we use health expenditure in total public expenditure in a general sense.  
In the following section, we will develop a theoretical model, starting from the 
revenue maximizing behaviors of a Leviathan government, formalizing the relationship 
between budget structure and the government efforts of pollution control. 
                                                        
75 Besides, the negative consequence of pollution to the property tax base is more conspicuous at local level. 
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The model 
Before the formal construction of the model, it is necessary to make some 
assumptions. 
The economy 
First we assume that the economy consists of only three key sectors and a 
Leviathan-like government. The government collects taxes and provides public goods. 
The residents cannot control the government behavior by voting system, either because 
there exists an asymmetric information problem related to voting (Turnbull and Mitias 
1999), or simply because there is no voting mechanism in some countries, or because the 
voting system does not work. Instead, we assume the government is bounded by a 
“constitution,” or the predetermined budget structure as described in essay one.  
The first sector is manufacturing, which includes industries such as automobile, 
chemical, clothing and many more others. This sector is assumed to be a pollution-maker, 
with higher production bringing about more pollution. The second is real estate sector 
that consists of properties that can be used commercially or residentially. The third is the 
health care sector.  
The last two sectors are assumed to produce no pollution at all. They are, rather, 
influenced negatively by pollution. For the real estate sector, pollution may drive down 
the market values for houses and land. For example, pollution may destroy some 
historical sites, and then significantly shock the local tourism sector. Also, pollution may 
make the environment in some community very unpleasant and lower the value of 
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property through capitalization. Pollution also has a negative impact on people’s health 
conditions, and thus imposes heavy burden on health care industry. For example, the 
increases in the pollution level will increase the probability of people getting sick, as a 
consequence the health care industry will have to spend more. This is well established in 
the literature.76  
The “Constitution” (the Budget Structure) 
Tax revenue 
In the economy the goal of the Leviathan-like government is to fiscally exploit 
the citizens, under the only constraint of the given constitution. On the revenue side, the 
government is granted the power to levy two kinds of taxes by the constitution, a 
business type tax such as VAT and a property tax. In addition, the tax rates are 
pre-determined by the constitution because the voters know well that otherwise the 
government would have an incentive to increase the tax rates at after-constitution stage in 
order to obtain more tax revenue, as we argued in the first essay.  
Expenditure 
On the expenditure side, the voters also know that the government wants to make 
the fiscal surplus as big as possible. Therefore it is rational for the government to spend 
as little funds as possible in order to obtain more surpluses, if there are no constraints. To 
deal with this problem, the constitution sets up some mandates on what the government 
                                                        
76 For example, there is a causal relationship between pollution level and mortality rate (Dockery et al. 1993).   
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should provide to the residents. We assume that the government is obligated to provide 
public health services.  
Thus the Leviathan government is required to provide two categories of public 
goods. One is related to the health care provision. Expenditure on education, 
infrastructure investment, social security and so on goes to the category of OTHERS, 
denoted by G. The reason we divide the expenditure responsibilities in this way is based 
on our assumption that the former category is influenced by pollution, while the latter is 
not directly related to pollution. 
Economic policy 
As a government, we assume that the only economic policy instrument at the 
Leviathan government’s discretion is environmental policy. The government can use this 
instrument to serve its goal. In other words, the policy is a tool to balance the gain and 
loss at the revenue and expenditure sides of the budget, respectively. 
The Model Specification 
To capture the exact impact of pollution on the Leviathan government’s behavior, 
and how the pollution level is determined, we need to specify the following variables. 
We first assume that the government can perfectly control the pollution level. So 
the real pollution level d can be represented by the government efforts of controlling 
pollution, e . This implies that the environmental policy can achieve the desirable level of 
pollution, therefore the government can control the pollution to an extent that is optimal 
to the government. For the relationship between real pollution level  and the d
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government efforts of controlling pollution , we have e )(edd = , and . Due to 
this, we can use e instead of d to explain the relationship between pollution and other 
variables. In other EKC literature, since the role of government is not a variable of 
interest, usually the pollution level itself is used.
0)(' <ed
77  
On the revenue side, the government has two sources of revenue. The first one is 
business tax. Given the tax rate vτ , the only avenue for obtaining higher tax revenue is 
to expand the manufacturing production as high as possible since production level is the 
tax base of business tax. To increase its fiscal surplus, the Leviathan needs to seek the 
expansion of the production activities as far as possible. Production in this economy is 
inherently related to the level of pollution. As pointed out earlier, there is a positive 
relationship between production level and pollution level. The expansion of the 
production level will inevitably expand the pollution level. We assume that the 
production level is a function of pollution level and the government efforts to control 
pollution: and . and 
d
))(( edff = 0)(' >dfe 0)(' <∂
∂•∂
∂=
e
d
d
fef . Hereafter, we will 
ignore the real pollution level d , and focus on government efforts of pollution control, 
. e
Because the base of the business tax is the production level, it relates to pollution 
level and therefore indirectly relates to the government effort to control pollution. We 
therefore define the base of business tax as ))(( efVV = , or simply . If )(eVV =
                                                        
77 In our estimation, we actually use the pollution levels instead, while controlling for the measure of governance, 
mainly due to the difficulty of quantitatively measuring the effort of government pollution control. 
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government applies higher environment standards and enforce the law more vigorously, 
the production level would be lower because the government’s efforts of controlling 
pollution can significantly increase the prices of the inputs, driving up the costs of the 
production and reduce the profits. In some extreme case, the stringent pollution control 
may even make production unprofitable and therefore force the exit of some firms. On 
the other hand, if lower the environmental standards, the costs of locally produced 
products will be reduced; therefore expanding production will be more profitable. Also, 
more firms will enter the industry to take the advantages of these more polluter-friendly 
environmental standards (Smarzynska and Wei 2001). Under both of these situations the 
production would expand. Therefore there exists a negative relationship between 
production level and government efforts of curbing pollution, or  and 
. 
0)(' <eVe
0)(" <eVe
In addition, the production activity plays different levels of importance at 
different stages of economic development (Balsdon 2003; Gallapher 2004). When GDP 
per capita is low, the economy may not have strong production capacities. As the 
economy grows, the manufacturing activities expand too. This positive relationship, 
however, does not last forever. At some points, this positive relationship may become 
negative in that developed countries may specialize on technology-intensive and human 
capital-intensive industries that are less pollution-conducive (Hettige, Lucas, and 
Wheeler 1992).78  
                                                        
78 As countries become more developed, they tend to adopt human capital intensive technologies and provide more 
services instead of simply manufacturing products, different from mining and chemistry industries that are prevail in 
countries with lower level of development. Here we refer to those high-tech industries that require highly intensive 
technology and human capital and don’t remit as much pollution as those relatively more primitive manufacturing 
industries. 
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One important phenomenon that needs to be pointed out is that, some developing 
countries take great efforts to attract more FDI inflows, which allows developed 
countries to relocate their heavy polluting industries to these developing countries, in 
order to take advantage of the lower environmental standards of the destination countries. 
This is the so called the “pollution heaven.” And even worse, if other countries get 
threatened by the capital flight, they might reduce their environmental standards to keep 
capital from moving out or to attract new investment, which is predicted by the “race to 
the bottom” theory. The “race to the bottom” or the “pollution haven” hypothesis is still 
in great controversy. Wheeler (2003), Eskeland and Harrison (1997) and many others 
argue that the empirical studies do not support this line of thought. Nonetheless, there are 
some studies showing evidence of support, for example, Smarzynska and Wei (2001), 
Xing and Kolstad (1998). This hypothesis actually reveals the relationship between level 
of production and level of pollution from a different angle: countries with lower 
environmental standards are usually countries with low incomes, the investment from the 
polluting industry will degrade the environmental quality in these countries. While for 
higher income countries from which these dirty industries come, the environmental 
quality will be improved, if they do not relax their environmental standards.  
In short, the production level is a function of both pollution level, d, which in turn 
is a function of , and GDP per capita. Because the business tax is based on the 
manufacturing level, we have that the business tax is a function of both  and GDP per 
e
e
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capita I, namely, .),( IeVV = 79 Therefore, we have , which captures the 
effects of government behavior of pollution control on the business tax. To expand the 
tax base and gain higher tax revenue, the government has incentives to lower . 
0),(' <IeVe
e
On the other side of Leviathan’s revenue coming from the property tax, two 
factors should be examined carefully. First, the higher production level is not a free lunch. 
Though a higher-level production can expand the base of the business tax, the pollution 
coming with it will damage the value of the real estate properties. This would lower 
Leviathan’s revenue from property tax, given property tax rate pτ . Therefore, the 
property tax base is a function of government efforts to control pollution. We assume 
before some point and after that. The reason 0)(' >ePe 0)(' <ePe P  is concave in  is 
that when  increases initially, pollution decreases and the value of property goes up. 
When , however, is too high, the production level becomes lower, which means that 
the environmental restrictions put too much pressure on production activities and even 
lead to the exit of some firms. The pessimistic prospect for the job market drives people 
away to other localities, and then the demand on the property, such as housing, will be 
lower, which will lead to the drop in property value. Second, the value of property is 
significantly influenced by GDP per capita. The property value will increase as GDP per 
capita increases. To model the effects of these two factors, we have the following 
equation, namely, . Therefore, we will have 
e
e
e
),( IePP = 0>∂
∂
e
p before some point and 
0<∂
∂
e
p afterwards. Also we have 0>∂
∂
I
p . 
                                                        
79 We need to note that the relationship between V and I is non-linear. 
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About the demand for health care, H, we also need to consider two factors. The 
first one is still the pollution level. In order to harvest the revenue increase resulting from 
the boom in the production level, however, the government needs to pay a price that it 
may face a bigger heath bill resulting from the higher pollution levels, since 
higher-pollution level can expose residents to an unhealthier environment and they will 
have a higher chance of getting sick., No matter to what extent a government spends on 
the health care service for its residents, increased pollution will more or less drive up 
public health expenditure since it is one of the basic public services governments are 
obligated to deliver. What is more, a small increase in the pollution level can possibly 
significantly increase the chances of residents being negatively affected by the pollution. 
So the government’s expenditure for health protection is also a function of government 
efforts to control pollution . We will have  and . e 0)(' <eH e 0)('' >eH e
The demand for health care is a normal good in the sense that as people get richer, 
namely, as GDP per capita increases, they will usually demand more and better health 
care services. Meanwhile, government has more resource available and so is able to 
spend more on health care as income increases. So the demand for health is a function of 
both the government efforts of pollution control and GDP per capita, . ),( IeHH =
In the context that we discussed above, the Leviathan’s problem becomes the 
following 
)1(),(),(),( GIeHIePIeV pv
e
Max −⋅−⋅⋅+⋅⋅ γτβτα  
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Where vτ is the tax rate for the business tax, pτ  is the rate of property tax. 
α , β  and γ  are pre-determined parameters, measuring the extent of the 
government levy taxes on the economic resource and the extent of the government taking 
care of the health of the residents. For example, the Leviathan government may be 
obligated to pay the entire health care bill; or, alternatively, the Leviathan may decide to 
pay nothing. If γ  is defined as the share of health care expenditure the Leviathan takes 
as its responsibility, ]1,0[∈γ . If 0=γ , the government pays nothing for the health bill. 
If 1=γ , then the government pays the entire bill.80 Same are true for α  and β , which 
can be taken as the weights of revenue sources given to the business tax and property tax, 
respectively. Similarly, if 0=α , the government does not levy the business tax; if 1=α , 
then the government exhibits a fierce collection on the business tax. If 0=β , the 
government does not levy property tax; if 1=β , then the government relies heavily on 
property tax as its revenue source and therefore exerts great collection efforts. 
The first-order condition (FOC) to this revenue maximization function is81
)2(0),(),(),( ''' =⋅−⋅⋅+⋅⋅ IeHIePIeV eepev γτβτα . 
The government behavior on the efforts of pollution control is governed by the FOC (2).  
From the above equation,  can be denoted as a function of all the other variables in (2) e
                                                        
80 Here the case of health care is different in that usually governments are paying more or less for the health care of the 
resident, therefore in general we should expect 10 << γ ; unlike the weights to VAT and property tax, which can take 
the value of zero since some countries don’t levy VAT or property tax. We don’t differentiate here.  
81 The last term in the object function disappears in the FOC because, according to our assumption, that G is not 
related to the government efforts . e
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)3(),,,,,( γβαττ pvIee =  
From this revenue maximization problem, we can derive the following 
propositions: 
Proposition I, for any given per capita income I , budget structure or the 
constitution in the sense of the first essay matters in pollution control. The effort devoting 
to pollution control, and therefore, according to our assumption, the pollution level, is 
determined by the constitution. The constitution, following what we used in the first 
essay, states whether government has business taxes or residential taxes, and how 
obligated it is to provide services to mediate the health effects of pollution, and etc.   
Proposition II, for any given per capita income I , if 0>α , 0=β  and 0=γ , 
the revenue maximizing Leviathan will have no incentive to control pollution. For the 
proof, please see the Appendix B-1 
Proposition III, for any given per capita income I , if 0=α , 0>β  and 0>γ , 
and the pollution level is high (which means e is low), the Leviathan will have strong 
incentives to control pollution. But the extent of pollution control is subject to some 
constraints and can not be too high. There exists an optimal level of pollution control. 
For the proof, please see the Appendix B-2. 
If all the three parameters α , β  and γ are in the range of (0, 1), without taking 
the extreme values, we would expect the optimal level of pollution control is achieved by 
balancing the revenue and expenditure associated with the pollution level. Specifically, 
the optimal condition is governed by the FOC (2) above, or 
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As the pollution affects government behavior from both the revenue side and the 
expenditure side of the budget, the interaction between the two sides of the budget makes 
the problem even more complicated. For example, if a government does not need to 
spend much on healthcare and relies heavily on the pollution production activities (from 
which government can collect the business tax), it may even try to attract those 
high-pollution industries into its jurisdictions in order to increase their tax bases. Bidding 
for “dirty” industries could be a “good choice” under those circumstances, given the 
assumption of government strategic behavior. However, if with the same level of 
expenditure responsibility on health care, while most tax revenue is from property tax, 
the government will be interested in maintaining higher environmental quality. We can 
see the outcomes of the interaction more clearly through the following table.  
 
Table A Different Incentives under Different Budget Structures 
  Share of Public Health Expenditure 
                 High  Low  
Tax collected from 
pollution production 
activities (Business 
related taxes)  
Trade-off Lowest incentives 
Main 
Component of 
Revenue 
Source  
Property tax 
 
Highest incentives 
 
Trade-off 
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According to the Table above, we will expect some interactions between budget 
structure and government behavior of pollution control. The model above covers the 
relationship among business related taxes, the property tax and health expenditure and 
their interaction in a comprehensive framework. To summarize, if we make the 
assumption that the government’s effort of pollution control can effectively achieve 
desired pollution level, we can formulate the following three hypotheses,  
Hypothesis I:  
Higher proportion of tax revenue collected from business related taxes gives 
government weaker incentives to protect environment quality. Therefore, higher ratio of 
business related taxes over total tax revenue will result in lower effort of pollution 
control and higher pollution level. 
Hypothesis II: 
Higher proportion of tax revenue collected from property tax gives government 
stronger incentives to protect environment quality. Therefore, higher ratio of property tax 
over total tax revenue will result in higher effort of pollution control and lower pollution 
level. 
Hypothesis III: 
A fuller assignment of expenditure responsibilities on health gives government 
stronger incentives to protect environment quality. Therefore, the higher the ratio of 
public health expenditure over total expenditure, the stronger incentive of pollution 
control and the lower the pollution level. 
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In the following section, we test empirically the three hypotheses using a 
cross-section time series data set.  
Data and Methodological Issues 
Model specifications 
Starting from our previous hypotheses, we investigate whether differences in the 
budget structure have an impact on the government’s incentive to control pollution. More 
specifically, we want to see how effort towards pollution control, and therefore in turn, 
how the pollution level is affected by the incentives from the budget structure, 
exemplified by the shares of business related tax and property tax in total tax on the 
revenue side, in conjunction with the share of health expenditure in total government 
expenditure on the expenditure side.82 Thus, our equation takes the following form: 
),,,(Re, ControlGovExpvfM ti =                                      (1) 
where  is the level of total emissions for the aforementioned four air 
pollutants, Rev is a vector of variables that affect level of pollutions from the revenue 
side of the budget, Exp includes variables from expenditure side of the budget. Gov is a 
vector that captures the characteristics of the government, and control includes some 
variables controlling for the basic conditions of the country. We will explain the relevant 
variables included in each of these categories below. 
tiM ,
In order to capture the effects of incentives on the revenue side on the 
government behaviors, we use both data on business related taxes and property tax in our 
                                                        
82 This is under the assumption that the government’s policy can always achieve the desirable outcome. 
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estimation. Therefore, Rev includes Iratio, Cratio and Lratio. Iratio is the ratio of 
revenue from business related taxes over total revenue. According to our hypothesis I, the 
expected sign for the coefficient on this variable is positive in that higher ratio of 
business related taxes will lead to a lower effort of pollution control and thus a higher 
pollution level, due to the government’s motive of pursuing higher tax revenue.  
For property tax, the ratio of property tax over total revenue at both the central 
level and local level are adopted, since in our sample, property tax either constitutes the 
main revenue source of local government, or goes to the central government’s coffer .83 
We use Cratio to denote the ratio of property tax over total tax revenue collected by 
central government and regional government. Lratio is the ratio of locally collected 
property tax over total local government tax revenue. According to our hypothesis II, the 
expected signs of Cratio and Lratio are both negative. Our earlier analysis argues that the 
damage to the property tax is more evident at the local level; therefore we would expect 
the effect of Lratio to be more important. In other words, a bigger share of property tax 
in local tax revenue would lead to the local government to exert a higher effort of 
pollution control, and therefore result in a lower pollution level, and vice versa. The 
property tax ratio for the central and regional governments might not have the same 
effects, since the higher level government has a broader tax base than local government, 
and the negative consequence of pollution on property tax base will not be as substantive.  
                                                        
83 In a lot of countries, government is divided into central, regional (state or province,), and local government. In that 
case, we group central and regional government into central government. 
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In order to capture the effects of pollution on the expenditure side of government 
behavior, we use the ratio of government’ healthcare expenditure over total public 
expenditure, Hratio in Exp in equation (1).84 This variable measures to what extent the 
government is allocating fiscal resources to healthcare. A higher Hratio means that 
governments spend higher shares of resources on public health services; thus the 
government will have incentive to exert higher efforts to control pollution, in order to 
save on the expenditure outlet. Lower Hratio means that governments do not have 
obligation to spend much on public health, and thus have less incentive to control 
pollution. We anticipate this variable to have a negative effect, meaning a higher share of 
public expenditure on healthcare would give government more incentive to lower the 
pollution level. 
As mentioned above, the EKC hypothesis does not take into account the role of 
the government. However, in our framework, we are trying to identify whether 
governments play important roles in influencing environmental performance. One of the 
important policy conjectures we can investigate is whether the relationship between 
budget structure and government incentive in pollution control is more evident in 
democratic countries than in non-democratic countries. In order to test whether or not the 
political characteristic of the government play a role in the process of pollution control, 
we include a variable dem, which measures the extent of democracy in the country.  
                                                        
84 Our data set doesn’t differentiate between local government’s healthcare expenditures and those of the central 
government, mainly due to the data availability. Actually in most of the countries, central governments are at least 
partially responsible for the healthcare, except in very few countries such as China. 
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Following this line of analysis, it will also be helpful to control for the quality of 
governance. In our model we assume that the government intention of pollution control, 
and the policy instruments governments employ can achieve the desirable outcomes. This 
is a very strong assumption, and empirically we can relax it. In order to do this we need 
to control for some measure of governance. Only countries with good governance can 
possibly achieve the desired policy objectives. In our context, only countries with good 
governance can achieve the goal of reducing pollution to the desired level, a point that 
Dasgupta, et al (2004) make in their study. In a country with corruptive government, 
even when it has the incentive to control pollution, it might not be able to achieve the 
goal. Here we use cpi, the corruption perception index as the measure of governance. 
Both dem and cpi are included in Gov in equation (1). 
In addition, we include in our model some other variables to control for the 
characteristics of each country, which we denote in the model with Control. Firstly, in 
our model, per capita GDP enters our regression. We assume that, as a public good, 
environmental quality is a normal good. In other words, as GDP per capita increases, the 
demand for environmental quality also increases (North 1990), and government is not 
only obligated to provide better quality of environment, but also can afford to do so when 
income level is higher. Therefore, GDP per capita enters our regression as an explanatory 
variable, denoted by pgdp. We also control for population in a country, pop, since more 
population will bring about possibly more economic activities and thus more pollution 
than countries with less population. But if population is spread out in a big country, 
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pollution should be lower than when population is concentrated in a small country.  
From this perspective, the land area, land, is included in the model. We include each 
variable separately. 
Therefore, with all variables explicitly, our model takes this reduced form: 
)2(,,109,8
,7,6,5,4,3,21,
titiiti
tititititititi
vpoplandpgdp
cpidemHratioLratioCratioIratioM
++++
++++++=
βββ
βββββββ
 
In our model, the is a composite error term, which can be alternatively 
formulated in a way that includes country heterogeneity, which we denote by c
tiv ,
i, and , 
the idiosyncratic disturbance term. c
tiu ,
i captures country specific effects that do not vary 
over time. Usually for time series cross sectional data, we would also consider time effect, 
which changes over time. However, as we will see later on, we have few countries for 
which many time periods of data are available, so we mostly conduct one-way error 
component analysis.  
Data  
Environmental Indicators 
In the prevailing EKC literature, different kinds of pollutants are used to test the 
validity of the reversed U shape phenomenon, including air pollutants, water pollutants, 
deforestation, and so on, with a special interest in air pollution. We follow this tradition 
and use air pollution data to do our empirical test. Here for our purpose of empirically 
investigating the relationship between budget structure and environmental performance, 
we choose the following pollutants NOx, CO, SO2 and CO2 as our environmental 
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indicators. The reason is that they have different environmental and health impacts. 
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), six principal pollutants 
considered harmful to public health and the environment, also called "criteria" pollutants, 
have been set in National Ambient Air Quality Standards: Ozone, Particulate Matter 
(PM), Carbon Monoxide (CO), Nitrogen Dioxide (NOX), Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) and lead. 
We obtain cross sectional time series data for three of them, NOX, CO and SO2. In 
addition, CO2 is included due to the fact that data for CO2 is the most readily available. 
Even though it does not damage human health in any direct way, it is the major 
contributor of global warming and has significant impact on environment. Due to their 
different impacts on human health as well as on environment, government may have 
different incentives in controlling their emission levels.85 Also due to the different 
properties of these pollutants, aggregating might obscure some of the individual effect. 
Therefore, we will look at the relationship between pollution level and budget structure 
of each pollutant separately. Most of the EKC literature deals with individual pollutants, 
too.  
Mainly due to data availability, we do not make distinctions whether these 
pollutants are from production process or other processes, and use the total yearly 
emissions of a particular pollutant in a country instead. This could bring about potential 
                                                        
85 According to the information on the EPA website, CO affects human health by reducing the level of oxygen 
delivered. It is especially harmful to people with heart disease if at lower level, but will harm healthy people at high 
level. It also contributes to smog formation. NOx has serious health and environmental effect since the nitrogen oxides 
family has a lot of compounds and derivatives that contribute to smog, acid rain, particles that deteriorate human health, 
worsening water quality, global warming, formation of toxic chemicals, and leading to visibility impairment. SO2 
affects human health by damaging respiratory organs and functions. It is also conducive to the formation of acid rains, 
accelerating the decay of building and statute, changing negatively water and plant system and so on. For more detail, 
please visit http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair (last accessed on Dec. 05, 2005). 
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measurement error problems since air pollutants can flow across countries and total 
emissions might not accurately measure the extent of the pollution in a country at some 
point of time. A similar issue is that pollution can flow across different regions within a 
country, thus emissions at national level will not capture the extent of the pollution in 
different localities.86 Nonetheless, keeping these points in mind, the measure of total 
emissions should provide us a starting point for the relationship between pollution level 
control and government budget structures.  
Data Sources  
The data used in our empirical analysis come from several different sources. The 
data of dependent variables, level of pollutants including CO, NOx and SO2 are from 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory (GHG) Database, including data for a total of 108 countries, during the year of 
1990-2002.87 In addition, we obtain CO2 data from the World Development Indicator 
(WDI), 2004.  The pollutant data from UNFCCC are measured by total emission for a 
particular pollutant with the unit of gigagram, which is an equivalent measure of 
thousand metric tons that is used for CO2 from WDI.88                       
The data for the explanatory variable, ratios of taxes on the revenue side of the 
budget, Iratio, Cratio and Lratio, are from IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS). 
We use the general value added, sales, or turnover taxes in GFS as the measure of 
                                                        
86 In this sense, it is reasonable to take into consideration the geographical characteristics of a country, as Dasgupta, et 
al (2004) and others did in their works. We didn’t control this, nor could we carry out spatial analysis due to the limit 
of our dataset and the unbalanced nature of it. 
87 The GHD database contains more than 108 countries, but we leave out those countries with too limited data, and we 
end up have 108 countries.  
88 The UNFCCC includes data for CO2 as well. However, data from WDI give us more observations. Therefore we use 
CO2 from WDI instead. 
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business related tax in our estimation, thus the Iratio is the share of general value added, 
sales, or turnover taxes over total tax revenue. Cratio and Lratio are the shares of 
property tax in total tax at the central (and regional) and local level, respectively. The 
data for expenditure side of the budget, the expenditure ratio of central government on 
the health over total expenditure, Hratio, is from various issues of World Health Report 
published by World Health Organization (WHO).  
For the measure of government, Gov includes two variables, dem and cpi. The 
measure of democracy, dem is calculated with the two measurements of freedom from 
the “Freedom in the World” survey by the Freedom House: political rights and civil 
liberties. The former measures how freely people are involved in the political process, 
while the latter measures individual freedom of expression, rule of law, etc. Both of these 
two measurements are measured on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 denoting highest freedom. In 
order to capture the freedom both in the political sphere and personal life, we follow 
Dailami (2000) and use linear combination of these two to convert the measure of 
freedom to be within the range of [0,1], with 0 denote the least free.89 Since people from 
democratic countries generally enjoy more freedom than people from non-democratic 
countries in that in the latter, the authoritarian way of decision making deprives people of 
much freedom, we use the extent of freedom to measure the degree of democracy. This 
measure of democracy gives a rough idea of how democratic the country is from a 
special angle. 
                                                        
89 The formula Dailami (2000) used to convert is Dem = (14- score of political rights – score of civil rights)/12 . 
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The other measure of government, cpi, corruption perception index, is from 
Transparency International (TI). This measure is a survey-based composite measure of 
the extent of corruption, instead of a comprehensive measure for the quality of 
governance, which can not provide a precise measure whether or not an intended policy 
can achieve desired results; therefore it might not be an ideal proxy for our purpose. In 
addition, the index measures how corrupted countries are perceived to be, which not only 
gives the cpi an ordinal nature, but also makes it vulnerable to the cultural, democratic 
and economic backgrounds of the businesspeople and country analysts being surveyed as 
well as to the survey methodology change over time. However, this measure focuses on 
public sector corruptions, defining corruption as the “abuse of public office for private 
gain,” which at least partially possesses the characteristics of the governance indicator 
that we are trying to capture.90 Besides, compare with other measures, this index gives us 
more degrees of freedom.91  
For the control variables, Control includes GDP per capita, land areas, and 
population, which are all from WDI, 2004. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the estimation. More detailed explanations of each variable are 
presented in Table 2. 
We adopt panel data estimation because it has the advantage of pooling 
cross-section and time series data and thus increases degrees of freedom, which not only 
                                                        
90 This is according to the definition of TI. 
91 Other measurements include for example, the corruption control composite by Kaufmann in the WBI, which is 
released biannually, from 1996-2004.  
   
 134
mitigates our problem with limited data, but also partially deals with potential omitted 
variable bias by controlling for unobserved effects (Baltagi 2001; Wooldrige 2002).92 
Ideally we would have data for 108 countries spanning over years 1990-2002. However, 
missing values especially for the dependent variables and tax variables leave us 
unbalanced panel dataset with at best less than 100 observations.  
A closer look at the dataset gives us a clearer idea of what data we can actually 
use in our estimations. Among the four pollutants we are working with, CO2 has the 
biggest sample size; NOx and CO has the same size, while the size for SO2 is the smallest. 
Due to missing values, for most countries our data do not have many time periods 
available. The availability of the pollutants data and the tax data enable us to estimate the 
relationship between tax structure and pollution level within the range of 1995 to only 
2000 for CO2 and to 2001 or 2002 for the other three. Few countries have data available 
for all these years. Countries with longer horizons in the dataset include only Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark and Switzerland for NOx and CO (less Canada for SO2), and 
include additionally 5 countries including Bolivia, Mexico, Norway, Poland and Thailand 
for CO2. These limits on the data restrict us from applying more estimation techniques 
and favor performing some of the specification tests. Consequently, as we will see later, 
we empirical estimations are based on simple regressions. 
Empirical Estimation Issues 
                                                        
92 In theory panel data can achieve this; however, it is not necessarily as effective for our dataset, due to the poor 
quality of our dataset. Nonetheless, it can at least partially remedy the problem.  
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Econometric Estimation Issues 
Endogeneity Problem 
There are some potential endogeneity problems in our estimations. Our model 
predicts that as the share of health expenditure in total public expenditure, Hratio rises, 
the government will have greater incentive to control pollution, and therefore the 
pollution level should be lower. However, the high Hratio could be the consequence of 
high pollution level: when more people get sick because of the increased pollution level, 
government will have to spend more on health care and thus drive up Hratio. If this 
relationship is true, then we will encounter an endogeneity bias in our regression.  
To deal with this potential endogeneity problem for ratio of health expenditure, 
we use a Hausman test to test for endogeneity, using as an instrument life expectancy at 
birth.93 Following Castineira and Nunes (1999), Posnett and Hitiris (1992) and others, 
we tried different instrument variables, including share of population over 65 in total 
population, number of physicians in per 1000 people, number of hospital beds in per 
1000 people, share of education expenditure in total expenditure, share of military 
expenditure in total expenditure, and etc. Only share of education expenditure and life 
expectancy at birth are significant in the first stage regression. We finally choose life 
expectancy at birth as our instrument because education expenditure imposes further 
                                                        
93 The life expectancy at birth and all other variables are from World Development Indicator (WDI), 2004. 
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restrictions on our sample size in the regression. In Table 3, we can see that the life 
expectancy at birth is significant in the first stage regressions for all four pollutants.94
The null hypothesis for the Hausman is that the estimates from OLS and 
instrumental variable are not significantly different from each other. If we do not have 
evidence to reject the null of no difference, it is possible the OLS estimates are not badly 
biased. As illustrated in the last two rows in Table 3, in our estimations, the test statistics 
we obtain are not significant to reject the null for any of the four pollutants. Thus we can 
draw the conclusion that in our sample, there is no evidence of endogeneity.95
Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects 
We can write our model in the general form  
tiititititi ucXvXy ,,,,, ++=+= ββ  
For the panel dataset we have, the first thing we need to decide is whether we 
should choose fixed effects regression or random effects regression. The key criterion is 
whether unobserved effects ci, or the country heterogeneity is correlated with the 
explanatory variables . If ctiX , i is orthogonal to or uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables, we can treat ci as random by putting ci into the error term. The appropriate 
estimator is generalized least squares (GLS) estimator based on the composite error 
                                                        
94 Since all the explanatory variables are the same for all four pollutants, we should obtain the same results in first 
stage regressions in all cases. However, our sample sizes are different among different pollutants, which explains why 
the results are the same only for NOx and CO, while for SO2 and CO2, results are different.   
95 Note this Hausman test is sensitive to the chosen instruments. If the instrument is poor and the test statistic lacks 
power, it will not be able to reject the null and the model will be misidentified due to the presence of the endogeneity 
problem. 
   
 137
term .tii uc ,+ 96 If is correlated with the explanatory variables , then fixed effects 
regression is necessary.  
ic tiX ,
In considering the roles of geographical characteristics play in affecting pollution 
level, we believe fixed effects regression be better to account for these effects that are not 
changing over time. However, lack of data makes it infeasible to conduct fixed effects 
regression. Therefore, we assume that in the general form model, ci is uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables and apply random effects regression.  
Error Structure 
Another important issue is that because different components of the dataset are 
from different data sources, thus we would not expect that error terms to possess the 
property of  and . Recall that v is the composite error, and almost 
certainly . If we follow most of the EKC studies and do OLS regressions, 
heteroskedasticity problem will arise and consistent but inefficient estimates will be 
produced, which raises the necessity of testing for the heteroskedasticity. We use the 
robust standard errors to correct for the heteroskedasticity in our pooled least squares 
regressions. In the panel data regressions, we also correct for heteroskedasticity by 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), assuming the idiosyncratic error terms take 
some special structures, which we will discuss in more detail in Appendix A.  
0][ =vE 2][ σ=vVar
][][ 22 ji vEvE ≠
Additionally, due to the time series in the data, there is a potential dynamic 
process. The emissions in this year could be due to the same reasons for the emissions 
                                                        
96 As we will explain in detail later, the way of treating can take the general form or random effect regressions. tiu ,
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last year, or the year before. Due to the limitations on our dataset, we do not have 
sufficient time series data to deal appropriately with the dynamic structure, but hope we 
can remedy this in the future once better data become available. 
Regression Results 
We use several estimation strategies. First, in order to compare our hypothesis 
with those original EKC studies, we follow Panayotou (1993)’s estimation model to 
examine the relationship between pollution indicators and GDP, GDP square with our 
data. From the outcomes we can determine if our data provide support to the EKC 
hypothesis. However, even though we are following the log linear functional form, we 
need to be mindful that the data we used in this study is different from what Panayotou 
used in 1993 since we have an unbalanced panel dataset.  
Therefore, first we estimate the following equation using the total emissions of 
pollutants: 
titititi pgdppgdpMLn ,
2
,3,21, )()( εβββ +++= .             (3)                     
Here  are the emission levels of CO, COiM 2, NOX and SO2, pgdp is per capita GDP.
97
Our results show that our data set are conformable to the EKC framework in that 
all the quadratic forms are negative. We report the results for these regressions in Table 4. 
Then we test the three hypotheses by adding the six variables Iratio, Cratio, 
Lratio, Hratio, dem and cpi, as well as some control variables that we mentioned earlier, 
to the list of explanatory variables and estimating the following equations: 
                                                        
97 From here we can see that our equation is different from what Panayotou (1993) used in his paper. 
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We still follow this log linear functional form, taking the logarithm of the 
dependent and independent variables except for the ratio of health expenditure.98 We 
estimate 4 different models for each of the pollutants here. Model 1 is the pooled OLS 
regressions. Model 2-4 are the random effects regressions, since, as we tested earlier by 
Hausman specification test, random effects are preferable to fixed effects for our data.99 
Model 2 and model 3 are the traditional random effects regressions, a special form of 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), which takes the country heterogeneity into 
account and we take to be the most appropriate models for our dataset. The difference 
between model 2 and 3 is that in model 3, we include a time trend to account for the time 
specific effects. Model 4 is the more general form of FGLS regressions. In the Appendix 
A, we explain in more detail the difference between the special FGLS, the random effects 
model (REM) in model 2 and 3 and the general FGLS in model 4.We assume the error 
structure is heteroskedastic and try to correct for the potential heteroskedasticity in model 
4. The results are presented in Tables 6-9. 
From Table 5 we can see that, in all 4 models, the share of business related taxes 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on pollution levels, which provides 
support to our hypothesis I. Since we are using logarithm transformations, it is easier to 
interpret the results. We can see the magnitude of the relationship between pollution and 
                                                        
98 Usually we don’t take logarithm of ratios. In considering of the relationship between pollution level and ratio of 
taxes is not linear, we multiply the tax ratios by 100 and then take logarithm of them.  
99 Except for SO2 that is weakly significant, as we discussed before. 
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business tax ratio ranges from 1.29-1.98 percentage points, which means that the increase 
in one percentage point in business tax ratio will result in pollution level increase by 
1.29-1.98 percentage points. The effects of property tax share at local level have small, 
but negative and significant impacts, which support our hypothesis II. The magnitude 
ranges from 0.3-0.4 percentage points. Coefficients of property tax ratio at central and 
regional level are mixed and imprecisely measured, which conformsto our earlier 
conjecture. Ratios of health expenditures always correctly give negative signs, usually 
with a magnitude of much bigger than business tax ratio and local property tax ratio 
except in model 3, even though only in model 4 is it significant.100 This provides some 
supporting evidence for our hypothesis III.  
The measure of democracy gives us systematically positive signs. This suggests 
that with this measure of democracy, we can say that the environmental policy control is 
performing worse in democratic countries than in non-democratic countries, at least with 
the pollution data of NOx in our sample. Given our results, it seems that the incentive of 
tax structure on government’s pollution control works better in non-democratic countries. 
The measure of governance, corruption perception index, gives mixed results. In the first 
3 models, the coefficient signs are negative, meaning countries with good governance 
should have better environment or less pollution, but the effects are not significant. One 
explanation might lie in the inadequacy of our dataset; in particular, our sample size may 
                                                        
100 We did not take the logarithm of the health expenditure ratio, therefore we need to take caution when interpreting 
and comparing the results.  
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not be large enough. In addition, these two measures might not be able to capture the 
political characteristics and quality of governance very well. We hope that better 
measurements can be used in the future.  
For the control variables, population and per capita GDP are always positive and 
significant, meaning more populated countries and richer countries have higher level of 
pollution, which is intuitive. Given the high correlation between per capita GDP and 
democratic measure, our positive results of democracy are not a surprise: countries with 
higher income are usually more democratic, and also these countries have more serious 
pollution problem.101 Land area is always negative and mostly significant, suggesting 
that NOx gets dispersed as the country becomes bigger. The time trend in model 3 is 
negative and significant, meaning level of NOx decreases over time. As we will observe 
later, for the other three pollutants, time trends always exhibit a strong negative pattern. 
From Table 6 we can see that, for the pollutant CO, we generally have the similar 
story as NOx, with smaller magnitude for business tax ratio and similar for central (and 
regional) property tax ratio and health expenditure ratio. But in the two random effects 
models 2 and 3, business tax ratios are not significant. In addition, local property tax 
ratio and per capita GDP do not have expected good and significant results; neither does 
the land area exhibit the strong relationship as it does for NOx. However, the health 
expenditure ratio is always negative and significant in two out of the 4 models. Results 
                                                        
101 The pair wise correlation between per capita GDP and democracy is 0.585, and highly significant. 
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for democracy and corruption perception index are still mixed, and usually the 
coefficients are not significant. 
Table 7 indicate that, the results for SO2 are not as good as those for NOx and CO. 
The coefficients for business tax ratio differ by big scales depending on model, while the 
local property tax ratio and health expenditure ratio exhibit the similar trend as NOx and 
CO. The business tax ratios are only positive and significant in model 1. Ratios of 
property tax at local level have correct signs only in model 3 but not significant. Health 
expenditure ratio is only significant in the random effects model 2, even though it is 
negative in 3 of the 4 models. However, the unexpected big magnitude of the coefficient 
in model 2 is suspicious. For democratic measures, the coefficient gives negative signs in 
all 4 models in this case, meaning that the democratic countries control emissions of SO2 
better than non-democratic countries, however the signs are not significant. For 
governance measures, except in model 2, we usually have positive and significant 
coefficients. According to this, countries with good governance or less corruption will 
have higher levels of SO2. Per capita GDP usually has significantly negative signs in this 
case, which means richer countries tend to have less SO2. When we take into account that 
richer countries usually are those countries with less corruption, we encounter a 
contradiction here. However, SO2 is mainly from heavy industries and is different from 
other pollutants, which might be part of the reasons for the difference in the estimations. 
Besides, we have the smallest sample size for SO2, which might contribute to these poor 
results. The time trend is again significantly negative. 
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Table 8 records the results for CO2. We can see from this table that CO2 is the 
pollutants that we have the biggest sample size. As it illustrated, business tax ratio are 
always positive, but only significant in model 4, with the scales smaller than the other 
pollutants. Different from the pollutants that we dealt with earlier, for CO2, both property 
taxes at central and regional level and at local level are negative. Health expenditure ratio 
does not always exhibit negative signs as other pollutants do and the scales are smaller, 
too. This can be explained partly by the fact that CO2 is not directly detrimental to human 
health, therefore it does not have as strong effects on health expenditure as other 
pollutants. Levels of CO2 are surely higher where economic activities are more 
prosperous, as both people’s livelihood and production activities contribute to the level of 
CO2. However, due to the special role of CO2 in greenhouse effects, it is one of the most 
important contributors to global warming, thus gives every level of government great 
incentives to control the emission level. The serious consequences of global warming 
make it even more important for the higher level government than for local government 
to control level of CO2, which partly explains the different effects on property tax ratios 
for central and local governments from other pollutants. Measure of democracy does not 
give us systematic results in this case either. But corruption index are generally positive 
and significant in 2 models, meaning in countries with good governance or less 
corruption, level of CO2 is higher, which is an unexpected result. Coefficients of 
population, per capita GDP, and land areas are generally positive and significant, 
meaning countries with more prosperous economic activities, higher population and 
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higher income usually have higher level of CO2, which does not have the contradiction as 
in the case for SO2. 
Therefore, as a summary illustrated in table 9, we report the results from model 3, 
our preferred model, for all four of the pollutants that we are considering here. Most of 
our regressions provide evidence supporting our hypotheses, though in some cases the 
evidence is not very strong. We observe that higher ratio of business related taxes in tax 
revenue, lower share of property tax in tax revenue at local level, and lower share of 
public health expenditure over total public expenditure are associated with higher 
pollution level and vice versa. The strong time trends show that pollution decreases over 
time.  
We could not obtain evidence whether or not the environmental policy is different 
for democratic countries and non-democratic countries, nor could we obtain the effect of 
governance on pollution control. These results call for better measurements. But 
meanwhile, it is possible that the incentive of budget structure to government 
environmental control works for both the democratic countries and non-democratic 
countries. 
Conclusion 
In this study we are trying to obtain evidences to support the proposition that the 
government budget structure can influence government incentives and therefore has 
effects on the provisions of public goods, with environmental quality as the example.  
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In conclusion, the empirical evidence we obtained in this study provides supports 
to our three hypotheses, even though the quality of the dataset and measurements of 
certain variables need improvement. We establish that the government incentives and 
budget structure can have some impacts on government behavior. And according to our 
empirical results, it works regardless of the political characteristics of the countries. 
Therefore, for the purpose of dealing with environmental problems, in addition to other 
direct and indirect regulations, incorporating government budget structure into the 
process of decision-making may be a good choice. More specifically, transition from 
relying on business related tax system to employ property tax to a broader extent and 
adopting government-financing healthcare system may be conducive to improving 
environmental performance. We can see that the policy implication of traditional EKCs 
that economic growth will cure environment problem by itself, and then “grow first, 
clean up later” is misleading. 
Governments are the same as individuals and firms in that they all have their own 
interests and respond to different incentives. Government incentives and governments’ 
strategic behaviors under different incentive schemes should be given full consideration 
when making policy decisions.
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Table 1. Summary of Statistics 
 
 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviations 
Minimum Maximum 
Nitrogen Oxides 
(NOx) 
477 1129.89 3566.588 0.08 22860 
Carbon Monoxide 
(CO) 
478 5438.914 18040.28 0.02 130580 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) 409 1055.501 3097.563 0.01 20936 
Carbon Dioxide 
(CO2) 
1136 144157.7 544707.8 0 5600000 
Ratio of Business Tax 613 0.376824 1.347949 0 17.05926 
Ratio of Property tax 
at Central Level 
511 0.031641 0.033209 6.48E-06 0.171187 
Ratio of Property tax 
at Local Level 
378 0.476918 3.598491 7.99E-06 70.02703 
Population 1404 2.40E+07 3.96E+07 770000 2.88E+08 
Ratio of Health 
Expenditure 
864 10.89664 4.519649 1.6 28.9 
Democracy 1383 0.601772 0.307262 0 1 
Per Capita GDP 1381 7001.864 10769.6 84.73576 46894.91 
Corruption Perception 
Index 
470 5.219468 2.463203 0.4 10 
Land Area 1365 799957.1 2085717 670 1.69E+07 
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Table 2. Explanations of Variables 
Variables Label Unit Source 
Pollution level measured 
by total emissions of  
NOx 
NOx
Thousand metric 
tons 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory (GHG) Database 
Pollution level measured 
by total emissions of CO 
CO 
Thousand metric 
tons 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory (GHG) Database 
Pollution level measured 
by total  emissions of SO2
SO2
Thousand metric 
tons 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory (GHG) Database 
Pollution level measured 
by total  emissions of 
CO2
CO2
Thousand metric 
tons 
World Development Indicator Database 
(WDI), 2004 
Ratio of VAT revenue in 
total  tax revenue 
Iratio in percentage 
IMF Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS), 2004 
Ratio of central property 
tax revenue in total central 
revenue 
Cratio in percentage 
IMF Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS), 2004 
Ratio of local property tax 
revenue in total local 
revenue 
Lratio in percentage 
IMF Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS), 2004 
Population pop No. of people 
World Development Indicator Database 
(WDI), 2004 
Ratio of public health 
expenditure over total 
public expenditure 
Hratio in percentage 
Various issues of World Health Report 
published by World Health Organization 
(WHO) 
Democracy dem [0,1] Freedom House 
Per capita GDP pgdp 
In constant 1995 
dollars 
World Development Indicator Database 
(WDI), 2004 
Corruption perception 
index 
cpi [0,10] Transparency International 
Land areas land Square kilometers 
World Development Indicator Database 
(WDI), 2004 
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Table 3. Endogeneity Test Results 
 
 
 NOx CO SO2  CO2
First stage results: 
 Dependent variable: Ratio of Health Expenditure  
-0.514 -0.514 -2.115 -0.544 Ratio of Business 
Tax (0.55) (0.55) (1.57) (0.56) 
0.254 0.254 0.238 0.327 Ratio of Property 
tax at Central Level (1.05) (1.05) (0.98) (1.17) 
-0.893 -0.893 -0.620 -0.987 Ratio of Property 
tax at Local Level (2.60)*** (2.60)*** (1.62) (2.64)*** 
0.004 0.004 -0.497 0.100 
Population 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.87) (0.20) 
0.674 0.674 0.711 0.539 Life Expectancy at 
Birth (3.21)*** (3.21)*** (3.30)*** (2.18)** 
-1.583 -1.583 1.356 -4.880 
Democracy 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.49) 
-0.705 -0.705 -1.471 -0.593 
Per Capita GDP 
(0.99) (0.99) (1.72)* (0.56) 
0.040 0.040 1.132 0.487 Corruption 
Perception Index (0.03) (0.03) (0.80) (0.26) 
0.123 0.123 0.705 0.142 
Land Areas 
(0.43) (0.43) (1.52) (0.48) 
-28.739 -28.739 -20.221 -22.198 
Constant 
(1.89)* (1.89)* (1.27) (1.32) 
Observations 54 54 50 48 
R-squared 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.64 
IV test  2χ 1.28 4.08 0.00 1.50 
P-value 0.9985 0.9060 1.000 0.9972 
 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. Simple Regressions Testing EKC Hypothesis 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log of NOx Log of CO Log of SO2 Log of CO2
Per capita GDP 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.019 
 (5.17)*** (2.93)*** (3.80)*** (8.35)*** 
Square of per capita GDP -0.024 -0.019 -0.036 -0.030 
 (5.38)*** (4.12)*** (6.19)*** (6.51)*** 
Constant 4.102 6.458 3.803 8.884 
 (19.67)*** (30.47)*** (11.65)*** (43.64)*** 
Observations 472 473 404 1120 
Number of Countries 96 97 69 106 
 
 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5. Regression Results for NOx
 
 
 
Model (1) 
Pooled OLS 
With Robust se 
Model (2) 
RE 
Model (3) 
RE w/Time Trend 
Model (4) 
FGLS/Hetero 
 Dependent Variable: Logarithm of NOx 
1.982 1.287 1.448 1.945 
Ratio of Business Tax 
(6.94)*** (2.83)*** (3.39)*** (9.65)*** 
0.004 -0.020 -0.032 -0.007 Ratio of Property tax 
at Central Level (0.12) (0.26) (0.45) (0.25) 
-0.394 -0.300 -0.360 -0.357 Ratio of Property tax 
at Local Level (4.59)*** (1.97)** (2.51)** (6.03)*** 
-0.048 -0.071 -0.001 -0.048 Ratio of Health 
Expenditure (1.50) (1.40) (0.01) (2.38)** 
1.515 1.409 1.374 1.477 
Population 
(19.29)*** (8.75)*** (9.21)*** (24.21)*** 
1.557 0.412 0.659 1.699 
Democracy 
(3.39)*** (0.50) (0.81) (2.41)** 
0.472 0.572 0.437 0.394 
Per Capita GDP 
(3.46)*** (2.37)** (1.85)* (4.55)*** 
-0.066 -0.263 -0.092 0.274 Corruption Perception 
Index (0.17) (0.70) (0.24) (1.37) 
-0.321 -0.390 -0.345 -0.285 
Land Area 
(3.62)*** (2.81)*** (2.66)*** (3.89)*** 
  -0.073  
Time Trend 
  (1.97)**  
-24.170 -20.003 -19.617 -23.794 
Constant 
(9.69)*** (4.77)*** (5.01)*** (13.93)*** 
Observations 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.90    
Number of Countries  18 18 18 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6. Regression Results for CO 
 
 
 
Model (1) 
Pooled OLS 
With Robust SE 
Model (2) 
RE 
Model (3) 
RE w/Time Trend 
Model (4) 
FGLS/Hetero 
 Dependent Variable: Logarithm of CO 
0.619 0.312 0.502 0.827 
Ratio of Business Tax 
(3.05)*** (0.75) (1.42) (7.05)*** 
0.028 -0.004 -0.010 0.018 Ratio of Property tax 
at Central Level (0.86) (0.06) (0.16) (0.87) 
-0.119 0.001 -0.056 -0.134 Ratio of Property tax 
at Local Level (1.21) (0.00) (0.48) (3.02)*** 
-0.072 -0.056 -0.004 -0.091 Ratio of Health 
Expenditure (2.07)** (1.23) (0.07) (5.98)*** 
1.061 0.999 0.975 1.096 
Population 
(14.30)*** (6.65)*** (8.02)*** (20.78)*** 
0.266 0.126 0.281 -0.128 
Democracy 
(0.49) (0.17) (0.39) (0.50) 
0.347 0.340 0.243 0.358 
Per Capita GDP 
(3.46)*** (1.54) (1.23) (5.41)*** 
-0.409 -0.444 -0.305 0.093 Corruption Perception 
Index (1.37) (1.33) (0.92) (0.68) 
0.012 -0.043 0.005 0.046 
Land Area 
(0.17) (0.33) (0.05) (0.90) 
  -0.058  
Time Trend 
  (1.75)*  
-13.794 -11.558 -11.703 -16.187 
Constant 
(6.73)*** (2.99)*** (3.61)*** (15.01)*** 
Observations 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.87    
Number of Countries  18 18 18 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7. Regression Results for SO2
 
 
 
Model (1) 
Pooled OLS 
With Robust SE 
Model (2) 
RE 
Model (3) 
RE w/Time Trend 
Model (4) 
FGLS/Hetero 
 Dependent Variable: Logarithm of SO2 
0.915 -0.010 0.170 0.690 
Ratio of Business Tax 
(1.76)* (0.02) (0.32) (1.55) 
-0.108 0.022 0.002 -0.097 Ratio of Property tax 
at Central Level (1.36) (0.26) (0.03) (1.69)* 
0.057 0.215 -0.129 0.115 Ratio of Property tax 
at Local Level (0.39) (0.80) (0.56) (1.16) 
-0.040 -0.157 0.036 -0.073 Ratio of Health 
Expenditure (0.66) (2.70)*** (0.60) (1.59) 
1.155 1.121 1.095 1.121 
Population 
(4.88)*** (2.76)*** (3.18)*** (5.88)*** 
-1.394 -0.468 -0.356 -0.939 
Democracy 
(1.43) (0.67) (0.64) (1.04) 
-0.422 -0.383 -0.697 -0.678 
Per Capita GDP 
(2.05)** (1.06) (2.29)** (3.63)*** 
1.189 -0.256 0.368 1.390 Corruption Perception 
Index (2.35)** (0.75) (1.24) (2.95)*** 
0.198 -0.025 -0.001 0.286 
Land Area 
(0.89) (0.06) (0.00) (1.50) 
  -0.166  
Time Trend 
  (5.22)***  
-16.603 -6.955 -5.620 -13.942 
Constant 
(3.56)*** (1.05) (1.02) (3.61)*** 
Observations 57 57 57 57 
R-squared 0.83    
Number of Countries   17 17 17 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8. Regression Results for CO2 
 
 
 
Model (1) 
Pooled OLS 
with Robust SE 
Model (2) 
RE 
Model (3) 
RE w/Time Trend 
Model (4) 
FGLS/Hetero 
 Dependent Variable: Logarithm of CO2 
0.057 0.056 0.057 0.210 
Ratio of Business Tax 
(0.35) (0.57) (0.60) (2.68)*** 
-0.112 -0.027 -0.031 -0.097 Ratio of Property tax 
at Central Level (4.83)*** (1.25) (1.53) (7.35)*** 
-0.133 -0.100 -0.118 -0.065 Ratio of Property tax 
at Local Level (2.32)** (1.60) (1.97)** (2.03)** 
0.035 -0.015 -0.002 -0.003 Ratio of Health 
Expenditure (1.60) (1.72)* (0.26) (0.29) 
0.969 0.929 0.953 0.969 
Population 
(22.82)*** (8.58)*** (8.93)*** (44.75)*** 
-0.114 0.040 0.093 0.072 
Democracy 
(0.57) (0.56) (1.31) (0.50) 
0.177 0.344 0.370 0.226 
Per Capita GDP 
(1.27) (4.02)*** (4.42)*** (3.66)*** 
0.843 0.095 0.039 0.849 Corruption Perception 
Index (2.61)** (0.96) (0.41) (5.35)*** 
0.116 0.128 0.120 0.158 
Land Area 
(2.87)*** (1.69)* (1.61) (9.65)*** 
  -0.022  
Time Trend 
  (3.03)***  
-9.229 -8.404 -8.733 -10.386 
Constant 
(6.67)*** (5.58)*** (5.91)*** (18.36)*** 
Observations 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.92    
Number of Countries  27 27 27 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 9. Summary for the Results of Model 3 
 
 
 NOx CO SO2 CO2
Ratio of Business Tax (+) + + + 
Ratio of Property tax at Central 
Level 
- - + - 
Ratio of Property tax at Local Level (-) - - (-) 
Ratio of Health Expenditure - - + - 
Population (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Democracy + + - + 
Per Capita GDP (+) + (-) (+) 
Corruption Perception Index - - + + 
Land Area (-) + - + 
Time trend (-) (-) (-) (-) 
 
Note: we use + to denote positive coefficients and – for negative ones. Where the results are 
significant, we put them in bold and also in parentheses.  
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Appendix A General Form Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) 
and Random Effects Methods (REM)102
Consider the model in the general form 
,,,, tititi vxy += β  t = 1, 2, ..., T 
Or, ,,,, tiititi ucxy ++= β  t = 1, 2, ..., T 
Where is the unobserved country heterogeneity and time-invariant. ic
As we already explained, the differentiation between fixed effects regressions and 
random effects regressions mainly lies in whether or not the unobserved effects is 
correlated with the observed explanatory variables , t = 1, 2, ..., T. According to the 
results of Hausman specification test we performed, it is necessary that we treat as 
uncorrelated with , and therefore we should follow random effects estimation. 
ic
tix ,
ic
tix ,
The random effect estimation is the weighted average of the within (or fixed 
effects) regression and between regression. To illustrate, we take the model above, 
,,,, tiititi ucxy ++= β  t = 1, 2, ..., T                                      (1) 
And take the averages of the function, we then have 
,iiii ucxy ++= β  t = 1, 2, ..., T                                         (2) 
Where ∑= t
i
ti
i T
y
y , , ∑= t
i
ti
i T
x
x , , and ∑= t
i
ti
i T
u
u ,  
(2) – (1), we will have 
)()()( ,,, itiitiiti uuxxyy −+−=− β , t = 1, 2, ..., T                            (3) 
                                                        
102 In this part, we mainly follow the notation used in Wooldridge (2002), chapter 7 and chapter 10.  
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Applying OLS to estimate (3), we can get fixed effects estimators (or within 
estimators), and applying OLS to (2), we will have between estimators. The random 
effect regression is the weighted averages of the within and between estimator, which can 
take the form of  
)()()( ,,, itiitiiti uuxxyy θβθθ −+−=− , t = 1, 2, ..., T                          (4) 
With θ  be the weight put on the between transformation. θ  takes the value of 
[0,1]. When 0=θ , the random effects regression becomes OLS; while when 1=θ , the 
random effects regression becomes the fixed effects regression. 
In estimation process, we usually use generalized least squares (GLS) to estimate 
the random effect estimators. And depending on the assumptions we make, we can carry 
out general form GLS or the random effects model (REM) that we traditionally deal 
with.103 In GLS regressions, we assume that the unobserved effects is uncorrelated 
with the observed explanatory variables, or 
ic
0)( =′Ε iitcX . However, since stays the 
same within the panel in each time period t, the composite error will be correlated 
across time. In addition, the fact that depends on  for all time periods makes this 
correlation not fade along the increase of the time span.  
ic
tiv ,
tiv , ic
In addition, in REM we assume that the idiosyncratic error is serially uncorrelated 
and homoskedastic, or  and 22 )( uitu σ=Ε 0)( =Ε isituu  for all st ≠ , . 
Therefore, the serial correlation comes only from . And if we denote , we 
Tt ,...,2,1=
ic
22 )( cic σ=Ε
                                                        
103 This follows the language in Wooldridge (2002). Here the general form GLS is so called simply because it is more 
generalized than the REM. Special assumptions still have to be made for the idiosyncratic error terms in order to 
perform the regressions, however. 
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will have that , and 
.  
22222 )()()( ucitiit ucv σσ +=Ε+Ε=Ε
2)])([()( cisiitiisit ucucvv σ=++Ε=Ε
Therefore, under REM, the variance matrix will take the following form 
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If we have as the identity matrix, and TI TT JJ ′ as the TT × matrix with unity in 
every element, we can write the above matrix in the form 
TTcTu JJI ′+=Ω 22 σσ  
Then under this assumption, we only need to estimate two unknowns for each , 
and . There are different methods of estimating and , as discussed in 
Wooldridge (2002) and Hsiao (2003). Then, using this variance matrix, we can obtain the 
FGLS estimator by the following formula 
T
2
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This is what we did in our regression model 2 and 3. As we mentioned before, the 
difference between 2 and 3 is that we include year dummies in model 3, in order to take 
into account the time effects. Even though we generally do not have many time periods 
available, it is more appropriate to take the time effect into consideration. We do not 
report the dummies in the result tables, however. Due to the nature of the panel data set 
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we have, even though unbalanced, we deem these two models are more appropriate for 
our analysis, especially model 3.104
However, if we do not assume the composite errors  are composed of country 
heterogeneity  and idiosyncratic errors , with the latter well-behaved as in REM, 
we will need to use the general FGLS. We will use the form 
itv
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Where , and  is the pooled OLS residuals.  i
N
i
ivvN ′=Ω ∑
=
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1 βˆˆˆˆ iii Xyv −=
At one extreme case, if we assume  is i.i.d, we will have that  is the 
same as pooled OLS, . As the other extreme, for the most generalized form, we 
basically need to estimate each element of the variance matrix; with a total of 
 if we do not make any specific assumptions. But in general, there is a robust 
variance matrix available and takes the form 
itv FGLSβˆ
SOLSβˆ
2/)1( +TT
11
1
11
1
11
1
)ˆ)(ˆˆˆˆ()ˆ()ˆvar( −−
=
−−
=
−−
=
Ω′Ω′Ω′Ω′= ∑∑∑ iN
i
iiii
N
i
ii
N
i
i XXXvvXXXA β  
However, usually for the general GLS, we assume that the composite error  
take some special form, which will ease our regression a lot. For example if we assume 
that the composite errors are heteroskedastic, we can correct for the heteroskedasticity by 
specifying the relevant variance structures. This is what we did in our model 4. Since we 
itv
                                                        
104 And the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects gives us significant results for random 
regressions with all four pollutants, which confirms the existence of country heterogeneity (Breusch and Pagan 1980). 
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have a cross section time series dataset, we assume that the variance for each panel differ, 
which results in heteroskedasticicy.  
More specifically, in model 4, we assume that , or there is a unique 
 for each panel and different across panels, therefore we need to estimate the unique 
 for each group. We also assume for simplicity that 
22 )(
iuit
u σ=Ε
2
iu
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σ 0)( =Ε isitvv . The variance 
matrix will then take the following form 
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Or, to write in a matrix form, it will be . Tu Ii
2σ=Ω
Thus in model 4, in addition to , it is necessary to estimate the for each T. 2cσ 2iuσ
In this case, the variance matrix will take the form .After 
pooled OLS estimations, these covariance estimates and autocorrelation parameters are 
not difficult to obtain. And the FGLS estimation with the specially structured can be 
obtained relatively easier. 
TTcii jjuuE ′+′=Ω 2)( σ
Ω
   
 160
Appendix B Proof of propositions 
C-1. Proof of Proposition II. 
In this case, the F.O.C is  the only chance for  is 0),(' =IeVevτ 0' =eV 0=e . 
The government has no incentive and thus provides zero effort in pollution control, 
which means that the pollution level will be very high. 
),( IeVV =  
0' =eVwhere  
0 e 
 
C-2. Proof of Proposition III. 
In this case, the F.O.C is 
0),(),( '' =⋅⋅−⋅⋅ IeHRIeP eep γτβ .  
To make this equation hold, since we have P  is concave in , or  
before some point and after that; while H is convex in e, or , 
the only possible solution has to be on the part that . 
e 0),(' >IePe
'e 0),(' <IePe 0),(' <IeH e
0),(' <IePe
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0   e’   e   e* 
),(' IeH e
),(' IePe  
Property tax base/demand on health 
 
If pollution level is high, which shows that the government effort  is low, then 
increase in  would increase the value of property and save on the expenditure on 
health care at the same time, as illustrated in the diagram above, for the part before e’ . 
Therefore, the government has great incentive to increase e and control pollution. 
However, the government can not increase e too much. If the government effort e 
becomes so high that it not only lowers the pollution level and reduces the expenditure 
on health, but also at the same time drives down the property value, as illustrated in the 
diagram for point beyond e’, the government will have to balance the gain from saving 
on health expenditure and loss from drop in property tax. We would expect the 
equilibrium to be achieved at point e*, while H and P are cotangent to each other. At e* 
we have that the gain from savings on expenditure on healthcare is equal to the loss of 
property tax resulting from the lower property values.
e
e
   
REFERENCES 
Alderman, H. and C. Paxson. 1994. Do the poor insure? A synthesis of the literature on 
risk and consumption in developing countries. In Economics in a changing world: 
Proceedings of the tenth world congress of the international economics 
association, 4. London: Macmillan. 
Arrow, Kenneth, Bert Bolin, Robert Costanza, and et al. 1995. Economic growth, 
carrying capacity and the environment. Science 268, no. 4: 520-21. 
Bahl, Roy. 1999. Fiscal policy in China: The 1990 Institute. 
Bahl, Roy and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez. 2003. Fiscal federalism and economic reform in 
China. In Fiscal federalism in a global environment: Center for Research on 
Economic Development and Policy Reform, Stanford University. 
Balsdon, Ed. 2003. Political economy and the decomposition of environmental income 
effects. Center for Public Economics: Department of Economics, San Diego State 
University. 
Baltagi, BH. 2001. Econometric analysis of panel data. New York: John Wiley. 
Bergstrom, T. and R.  Goodman. 1975. Private demands for public goods. American 
Economic Review 63, no. 3: 280-296. 
Bernstein, T. and X. Lu. 2003. Taxation without representation in contemporary rural 
China. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Besley, T. 1995. Non-market institutions for credit and risk-sharing in low-income 
countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 3: 115-127. 
Blanchard, Oliver and Andrei Shleifer. 2000. Federalism with and without political 
centralization, China versus Russia. Department of Economics Working Paper 
Series, MIT. 
Borcherding, T. and R. Deacon. 1972. The demand for the services of non-federal 
governments. American Economic Review 62: 891-901. 
Brennan, G. and J. M. Buchanan. 1977. Towards a tax constitution for Leviathan. Journal 
of Public Economics 8, no. 3: 255-73. 
________. 1978. Tax instruments as constraints on the disposition of public revenue. 
Journal of Public Economics 9: 301-18. 
 162 
 163
________. 1980. The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Breusch, T. S. and A. R. Pagan. 1980. The Lagrange multiplier test and its applications to 
model specification in econometrics. The Review of Economic Studies, 
Econometrics Issue 47, no. 1: 239-253. 
Castineira, Berta Rivera and Luis Currais Nunes. 1999. Testing endogeneity in a 
regression model: An application of instrumental variable estimation. 
Investigacion Operativa 8, no. 1, 2 and 3: 197-206. 
Chavas, Jean-Paul. 2004. Risk analysis in theory and practice. London, UK: Elsevier 
Academic Press. 
Chen, Lei and Guangxin Yang. 1998. Enhancing reforms in small hydration project and 
accelerating agricultural development. Rural Hydration in China 6: 1-4. 
Cheng, Guili and Tao Chun. 2003. The investigation of Chinese farmers' lives. In 
Investigation of current issues, 6. Beijing. 
China Statistical Yearbook. 2004. ed. State Statistics Bureau. 
Dailami, M. 2000. Financial openness, democracy, and redistributive policy. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank Working Paper. 
Dasgupta, Susmita, Kirk Hamilton, Kiran Pandey, and David Wheeler. 2004. Air 
pollution during growth: Accounting for governance and vulnerability. Policy 
Research Working Paper: World Bank. 
Dercon, S. 2001. Income risk, copping strategies and safety net. Center for the Study of 
Africa Economies Working Paper: Oxford University. 
Diamond, Peter A. 1975. A many-person Ramsey rule. Journal of Public Economics 4: 
335-342. 
Dockery, Douglas W., C. Arden Hope, Xiping Xu, John D. Spengler, James H. Ware, 
Martha E. Fay, Benjamin G. Ferris, and Frank E. Speizer. 1993. An association 
between air pollution and mortality in six U.S. Cities. The New England Journal 
of Medicine 329, no. 24: 1753-1759. 
Edin, Maria. 2003. State capacity and local agent control in China: CCP cadre 
management from a township perspective. The China Quarterly, no. 35-52. 
Eskeland, Gunnar and Ann Harrison. 1997. Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals 
 
 164
and pollution-haven hypothesis. Policy Research Working Paper: World Bank. 
Fan, Shenggen, Linxiu Zhang, and Xiaobo Zhang. 2002. Growth, inequality and poverty 
in rural China: The role of public investments. IFPRI. Research Report, No. 125. 
Gallapher, Kevin P. 2004. Economic integration and the environment in Mexico: Lessons 
for future trade agreements. Working Group on Development and Environment in 
the Americas, Discussion Paper. 
Glaeser, E. 1995. The incentive effects of property taxes on local governments: NBER 
Working Paper. 
Gordon, Roger and David Li. 1997. Taxes and government incentives: Eastern Europe 
versus China. CEPR Working Paper. 
Gordon, Roger and J D Wilson. 1999. Tax structure and government behavior: A 
principal–agent model of government: Stanford Institute for Theoretical 
Economics (SITE). 
Gramlich, E.M. and D.L. Rubinfeld. 1982. Micro estimates of public spending demand 
functions and tests of the Tiebout and median-voter hypotheses. Journal of 
Political Economy 90, no. 3: 536. 
Grossman, G. M. and A. B. Krueger. 1994. Economic growth and environment. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 110: 353-77. 
Grossman, P. 1989. Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension. Public 
Choice 62. 
Han, Jun. 2002. Fiscal crisis in rural China: Evidence, causes, consequences and 
treatment--a survey on three counties. In Conference on Fiscal Issues in Rural 
China. Beijing. 
Hettige, Hemamala, Robert E. B. Lucas, and David Wheeler. 1992. The toxic intensity of 
industrial production: Global patterns, trends, and trade policy. In the Hundred 
and Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 82:478-81: 
American Economic Review. 
Holcombe, R. G. 1980. An empirical test of the median voter model. Economic Inquiry 
18: 260-274. 
Holmstrom, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10, 
no. 1: 74-91. 
 
 165
Huang, Jikun and Scott Roselle. 2002. China's accession to WTO and shifts in the 
agriculture policy. Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics Working 
Paper: UC Davis. 
Huang, Yasheng. 1995. The strategic investment behavior of Chinese local governments 
during the reform era. China Economic Review 6, no. 2: 169-186. 
Knight, John and Shi Li. 1999. Fiscal decentralization: Incentives, redistribution and 
reform in China. Oxford Development Studies 27, no. 1: 5-32. 
Lin, Justin Yifu. 1988. The household responsibility system in China's agricultural 
reform: A theoretical and empirical study. Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 36: 199-224. 
Liu. 2003. People's Daily, Dec. 20, 2003. 
Liu, Zuo. 2004. Overview of tax system in China. Beijing: Economic Science Press. 
Lu, Bo. 2004. A survey on local fiscal debt crisis in Xiangfan. Economy (JINGJI, in 
Chinese), March, 23, 2004. 
Ma, Jun. 1995. Modeling central-local fiscal relations in China. China Economic Review 
6: 105-136. 
Ma, Jun and John Norregaard. 1998. China's fiscal decentralization: IMF. 
Marlow, Michael L. 1988. Fiscal decentralization and government size. Public Choice 
56. 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Zhihua Zhang. 2002. The system of equalization transfers 
in China. International Studies Program Working Paper: Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University. 
Matsusaka. 1995. Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: Evidence from the last 30 years. 
Journal of Political Economy 103, no. 3: 587-623. 
McGuire, Therese J. 1999. Proposition 13 and its offspring: For good of for evil? 
National Tax Journal 12, no. 1: 129-138. 
McKenzie, Richard B. 1984. Constitutional economics: Containing the economic powers 
of government. Lexington: Lexington Books. 
McLure, C, ed. 1983. Tax assignment in federal countries. Canberra: Center for Research 
on Federal Financial Relations, the Australian National University. 
 
 166
Meadows, D. H., D. L. Meadows, Randers J., and W. Behrens. 1972. The limits to growth. 
New York: Universe Books. 
Morduch, J. 1999. Between the state and the market: Can informal insurance patch the 
safety net? World Bank Research Observer 14, no. 2: 187-207. 
Morduch, J. 1995. Income smoothing and consumption smoothing. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 9, no. 3: 103-114. 
Nelson, Michael A. 1986. An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the 
context of the leviathan model of government. Public Choice 49, no. 3: 283-294. 
Niskanen, William A, Jr. 1968. The peculiar economics of bureaucracy. American 
Economic Review 58, no. 2: 293-305. 
________. 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government. Aldine-Atherton: Edward 
Elgar Press. 
________. 1975. Bureaucrats and politicians. Journal of Law and Economics 18, no. 3: 
617-43. 
________. 1994. Bureaucracy and public economics: The Locke Institute. 
North, D. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Oates, W. E. 1985. Searching for leviathan: An empirical study. American Economic 
Review 75: 748-757. 
________. 1999. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature 37: 
1120-1149. 
________. 2001. A reconsideration of environmental federalism. Resources for the 
Future, Discussion Paper. 
Oi, Jean. 1996. Rural China took off: Incentives for reform. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Panayotou, T. 1993. Empirical tests and policy analysis of environmental degradation at 
different stages of economic development. Geneva: Technology and Employment 
Program, International Labor Office. 
________, ed. 1995. Environmental degradation at different stages of economic growth. 
Edited by I. Ahmed and K. A. Doeleman. Beyond Rio: The environmental crisis 
 
 167
and sustainable livelihoods in the third world, ILO studies series. New York, NY: 
St. Martin's Press. 
Park, Albert, Scott Rozelle, Christine Wong, and Changqin Ren. 1996. Distributional 
consequences of reforming local public finance in China. The China Quarterly 
147: 751-778. 
Pauly, M. 1974. Overinsurance and public provision of insurance: The roles of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics 68: 44-62. 
Posnett, J. and T. Hitiris. 1992. The determinants and effects of health expenditure in 
developed countries. Journal of Health Economics 11: 173-181. 
Project of China's Agenda 21. 1993-2000. State Science and Technology Commission 
(SSTC), State Planning Commission (SPC). 
Qian, Yingyi and Barry Weingast. 1996. China's transition to markets: Market-preserving 
federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Policy Reform 1: 149-185. 
________. 1997. Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 4: 83-92. 
Ramsey, Frank P. 1927. A contribution to the theory of taxation. Economic Journal 37: 
47-61. 
Rodden, Jonathan. 2002. The dilemma of fiscal federalism: Grants and fiscal 
performance around the world. American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 3: 
670-687. 
Rosen, H. 1999. Public Finance. Boston: MaGraw-Hill. 
Ross, S. 1973. The economic theory of agency: The principal problem. American 
Economic Review 63: 134-139. 
Selden, T. N. and D. Song. 1994. Environmental quality and development: Is there a 
Kuznets curve for air pollution? Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 27: 147-62. 
Shafik, N. and S Bandyopadhyay. 1992. Economic growth and environmental quality: 
Time series and cross-country evidence. World Bank Background Paper. 
Shavell, S. 1979. Risk sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship. The 
Bell Journal of Economics 10, no. 1: 55-73. 
 
 168
Shleifer, Andrei, N. Barberis, M. Boycko, and N. Tsukanova. 1996. How does 
privatization work: Evidence from the Russian shops. Journal of Political 
Economy 104, no. 4: 764-790. 
Smarzynska, Beata K. and ShangJin Wei. 2001. Pollution havens ad foreign direct 
investment: Dirty secret or popular myth? NBER Working Papers. 
Stein, Ernesto. 1999. Fiscal decentralization and government size in Latin America. 
Journal of Applied Economics 2, no. 2: 357-391. 
Stern, D. Oct. 10th, 2004 2003. The environmental Kuznets curve. International Society 
for Ecological Economics 
Internet Encyclopaedia of Ecological Economics. Accessed. 
Stern, D. et al. 1996. Economic growth and environment degradation: The environmental 
Kuznets curve and sustainable development. World Development 24: 1151-60. 
Tao, Ran, Lin Justin, Liu Mingxing, and Qi Zhang. 2003. The problem of taxing farmers 
in China. In 25th International Conference of Agricultural Economists, 
Reshaping Agriculture’s Contributions to Society. Durban, Africa. 
Turnbull, G. K. and S. S. Djoundourian. 1994. The median voter hypothesis: Evidence 
from general purpose local governments. Public Choice 81: 223-240. 
Turnbull, Geoffrey K and Peter M Mitias. 1999. The median voter model across levels of 
government. Public Choice 99, no. 1-2: 119-138. 
Wang, Honglin. 2003. Public investment and agricultural development: A case study of 
Jiangsu province, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science. 
Wang, Shaoguang. 1997. China's 1994 fiscal reform: An initial assessment. Asian Survey 
37: 801-817. 
Wheeler, David. 2003. Racing to the bottom? Foreign investment and air quality in 
developing countries. World Bank Working Paper. 
Wilson, J. D. and Roger H. Gordon. 2003. Expenditure competition. Journal of Public 
Economic Theory 5, no. 2: 399-417. 
Wong, Christine. 1991. Central-local relations in an era of fiscal decline: The paradox of 
fiscal decentralization in post-Mao China. The China Quarterly 128: 691-715. 
________. 1992. Fiscal reform and local industrialization: The problematic sequencing 
of reform in post-Mao China. Modern China Quarterly 18, no. 2: 197-227. 
 
 169
________. 2000. Central-local relations revisited: The 1994 tax sharing reform and 
public expenditure management in China. China Perspective 31. 
Wooldrige, J. M. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
World Bank. 1992. World development report 1992: Development and the environment. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
________. 2000. Attacking the poverty. World Bank. 
________. 2002. China-national development and sub-national finance: A review of 
provincial expenditures. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit 
East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank, Report No. 22951-CHA. 
Wu, Changqi and Leonard K. Cheng. 1999. The determinants of export performance of 
China's township-village enterprises. LICOS Discussion Paper, K. U. Leuven: 
Center for Transition Economics. 
Xiang, Qin and Jikun Huang. 2003. A study on the evolution of property right for system 
of underground water irrigation and structural transformation in grain production. 
Xing, Y. and C. Kolstad. 1998. Do lax environmental regulations attract foreign 
investment? University of California Santa Barbara Working Paper. 
Xu, Shanda. 1995. The profound background of fiscal reform in 1994 in China. In The 
Fifth Asian-Pacific Conference on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reform. Yakata, 
Indonesia. 
Yandle, B. 2002. The environmental Kuznets curve: A primer. PERC Research Study 
02-1. 
Zax, Jeffrey S. 1989. Is there a leviathan in your neighborhood? American Economic 
Review 79, no. Jun: 560-567. 
Zhang, Xudong. Nov. 10th, 2005 2004. The difficulty of collecting agricultural tax. 
Xinhua News Agency. Accessed March 10th 2004. Available from 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-03/10/content_1357380.htm. 
Zhao, Yang. 2002. Progress and problems in rural tax reform in China: A survey on three 
counties. In Conference on Rural China Fiscal Issues. Beijing. 
Zhao, Yining. 2003. The flashback: Background of decision-making for tax sharing 
system in China. LIAO WANG 9. 
 
 170
Zhou, Ye'an. 2000. The country level fiscal expenditure administration reform in China: 
Theories and methods. Management World 5. 
Zhou, Ye'an and Xiaonan Zhao. 2002. A study on local government competition. 
Management World (Monthly) 12. 
 
 
 
  
 
VITA 
 
Li Zhang was born in 1973 in China. She graduated from Renmin University of 
China with a Bachelors degree in Economics in 1996 and a Masters degree in Economics in 
1999. After graduation, she came to the U.S. to pursue more advanced education. She came 
to Georgia State University in 2000 and earned her Master of Arts degree in Economics 
from the University. She received her Ph.D. in Economics from the Andrew Young School 
of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, in 2005. 
While pursuing her doctorate, Zhang was involved in several research projects with 
Dr. Jorge Martinez, which included several World Bank projects on various aspects of 
fiscal system, including fiscal decentralization and fiscal federalism in China; the 
equalization transfer system in China; and also expenditure assignment project for 
countries across the world, etc.  
Zhang’s research interests lie in the field of public finance. Her current research 
interests are government behaviors, both theoretically and empirically, including how 
self-interests motivated governments to react to different incentives in the budget system 
and behave accordingly. Zhang is also interested in the determinants of FDI across 
countries. 
Zhang can be reached at: 1322 Briarwood Rd, Apt G-3, Atlanta GA 30319 
 171  
